Negotiating with American Identity:
Analyzing the Tradeoff Between Interests and Values in United States Foreign Policy

By

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DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Political Science

in the

OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

of the

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

DAVIS

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2018

ABSTRACT:

From its founding, United States politicians and policymakers have espoused reverence for national values in the creation of US foreign policy. Yet, there are countless examples of traditional US values being disregarded in favor of interests. What are the terms of the tradeoff between US values and US interests in US foreign policy? In this dissertation I answer this question with a social-psychological theory of US foreign policy. US values are a greater determinant of US policy when these values are more connected to US national identity. I test this theory at the individual-level and at the macro-level of US foreign policy decision-making.

In Chapter 2, I draw on sociological, psychological, and constructivist international relations research and assert that US national identity consists of "core" and "peripheral" values. Core values are more resilient to the challenge of interests, since disregarding them betrays central parts of US identity. Consequently, it is expected that when interests and values clash, the degree to which the interests are betrayed depends on the value's proximity to US identity.

I delineate exactly which values are “core” and “peripheral” in US national identity in Chapter 3. I determine and differentiate the values associated with US national identity by analyzing the National Archives and Records Administration's "100 Milestone Documents," US federal holidays and symbols, and presidential State of the Union addresses. I find that democracy is the most privileged value in all realms analyzed.

Chapter 4 proposes that an analysis of identity’s impact on policy should focus on the agents of state policy: policymakers. I also explore cognitive dissonance as a potential psychological mechanism that enforces national identity. A series of experiments show that respondents favor foreign policy actions that are consistent with US values and that respondents

experience more cognitive dissonance when they are forced to argue in favor of violating US values, particularly democracy.

In Chapter 5, I analyze how the tradeoff between US values and US interests occurs in US military aid policy. National values clash with national interests when policymakers are faced with the decision of whether or not to grant US military aid to countries that serve US interests but do not embody US national values. The results show that more prominent values (democracy) are almost impervious to countervailing interests while more tangential values (enterprise and human rights) exhibit wildly different effects on US military aid allocation depending on the security and economic importance of the recipient state. I discuss the results of the entire dissertation and its connection to the Trump presidency in Chapter 6.

Acknowledgements

Bismillah al-rahman al-rahim. I would have had no chance of ever completing this dissertation and this degree if it hadn't been for the immense amount of support, love, and assistance I have received from my family, mentors, colleagues, and friends. First among these is my wife Heidi Elneil, who moved across the state so I could pursue this degree and held my hand as I jumped through every hurdle. There are no words to express how grateful I am for her understanding and kind words, which got me through the most difficult of times. I am also extremely thankful for the arrival of our son, Éamon Tarek Sandlin, whose advent pushed me across the finish line. I thank my parents, Jean Kelso Sandlin (the first doctor in the family) and Ernest Sandlin, both of whom helped me move into my first apartment in Davis. My weekend talks with them served as essential advising and (many times) desperately needed distraction. I also thank my sister, Erin Sandlin, for always providing her insight into "real world" politics along with words of encouragement and support. Additionally, Lamia, Tarek, Danna, and Hady Elneil are the best in-laws that a person could ever ask for and everything was made easier with their support and patience. I thank all of you.

I have many mentors to thank for helping me finish this dissertation and complete this degree, especially those on my dissertation committee. I'd first like to thank Miroslav Nincic for being my advisor throughout my time as a student at the University of California, Davis. He encouraged me to be ambitious and to never succumb to picking an easy or (God forbid) "boring" dissertation topic. I always felt like my brain was sharper and my ideas were clearer after sitting and talking with him in his fifth-floor office. I thank Gabriella Montinola, whose many hours of expert advice and guidance led to my first publications. I also thank Brandon Kinne, who provided extremely helpful feedback on each dissertation chapter. Even though they

were not on the dissertation committee, I would be remiss if I did not thank Daniel Kono, Zeev Moaz, and Kathy Olmsted, who served on my exam committees and ended up providing feedback that made its way into the dissertation. One undergraduate mentor is also uniquely deserving of thanks: Jose Marichal, who wrote a letter of recommendation for graduate school and whose career guidance I always find helpful.

My fellow graduate students in the Department of Political Science at UC Davis helped this dissertation come to fruition in their own way. I would first like to thank Cosmo Houck and Jaime Jackson. Our writing group was short-lived and off and on again but it certainly helped get the ball rolling. If nothing else, I got to bounce dissertation ideas off of them, commiserate with them, celebrate with them, and take some time to enjoy a cold drink outside. I thank Timothy Taylor who served as a de-facto peer mentor on everything from comprehensive exams to revise and resubmits. Daniel Simmons graciously guided me through the IRB process and introduced me to Qualtrics and I thank him for that. I thank Jasper Kaplan who was always willing to share his experiences (and a day at the movies) with me so that I could jump over the same barriers. I also thank Carlos Algara and Isaac Hale for being part of the definitive "group thread," where we could rejoice and panic together in these strange times.

Lastly, I was only able to persist in the tough times due to the support of many friends. I thank Mike Frieda, Evan Clark, Grant Berg, and Sam Lovetro. I feel I always learn something new every time I talk with them. I also thank Bjorn Lindholm, Evan Reed, and Stephen Shirk. Our retreats to Santa Monica or the mountains and Colorado always kept me healthy in both mind and spirit.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

"Of liberty I would say that, in the whole plentitude of its extent, it is unobstructed action according to our will. But rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our will within limits drawn around us by the equal rights of others. I do not say 'within the limits of the law,' because law is often but the tyrant's will, and always so when it violates the right of an individual." – Thomas Jefferson (1819)[1]

"As to their fear, we presume that our strength and their weakness is now so visible that they must see we have only to shut our hand to crush them…Should any tribe be foolhardy enough to take up the hatchet at any time, the seizing the whole country of that time, and driving them across the Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to others, and a furtherance of our final consolidation." – Thomas Jefferson (1803)[2]

[1] This quote comes from a private letter to Isaac H. Tiffany (Jefferson 1819).
[2] This quote comes from a private letter to William Henry Harrison (Jefferson 1803).

Thomas Jefferson is known by Americans as perhaps the greatest articulator of the basic principles of "freedom," "liberty," and limited government during America's founding period. The *Declaration of Independence* (1776), which Jefferson largely composed, is known the world over as one of the most elegant expressions of the egalitarian and inalienable right to resist unjust government and secure freedom for all citizens. The document inspired both later liberal revolutionary declarations, such as France's *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* (1789), and anti-colonial and socialist revolutionary documents, such as the Haiti's 1804 declaration of independence and Vietnam's *Proclamation of Independence* (1945).

Despite Jefferson's vocal and radical advocacy for freedom and liberty, he seemed to dispose of his values when he entered the role of the country's highest-ranking official. Although it is President Jackson who is most synonymous with the ethnic cleansing of Native Americans, the policy originates with Jefferson.[3] One of Jefferson's first acts as President was to forcefully remove the Creek and Cherokee tribes from Georgia, violating a treaty between the US government and the Creek and Cherokee peoples that guaranteed the tribes the right to their land. Jefferson went on to double the size of the nation with the Louisiana Purchase, encourage white settlement, and recommend burdening Indians with large debts so that the US government could acquire their land and assimilate them (Zinn 2003; Miller 2006; Herring 2008). In cases where Indian tribes resisted white encroachment and forced assimilation, Jefferson argued for ethnic cleansing. These policies laid the groundwork for then speculator and slave trader Andrew Jackson's raids against Creek and Seminole tribes in the American South and the infamous Indian Removal Act of 1830.

[3] Although today Americans see indigenous affairs as a domestic issue, at the time many Native communities and lands were not under the banner of the US government and would periodically make alliances with foreign powers. Thus, US-Indian relations were very much an issue of foreign policy.

The contrast between Jefferson's idea of the primacy of freedom and his policies toward American Indians is not unique. History demonstrates that individuals who espouse high morals frequently fail to implement them when they are challenged, especially when challenged in the realm of foreign affairs. Like Jefferson, John Stuart Mill also believed that individual rights should be vigorously protected and that authority over the individual must have tremendous justification. Mill believed that preventing "harm to others" is the "only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised" (Mill 1978, 9). Yet Mill, who also served in the British East India Company, explained that "barbarian" peoples had no right to the kind of freedom enjoyed by "civilized" societies. In his writing, he explained that when dealing with "barbarian" societies, "international morality" does not apply because such barbarians are "not capable of so great an effort" (Mill 1987, 4). As such, Mill had no objections to the British government's brutal repression of the Sepoy rebellion of 1857, which killed 800,000 Indians.

The usual explanation for the inconsistency between Western political theory and Western treatment of designated non-Western peoples is that of race. This explanation is partially correct. There is a long history of European and (later) white supremacist attitudes amongst the ruling elite in Western countries. However, these sentiments did not prevent such individuals from expressing compassion toward non-Western peoples. While Mill vigorously defended the most brutal aspects of British imperialism in India, he was also an abolitionist who argued against American slavery and was a supporter of the North in the American civil war. Tocqueville too, although he praised the United States and its people as "the freest people in the world," spoke passionately against American chattel slavery, saying "I am moved at the spectacle of man's degradation by man, and I hope to see the day when the law will grant equal civil liberty to all the inhabitants of the same empire, as God accords the freedom of the will,

without distinction, to the dwellers upon the earth" (Tocqueville 1856). In addition to his ardent opposition to American slavery, Tocqueville also wrote to his mother about the what he considered the tragic ethnic cleansing of indigenous Americans, some of which he witnessed.

If Westerners were capable of conveying sympathy for "other" peoples, even those oppressed by fellow Westerners, what explains their numerous failures to uphold their values in crafting foreign policy? Tocqueville's failure to uphold his own values when it concerned the French colonization of Algeria is instructive:

> I have often heard men in France whom I respect, but with whom I do not agree, find it wrong that we burn harvests, that we empty silos, and finally that we seize unarmed men, women, and children. These, in my view, are unfortunate necessities, but ones to which any people that wants to wage war on the Arabs is obliged to submit. And, if I must speak my mind, these actors do not revolt me more than, or even as much as many others that they law of war clearly authorizes and that have occurred in all the wars of Europe. How is it more odious to burn harvests and take women and children prisoner than to bombard the inoffensive population of a besieged village or to seize the merchant vessels belonging to the subjects of an enemy power?...For myself, I think that all means of desolating these tribes must be employed (Tocqueville, Alexis de 1841, 71).[4]

[4] Besides advocating for what he called "extermination" in Algeria, Tocqueville also recommended the suspension of all civil and political freedom in Algeria and the institution of an apartheid system of racial segregation between Arabs and non-Arabs. Tocqueville's "support of the Algerian conquest" was "inconsistent" with his liberalism and his belief that in politics "good comes only from good; and evil, only from evil" (Richter 1963, 396-398).

The difference in how Tocqueville addresses the plight of black slaves in America, as an injustice that must be remedied, and how Tocqueville addresses French colonization in Algeria, as necessary brutality, exhibits an important difference. Tocqueville himself is French citizen and recognizes French colonization in Algeria as a French interest, as it would provide more "material pleasures" for the whole of French society. Furthermore, French participation in the colonization of Africa would improve its global standing and ensure its power remained on par with other colonizing nations. Abandoning imperial conquest of Algeria would mean accepting France's "second-class status as a power" (Richter, 374). No such interest is present for Tocqueville in the persistence of chattel slavery in the American South. As such, a conflict between what Tocqueville believed the French Empire must accomplish and what Tocqueville's values and morality suggested emerges in the French colonization of Algeria. Tocqueville's observations of slavery in the American South presented no conflict, as only values and morality were the relevant criterion for judgment, imperial French interests being largely absent.

The unifying feature in each of these examples is that policymakers or political theorists were placed in a predicament where there was a conflict between their values and the national interest. Jefferson was forced to choose between respecting the rights of Native Americans or expanding and securing the young US. Mill was made to decide between Indian self-determination and the maintenance of the British Empire. Tocqueville had to resolve a conflict between the humanity of Algerians and the ambitions of French power. These kinds of dilemmas continue to present themselves to every politician, policymaker, analyst, or academic who desires both the security, protection, and prosperity of the state in which they have citizenship and reside, and also the fulfillment of some notion of universal truth and good, whether it is of divine, natural, or human origin. Oftentimes, achieving both of these things is not possible. The

architects of state policy are then forced to decide whether the interests of state or their cherished values will take precedence in foreign policy.

Interests and Values in US Foreign Policy

This dissertation is about is about what happens when US policymakers are forced to choose between US interests and US values. The US in particular is a country in which the conflict between interests and values is readily apparent. From its founding, the United States has imagined itself as a state with a moral or divine mission. The rhetorical devices used to describe this mission have changed over time, yet have retained the core assertion that the US is an "exceptional" nation, concerning itself with matters beyond its own interests in order to ensure a more ethical and just globe. From Washington's farewell address, to manifest destiny, to George W. Bush's extolling of democracy promotion, US leaders have repeatedly invoked US values when acting in the international arena. The appeal to values is not unique to either liberal or conservative political spheres, nor is it unique to public offices as opposed to relatively secretive bureaucracies. The existence of something called "American values" is a shared belief among most US citizens.

The US has a record of incorporating US values into its foreign policy through ostensibly altruistic actions such as humanitarian assistance through foreign aid,[5] military intervention in the interests of democracy promotion,[6] and support for the codification of international human

[5] A consistent finding in the aid literature is that states in greater need receive more US economic aid. US economic aid also increases dramatically for states that have experienced natural disasters (Poe 1990; Fleck and Kilby 2010).

[6] Although the ultimate intentions behind the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq remain a source of controversy, it is rather indisputable that in both cases the US has attempted to install a form of electoral democracy.

rights.[7] Such actions suggest that US foreign policy behavior is motivated by a commitment to US values. However, the US must also seek to maintain and promote its tangible and material interest if it wishes to secure itself and possess the means to accomplish other long-term foreign policy objectives. Just as the US has a record of acting on values, much of US foreign policy has been conducted without reference to values or in a manner inconsistent with stated US values. The US has allocated military aid to brutal regimes,[8] used its military or covert intelligence agencies to undermine bourgeoning democracies,[9] and refused to sign or ratify treaties and conventions that protect the human rights of some of the most vulnerable populations.[10]

The same foreign policy dilemmas that existed for nations of the past exists for the "exceptional" state today. A state that wishes to fulfill its values and interests will not always be able to do both. International politics produces situations that demand states choose between promoting their interests and promoting their values. When a tradeoff between US interests and US values is necessary, what are the terms of this tradeoff?

The balance between interests and values in US foreign policy has long been a relevant and contentious subject in popular discourse. Commentators from both sides of the domestic political divide speak highly of US values and consider how they might be implemented

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[7] The US is party to the UN Convention on Universal Human Rights, among others.
[8] This was especially true of the Reagan administration, which allocated large amounts of aid to military regimes in countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala. However, this impulse was not relegated to Republican administrations. President Carter, often seen the individual that most exemplifies American concern with human rights, continued to fund the regime in El Salvador, ignoring pleas from victims to eliminate all aid the regime (Pearce 1982).
[9] Covert actions against Iran and Chile during the Cold War are perhaps the most well known incidents of successful US attempts to undermine democracy in the Third World. Once again, these actions have not been limited temporally or by which party occupies the executive. The Bush Administration's support of a coup against democratically elected Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez and the Obama Administration's support of coup regimes in both Honduras and Egypt demonstrate the persistence of such policies.
[10] The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is one such example.

alongside interests in US foreign policy, especially in the context of the modern "War on Terror." Liberal stateswoman Anne-Marie Slaughter (2007) argues that values and interests commonly align, as they did in the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya. Conservative pundit Eliot A. Cohen (2010) does not discount the potential for discord, and writes that, "American foreign policy has always been a long and difficult dialogue between realpolitik and our values, our pursuit of our own interests, and our deliberate efforts to spread freedom abroad."

The discussion of how US values are incorporated into US foreign policy relates to the most controversial contemporary foreign policy debates. Although there are exceptions, public deliberations over US policy are rarely characterized by one side arguing in favor of upholding US values and the other arguing in favor of discarding them in favor of interests. Opposing sides instead argue that their preferred policy better aligns with US values. The deliberation over the Bush Administration's torture program exemplifies the sanctity with which US values are treated in the public arena. Opponents of "enhanced interrogation techniques" cite the perception of a longstanding US commitment to "protect human rights and liberties" and mourn that the "Bush administration has dishonored that history and squandered that respect" (New York Times 2007). In contrast, proponents claim that the program fell "well short of 'torture'" and achieved US goals "in a manner fully consistent with American values" (Rivkin and Casey 2009). Similarly, supporters of drone strikes argue that their use is properly constrained and consistent with US values, while critics consider the program to conflict with traditional values and ethics in troubling ways (Amoureux 2013; Stohl 2015).

These diverging opinions as to whether certain US foreign policy actions live up to US values has long prompted queries as to whether US policymakers are concerned with US values at all, and if they are, how readily US interests might overwhelm them. Critics on the far-left

consider devotion to US values to be largely relegated to political rhetoric. A consistent line of criticism stemming from left-wing polemic and scholarly advocacy is that US foreign policy does not correspond to US values and commonly contradicts them. Herman (1987) recounts the ethically dubious means by which the US maintained power during the Cold War:

> "By protection and rehabilitation of the fascist cadres defeated in World War II, by outright or proxy invasions to install or protect terrorist clients, by subversion aiming at the overthrow of disfavored (often democratic) governments, and by 'supplying repression' via financial aid, training, and arms supply to security forces and military dictators" (Herman, 10).

These actions are the source of most left-wing grievances during the Cold War and up to the present. The general assertion is that the US does not care about values at all and only champions them "for public-relations purposes" (Chomsky 2003, 10). These arguments gained renewed popularity in the wake of the Bush Administration's War on Terror, invasion of Iraq, use of torture, and unrestrained support of Arab dictators, which once again prompted left-wing critics "to wonder whether by the term *democratic* what they [the Bush Administration] really mean is 'doing what we want'" (Khalidi 2004, 45).

Other critiques of US foreign policy are less harsh, acknowledging that the US has conducted itself ignobly and callously at times, but that these are aberrations rather than custom. In this account, the US is a well-intended and benevolent giant. US humanitarian intervention, aid programs, and diplomatic pressure on autocrats and human rights violators are cited as evidence of such benevolence. Foreign policy actions, such as the invasions of Vietnam and Iraq

that lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands and widespread human rights abuses, are characterized as "strategic blunders," "mistakes," or "betrayals" of a greater American legacy (New York Times 2013; Horsey 2013; Gompert, Binnendijk, and Lin 2014). Values are viewed as an integral part of US foreign policy rather than moralistic posturing.

This investigation into the terms of the tradeoff between values and interests in US foreign policy greatly contributes to this ongoing public debate regarding how US values and interests are reconciled. Such research has the ability to determine whether the US calculus more closely resembles the pessimistic leftist critique or the more generous centrist assessment. Additionally, the results of this investigation are amenable to normative issues. Citizens should know if government officials are offering values-laden empty rhetoric or if such values are significant elements of US foreign policymaking.

This dissertation also contributes to scholarly debates concerning broader systemic theories, since the popular debate over how US policymakers balance interests and values in crafting foreign policy mirrors the inter-paradigm ontological debate that occurs within the field of international relations. Critics on the left who assert that US values are strictly rhetorical roughly emulate the theoretical postulates of the neo-realist and Marxist paradigms, both of which make the case for pure materialist readings of international politics, albeit while directing their attention to rather different international actors. The neo-realist account argues that "units [states] worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their behavior" (Waltz 1979, 105). The "behaviors" of states and "outcomes" are "closely identified with the approach to politics suggested by the rubric, *Realpolitik*" (Waltz 1979, 117). This statement, in conjunction with the broader theory, makes the claim that foreign policy is determined primarily on the basis on what will ensure state survival, which is framed as an objective endeavor. There is therefore little

room for values in neorealism.[11] Marxists theories similarly discount values as determinants of foreign policy. In Lenin's (1916) theory of imperialism, international politics is thought to be determined by the interests of the international capitalist class.[12] The same is true of the variants of Marxist theory developed during the Cold War era and after (Frank 1966; Wallerstein 2004). In particular, the US is viewed as "the ultimate guarantor of capitalist interests globally," and as conducting foreign policy with the aim of "preventing the closure of particular places or whole regions of the globe to capital accumulation" (Pantich and Gindin 2012, 11). The theory does not predict (nor account for) the development of values that would check the impulse toward capital accumulation and imperialism.

In contrast to the paradigms of Marxism and neorealism, liberal theory, constructivism, and critical theory are paradigms that take seriously the proposition that values, with their roots in culture and identity, drive state behavior in the international arena. Liberal theorists believe that intangibles internal to the state, such as national values, drive foreign policy in addition to

[11] In the neorealist vision US behavior is simply a result of the nature of the international system (anarchy), the nature of the unit (the state), and the nature of its position in the international system (the unipole). The neorealist response to critiques of its foreign policy implications is, of course, that it confuses an explanation of the systemic with an explanation of foreign policy. Although Waltz (1979) is adamant that the neo-realist theory of international politics is not a theory of foreign policy, he clearly indicates that he believes neorealism *does* predict state behavior when he says that *Realpolitik* is the behavior "we expect to find," and that *Realpolitik* demands that "interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state's interests; success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state…*Realpolitik* indicates the methods by which foreign policy is conducted and provides a rational for them" (Waltz, 117). This is nothing more than a litany of state behaviors that Waltz (1979) believes are explained by "structural constraints." While neorealism is a systemic theory in that state behavior is *explained* by the structure of the international system, it nonetheless predicts certain foreign policy outcomes from assumed purely material motivations.

[12] Lenin's (1916) theory of imperialism represents one of the first explicit attempts to apply Marxism to the realm of international relations and foreign policy.

material interests, and include them in their empirical models.[13] However, many liberal theorists take values as being instrumental to achieving state interests. Democracy promotion, for example, is thought to be US policy not because democracy is an inherent good but because democratic states do not go to war with each other. Constructivism is fundamentally concerned with state values and their potential for explaining international phenomena. Constructivism is "the view that *the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world"* (Alder 1997, 322). In essence, constructivism proposes that very little can be known about the world, including the material world, if observers do not attempt to understand the social constructions (values, identity, culture, norms) that give meaning to the material in the first place. Applied to foreign policy, constructivism indicates that states will often make decisions based on norms and values derived from their identities rather than material geopolitical or economic interests.[14]

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[13] By "liberal theory" I mean theories that consider how the preferences of domestic actors are transposed onto the state. Liberal theory is concerned with the connection between the society and the state and is therefore highly distinct from its neoliberal relative, which largely abides by the "state as unitary actor" assumption (Moravcsik 1997). Many variants of the democratic peace theory are based on normative explanations rather than institutional or interest-based ones. Maoz and Russett (1993) find that the normative explanation for the democratic peace, the idea that democracies trust each other to settle disputes fairly, is more empirically supported than structural explanations. Tomz and Weeks (2013) provide individual-level evidence that populations of democratic states feel it is more immoral to attack democracies, providing additional evidence in favor of normative explanations. While liberals do not go as far as constructivists in putting ideas at the center of their analysis, they nonetheless embrace values, culture, and other ideological factors as independent variables that help to explain state behavior.

[14] For example, Wendt (1999) considers why the US might be reluctant to invade the Bahamas: "Coercion does not seem to be the answer, since probably no state could prevent the US from taking them…The self-interest argument initially seems to do better: US policymakers might calculate that conquest would not pay…it is doubtful that US policymakers are making or even ever did make such calculations…My proposal is that it stems from having internalized sovereignty norms so deeply…the US perceives the norms as legitimate and therefore the Bahamas, as a party to those norms, has a right to life and liberty that the US would not even

The inter-paradigm debates occurring in the academic literature reveal a captivation with the genesis of foreign policy, specifically US foreign policy, and whether the crafting of such policy is primarily interest-based or value-based. Although the paradigms of international relations are not theories of foreign policy, they imply models of how US foreign policy is made. Neorealism, Neoliberalism and Marxism tend to ignore, downplay, or explain-away the role of values in foreign policy, in favor of focusing on geopolitical and economic determinants. Constructivists and liberals argue that material determinants can be understood alongside or in light of ideas. Studying the tradeoff between values and interests reduces this inter-paradigm isolation by incorporating and empirically contrasting both interest-based foreign policy inferences and ideational-based inferences. This research also contributes to establishing which paradigm best speaks to the US modus operandi.

Given academic and public interest in how values and interests influence US foreign policy, one would assume that there would be a plethora of theoretical and empirical work dedicated specifically to determining the relative weight of interests and values in foreign policy. This is not the case. Ideational factors are overlooked. Most models of foreign policymaking typically rely on rational-choice or standard utility calculations. Allison's (1969) famous three models (rationalist, organizational, and bureaucratic) exhibit differences but all rely on the idea that actors are trying to maximize their utility. Discussion of the motivations behind US foreign policy does exist, and many of these discussions include references to US values, ideology, and identity (Hunt 1987; Thompson 1992; Ruggie 1997; Desch 2007). However, there has been little

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think of violating" (Wendt, 289-291). Strands of constructivism associated with critical theory and post-structuralism go much farther in examining the ideational content of foreign policy than those theories they would characterize as "soft constructivism" or "normative theory." Rather than being simple independent variables, "identities are continuously articulated, re-articulated, and contested" (Zehfuss 2002, 92).

theoretical work discussing how US values *relate* to US interests in the making of foreign policy. Addressing the potential tradeoff between interests and values necessitates drawing from models grounded in interest-based motivations for US foreign policy *and* theory grounded in values-based determinants. Thus, providing an assessment of the relative weight of interests and values contributes to the development of more comprehensive unit-level foreign policy theories. US values have also not been adequately differentiated from one another. If some values play a larger role in constructing US foreign policy than others, which values are more prominent and why? This research analyzes the distinctions between US values, their varying integration into US foreign policy, and articulates a theory of which US values are more likely to credibly compete with tangible interests in US foreign policy.

Apart from contributing to and expanding prevailing theoretical understandings of US foreign policy, this research also moves beyond the narrowness of past empirical studies. Empirically, the distinction and potential tension between US values and interests has been acknowledged and studied with respect to some US foreign policy realms, most notably US foreign aid allocation (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009; Sandlin 2016). The question has also been discussed as a historical phenomenon (McElroy 1992; Perkins 1994) and as a feature of the foreign policy preferences of the American public (Almond 1960; Nincic and Russett 1979; Nincic and Ramos 2010). Yet, much of the empirical literature suffers from the same weaknesses as the theoretical literature. Interests and values are treated as independent determinants rather than as interactive in large-n statistical models, which sidesteps the potential for clashes between the two. This study improves upon past research by properly specifying the empirical model through the inclusion of interactions.

Outline of the Dissertation

The dissertation proceeds as follows. In the next chapter, I define more clearly what I mean by both "interests," and "values." I analyze past literature that attempts to describe the relation of interests and values to the foreign policy of states and point out its significant theoretical and empirical flaws. I then develop a social-psychological theory of how states, or more accurately, the policymakers that design the foreign policy of states, prioritize interests and values in their policymaking. This social-psychological theory of foreign policy predicts that policymakers will generally prioritize interests over values. The theory also predicts that some values will better compete with interests in foreign policy due to their strong attachment to state identity and the potential cognitive dissonance that would arise in the mind of the policymaker from violating these values. After outlining the social-psychological theory of foreign policy, I apply the theory to the US specifically.

In Chapter 3, I ask "what exactly are US values?" What US values are and how important they are is often assumed rather than investigated. I use this chapter to empirically establish a hierarchy of US values. I analyze the most prominent documents in US history and discern which values are present. I also analyze US cultural displays through observing US federal holidays, the political declarations associated with them, and the values political and social leaders espouse when celebrating them. This chapter also considers the values present in US political rhetoric. I conduct a content analysis of US State of the Union Addresses and observe the frequency of the values referenced by Presidents as they attempt to appeal to the US public. What emerges is a complex but consistent picture of US national identity that is driven by dedication to democracy above all other values.

After establishing what US values are, I test whether the individual-level causal mechanism posited by the social-psychological theory of US foreign policy is present. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I conduct two experiments using foreign policy vignettes and essay-writing tasks. The experiments test whether US individuals are more wiling to violate some US values as opposed to others and also examine whether cognitive dissonance is causing these outcomes. The results show that individuals are less likely to support foreign policies that violate US values but reveals no significant differences between the propensity to violate some values rather than others. However, individuals are found to experience more cognitive dissonance when they are forced to argue for the violation of central US values, revealing cognitive dissonance to be a possible cause of the variation in the incorporation of values into US policy.

Finally, Chapter 5 tests the social-psychological theory of foreign policy at the macro-level of US foreign policymaking. Using a large-n dataset of US military assistance, I test whether or not the "values" characteristics of foreign states are overwhelmed by "interests" characteristics of states as determinants of US military assistance. I also determine whether or not this relationship varies by the value's proximity to US identity as hypothesized. The results show that the hierarchy of values hypothesized in Chapter 3 maps onto the determinants of US military aid. I finished with a discussion of the results and normative implications in Chapter 6.

Chapter 2

A Social-Psychological Theory of the Tradeoff Between US Interests and US Values

The balance between interests and values in US foreign policy looms large in public and academic discourse but systematic analyses have tended to miss key components of this discussion. Previous theories have not placed enough emphasis on the real and potential conflict between values and interests. Instead, they have tended to only elaborate on the mutual incorporation of interests and values into US policy. Previous theories have also downplayed or ignored the origins and salience of interests and values. Where do these constructs come from and how important are they? The answer to this question will play an integral role in determining how policymakers will prioritize them. Lastly, these theories, like much of international relations, have been state-centric and neglected the obvious role that humanness plays in the construction of foreign policy. States exist but humans who are subject to certain cognitive processes and limits run states. Theories of foreign policy should incorporate the existence of such processes and limits.

To remedy these shortcomings, I articulate a social-psychological theory of foreign policy. I first define what exactly I mean by the terms "values" and "interests" and how the two are feasible differentiated. I then elaborate on the origins of values and interests and explain how previous literature has treated these constructs. From there, I develop a theory of how human beings prioritize interests and values and explain the theory's relevance to states. The nature of the tradeoff between interests and values is described in the abstract and then applied to the specifics of the US case.

Defining Interests and Values

Definitions

In order to theorize the relationship between US values, US interests, and US foreign policy, values and interests must be defined. Values are sometimes defined as "beliefs" in general (Mabee 2013). This definition is too broad, as there are many different kinds of beliefs that most would not identify as values. For example, Americans may believe that single-payer healthcare is a good policy but this is not the same thing as believing that healthcare is a right. The term "values" denotes a specific kind of belief. I define values as beliefs that concern morality, ethics, and a universal conception of the timeless and context-independent "good." A nation's values refer to "widely shared abstract assumptions about what is right and wrong, desirable and undesirable, good and bad, or just and unjust" (Payne 1995, 9). Values are about the immaterial rather than the material and are prized not for their relation to any existing material reality but for their relation to something intrinsic about existence itself.

This distinction may seem small but it is rather significant. For example, take the (debatable) belief "democracies produce better economic outcomes than non-democracies." In this case, democracy is said to be beneficial because of the effects it produces. Thus, if these effects can be demonstrated to be empirically false or context-varying, the argument in favor of democracy that this belief produces is undermined. In contrast, the belief "democracies are *inherently* good" is based upon some notion of participatory government as universally true in the same way that a divine entity exists or murder is wrong. Thus, even if it is demonstrated that democracy produces bad effects, this does not undermine the argument in favor of democracy that is based on this belief. Similarly, there are those individuals who believe capitalism is the best economic system because it yields what they consider to be the best results for society at large. There are also those individuals who believe capitalism is the best economic system because the freedom to engage in market transactions is an inalienable right. If capitalism were

shown to be objectively inferior to other forms of economic organization, the former would cease their defense of it while the latter would declare such information irrelevant.

Essentially, values are not instrumental for other purposes or accepted for "pragmatic" reasons. Values command the allegiance of their bearers by their existence as existential principles. Dewey's summation of "Truth" (with a capital T) or "principles" corresponds well to what are called values:

> "Truth, as a noun singular, practically always means to the common man a conclusion to which one should pay heed, a general view of things upon which one should regulate one's affairs. Things that are urged upon our attention as the proper objects of attention and as standards of valuation are what we call principles…Truth is the sum of beliefs whose acceptance is necessary for salvation, rather than a logical distinction" (Dewey 1993, 11-12).

Lastly, because values are beliefs about what is intrinsically correct about the nature of existence, they are also not immutable in any differing geographic, temporal context, or situational. Values, can be identified by "their universalizability…and because they demand that an actor take another person's interest and point of view into account" (McElroy, 30). Values are *always* applicable and do not cease to exist when the situations of concern are outside an individual's cultural context or are applied to the benefit of someone other than one's self. If someone appeals to values this is essentially a rejection of cultural or temporal relativism.

Values are therefore a specific subset of beliefs or principles considered to be inherently, objectively and universally "good" in an ethical and moral sense by their bearers and not

instrumental to other goals. In any nation there exists a number commonalities or what might be called a national character, which entails shared culture, beliefs and practices (Duijker and Frijda 1960). National values, as part of the national character, are simply values common to the overwhelming majority of people and dominant culture of the nation as a whole. I make no argument regarding whether values, the kind the US holds or otherwise, are actually objectively good, but rather that they are considered such by the actors that revere them.

National values can be either beliefs that do not entail action or beliefs that demand action. One can believe in a value as a principle without also believing that the individual or organization of individuals has a responsibility to fulfill the principle. However, these two categories of values are not completely unrelated. It would be inconsistent to believe that all peoples have an inherent and universal right to democratic government while simultaneously believing that the state should use foreign policy to undermine democracy. Thus, while values are not always prescriptive, they often are, or at least they suggest certain actions or the prohibition of certain actions by logical extension.

In contrast to values, the definition of interests is more straightforward. Interests concern tangible and material needs. Individuals desire some measure of ontological security and financial well-being because they cannot have a comfortable existence otherwise. “Interests” are the beliefs individuals have about what actions or requirements are necessary to fulfill these basic material needs.

The needs of individuals and their own interests relate directly to the interests of the state. In the modern international system, individuals cannot achieve ontological security and well-being without the assistance of the state. Thus, in order for individuals to meet their needs they require the needs of the state to also be met. What are the needs of the state? To sustain

themselves, states generally need to develop some amount of military prowess or basic security apparatus and some amount of economic prosperity. Both of these needs help fulfill the Weberian prerequisites for state existence (Weber 1919). State actors decide what kinds of military and economic security are needed. Interests are the beliefs political actors hold about what is necessary to best meet these basic tangible and material state requirements (Rosenberg 1992, 167). The "national interest" is the amalgamation of the beliefs the populace or politically relevant actors hold regarding what is necessary to meet the state's requirements (Nincic 1999). Although this reading renders national interests "essentially subjective," once they have been articulated this framework allows for an evaluation of whether or not the national interest is being realized (Payne 1995, 4). Like values, what matters for my purposes is not whether interests are objective or constructed socially, but rather that they exist in the minds of the political actors being analyzed.

National values and national interests are therefore both beliefs. National values are beliefs the nation holds about what principles and actions of the state satisfy the universal and intangible. National interests are beliefs about what characteristics or actions of the state are necessary to satisfy the tangible and material.

Accepting the Constructivist Critique

Constructivists would argue that a strict distinction between interests and values is artificial. According to constructivists and poststructuralists the values individuals observe will naturally be determinants of interests, as "interests are constituted mostly by ideas," including those ideas from culture about what is correct or good (Wendt 1999, 130). For example, Telhami and Barnett (2002) explain that it is impossible to understand the interests of the Egyptian state

in its first decades of independence without an understanding of the influence of Arab nationalism. Claiming an "objective" national interest ignores the role of national ideology, national culture, and national values in constructing the national interest. As such, it is unreasonable to disentangle national interests and national values and especially unreasonable to gauge their potential competition given that one is constituted on the basis of the other.

I accept the argument that the distinction between values and interests is artificial, yet the distinction is reasonable. National interests and national values may both be human constructions but they can be disentangled on the basis of their ideational content. Even constructivists differentiate amongst different kinds of ideational constructs such as "culture" and "norms." Likewise, values and interests can be differentiated. Values are ideas that concern the metaphysical and interests are ideas that concern the tangible and material.[15] This distinction is also made by the subjects of the study themselves who readily admit a conflict between these two categories of ideas.[16] Thus, if the distinction is artificial, it is one produced and recognized by the subjects of study. Furthermore, the notion that both interests and values are ideas does not prevent a study of their potential conflict. Even if national interests and national values are both constructed, this does not mean that they are automatically compatible and does not prevent them from coming into conflict. Even values have the potential to conflict with each other. Should the US support a democracy that violates human rights? Constructivists that don't accept the distinction between values and interests could simply consider this study an analysis of what happens when some ideational constructs that subjects have placed in one subjective grouping clash with others that subjects have placed in another subjective grouping.

[15] Values map onto what Wendt (1999) calls "identity needs" while interests map onto what Wendt (1999) calls "material needs."
[16] For example, National Security Advisor Susan Rice admits that the US faces challenges when attempting to secure itself and protect human rights (Rice 2013).

The Location and Salience of Values and Interests

In order to establish how values and interests are relatively prioritized it is necessary to explain how values and interests arise in the mind of the political actor. Values, I argue, have their roots in state identity, or the state's conception of self. The more a value is connected with a state's identity, the more likely that value is to be prioritized by policymakers. In contrast, interests are rooted in a personification of the state, whereby political actors transpose physiological needs onto the state. Interests relate to the well-being of the state and its continued existence. Interests will outweigh values because they ensure physical survival. However, violating values produces costs for policymakers that come in the form of cognitive dissonance. The dissonance produced by violating values increases with the value's connection to US identity. Therefore, values that are more closely associated with US identity will be more resilient in negotiating tradeoffs with interests.

National Identity

Values come from a nation's identity. Identity is a "unit-level quality, rooted in an actor's self-understandings" that refers to "who or what actors are" and "designate social kinds or states of being" (Wendt 1999, 224-231). Identity "is an inescapable dimension of being" that "no body could be without" (Campbell 1998, 9). National identity is constructed as a result of its interactions with others and the characteristics of its internal politics and history. The identity of actors is "constituted in relation to difference," meaning that actors construct their identity based upon their social environment, their perception of others, and how others perceive them. National experiences in the international environment are a kind of international socialization that

establishes an actor's international role. For example, Said notes how the European experience of the Orient and its importance helped construct Europe or the "West:"

> The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience (Said 1979, 1).

Through establishing its social place in the international environment the Occident was able to construct itself through contrast with the Orient. The West was defined as "rational, peaceful, liberal" etc. while the Orient was "none of these things" (Said, 49). Just as the international arena shaped Western identity during the period of colonization, it is shaped by the modern international context as well. The international context is an external structure that positions nations as social beings in a social place.

National identity is also a product of history and how actors interpret this history. This history does not have to be limited to the actor's own history, but can be a history or tradition that the actor finds themselves associated with. For example, at the personal level, many Americans have never traveled to the countries of their heritage and may even be unsure of their genealogy but they nevertheless take upon themselves a hyphenated American identity as a result of a perceived correspondence with history. Likewise, a political unit's history or perceived association with a certain history will influence identity formation, even if those present in the political unit have not directly experienced this history. History is not simply a recounting of the

past, but is "a process of change that leaves an imprint on state identity" (Katzenstein 1996, 23). History develops salient national myths, which form the contours of identity. These myths then pass from one generation to the next in the form of a collective memory for the nation (Liu and Hilton 2005; Bell 2006).

National identity is also a consequence of the individuals inside the state and the characteristics that they collectively share. If the individuals within a state largely share a Christian heritage or religious beliefs the state will likely appropriate a Christian character and national identity. Likewise, if individuals within the state believe in democratic governance and have a democratic government the nation is very likely to have a democratic national identity. The connection between the national community's characteristics and its identity can be tenuous and contradictory. What is important is that nations do not imagine themselves as "coterminous with mankind" but conceive of themselves as having "a deep, horizontal comradeship" based on the characteristics they perceive they share (Anderson 2006, 7).

National identity formed through interaction, history, and perceived internal characteristics is a form of collective identity that holds the potential for producing individual-level effects through shaping individual cognition (Abdelal et al. 2006). Individuals are introduced to national history, symbols, and characteristics at a young age and are socialized to revere them. The individual begins to perceive themselves in light of their national identity and incorporates this national identity into their own personal identity as a consequence (Katz 1980). This individual-level national identity persists as new generations are familiarized with their nation's identity and continue to adopt it as their own. For example, although no living US citizens were present at the founding of the US, they have nevertheless read about the "founding fathers" in every US history textbook, sing nationalist songs about divine providence ("America

the Beautiful") and the democratic character of the US ("The Star Spangled Banner"), and are consistently informed that they belong to an exceptional nation that benevolently harbored immigrants and defended the world from fascists. An individual in the United Kingdom is no less likely to develop an understanding of their nation as a bastion of literature and enlightenment that "gave" the world "civilization" and also defiantly bore the brunt of and repelled the advances of authoritarian armies.

National identity is consequential because it informs beliefs that inform behavior. National identity infers the nation's values and fulfilling these values is an integral part of maintaining this identity. Like forms of individual identity, such as gender or sexuality, national identity is performative. This implies that national identity will be associated with certain values and that national identity will motivate actors to perform their national identity in the international arena by fulfilling said values. The values associated with a nation's identity are therefore predictive because they "operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity" (Katzenstein, 23).[17] Essentially, national identities proscribe values, which have effects on the behavior of the state, manifested in the actions and choices of the policymakers crafting foreign policy.

There are two major objections to the picture of national identity that is presented here, both of which have their roots in constructivist arguments. The first objection is that national identity is not homogenous and not necessarily associated with the state. There are usually significant minorities within states that do not share the same national characteristics of the majority population. Sometimes, even the leaders of political units do not share the identities of the political units they lead. This critique is correct but does not apply to all states equally. As

[17] Katzenstein (1996) is referring to "norms" here. However, in this formulation, values would serve as a kind of norm, one that is grounded in beliefs about the universal.

Telhami and Barnett (2002) state, "a state-building project can be understood as a social engineering exercise intended to generate the very state-national conflation assumed by international relations theorists" (Telhami and Barnett, 9). This exercise will be more or less successful, but will likely be more successful in cases in which the construction of the state is due to the relative agency of the populace. Telhami and Barnett (2002) define state identity as "identity linked to the national apparatus" and national identity as "a group of people who…share a common myth and historical memories" (Telhami and Barnett, 8). The disconnect between the state and the nation in states like Iraq, a result of the imposition of imperial designs, is less present in settler-colonial states where common myths and memories develop while simultaneously constructing the state apparatus, making the distinction between state identity and national identity relatively moot in these cases. The US belongs to this class of states.[18] Furthermore, while the identity of many states is not homogenous there is almost always a dominant identity that is usually associated with the majority population that tends to hold political power. Those individual policymakers that come from populations who do not share the dominant national identity may even be socialized to adhere to it as a result of their selection into elite circles where the dominant national identity prevails.

The dominant national identity can change to be more inclusive (or exclusive) as time goes on, which testifies to the fluidity or "re-writing" of national identity (Zehfuss 2002; Campbell 1998). However, although identity is fluid there are often core features that remain relatively consistent or simply take new forms. For example, white supremacy is (with few exceptions) not a part of US identity that is currently celebrated even though it was a widely endorsed idea at the nation's founding. However, the US value of "rule of law" is now mobilized

[18] I will from this point on onward often use state identity and national identity interchangeably since I have established that, at least in the US case, these two concepts are identical.

for the purposes of policing nonwhite populations. Other features of US national identity, such as the penchant for democracy, have remained present. This argument does mean that national identity does not change but that with few exceptions (the former Yugoslavia) it changes rather slowly. In most cases, the national values that policymakers were socialized with are still the national values that the present form of the nation endorses.

National Interests

Interests map onto what Wendt (1999) calls "material needs" and are akin to biological requirements in their origins. National interests are defined as the requirements of the state that must be met in order for it to survive and thrive, or fulfill its needs. Interests are therefore based on material reality yet still involve beliefs about those materials. National interests are not objective but are based on objective material realities. In order to survive and thrive, state must meet certain tangible needs, including defensible borders, a monopoly on violence, the physical integrity of citizens, and a minimum of economic well-being. The populations of states construct their national interests around these tangible needs. To make an analogy, all human beings need water to live. This is a non-debatable human need. However, how close to the water humans should live is a constructed interest based on this need. Likewise, when it comes to states, it is obvious that states need to protect their citizens but *how* states choose to fulfill this need (domestic spying, wars based abroad, military bases) is constructed. A number of social determinants will influence this construction.

Despite the subjectivity of interests and the nature of their construction, it is important to remember that national interests are an "expression of the nation's preferences" and refer to the commonalities that one finds within the political unit in question (Nincic 1999, 48). Many of

these commonalities garner little discussion because they are so taken for granted. Liberals and conservatives may debate on the specifics of immigration policy but few argue that a cogent immigration policy, one where there is some level of border enforcement, is an interest. It fulfills the state's "need" for recognized borders. Additionally, it is also important to emphasize that despite the subjective nature of interests they still relate to the state's ontological being. When economic and material interests are threatened, policymakers often declare these threats "existential," denoting their significance and mimicking the anxiety individuals might feel when facing threats to their own mortality. Interests are important precisely because fulfilling them allows the state to survive as a legitimate international entity. In the anarchical international system the survival of the state also influences, or at least is perceived as influencing, the survival and success of the individual.

The Tradeoff Between Values and Interests

Values are beliefs policymakers have about what they must do to preserve their national identity. Interests are beliefs policymakers have about what they must do to preserve their existence. Realizing national values performs the state's social function while realizing national interests performs the anthropomorphized state's biological function. Fulfilling values and interests simultaneously will not always be possible. Values and interests may align at times and will therefore not be subjected to a tradeoff. Policymakers can pursue both priorities jointly. However, there are times when the two must be pursued separately. At these times, policymakers must prioritize one over the other.

When Will Values and Interests Compete?

There are two possible ways in which values and interests may conflict. First, states have a finite amount of resources and must therefore choose the most desirable and efficient way to allocate these resources. In situations where values and interests must be pursued separately, states must choose whether to focus more resources toward promoting their interests or promoting their values. For example, should we spend more money on economic aid to poor nations or more money on national defense? If there is a finite budget, spending less on one leaves fewer funds for the other.

Secondly, there may be situations in which acting to preserve interests conflicts with promoting values and vice versa. In these situations, states must choose whether to violate their values in favor of interests or whether to adhere to their values and neglect their interests. For example, should we voice support for pro-democracy protests in a country where the autocratic regime is an ally? Or should we stand by our ally as they crush these protests? The first tradeoff can be characterized as a dilemma of an efficient allocation of resources while the second tradeoff can be characterized as a dilemma of intrinsic incompatibility.

For the purposes of this study I focus on the intrinsic tradeoff. States often allocate resources to institutions that act in the name of both values and interests. For example, while US military spending undoubtedly promotes interests it may also protect values, especially if this military conducts humanitarian interventions and disaster response.[19] Promoting values and interests might also require different levels of resource allocation. Perhaps the promotion of values requires relatively few resources while the promotion of interests requires a larger

[19] The most recent example of US military actions that could be related to US values is US disaster assistance in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, in which the US military was a "principle component" of the US humanitarian effort (Cecchine et al. 2013).

allocation of resources. As such, studying the resource allocation tradeoff between interests and values is not a reliable way of assessing the tradeoff.

In contrast, the intrinsic tradeoff is far more straightforward, more easily observed and considered by policymakers, and more amenable to both quantitative and qualitative analysis. There are situations in which states must fundamentally choose between their values and interests. These situations regularly involve the economic, security, and diplomatic relationships that states pursue. These relationships are a product of both values and interests to varying degrees. Many times these relationships are consistent with both interests and values. However, at times forming a relationship with another state will be beneficial in terms of interests but will be an affront to values (Walt 1987; Sylvan and Majeski 2009). At other times, forming a relationship with another state will promote values but detract from interests (Henderson 1997; Lai and Reiter 2000). In these situations, policymakers must make a tradeoff. If states tend to choose interests over values this indicates that they put more weight on the former and vice versa. If some values are more readily overwhelmed by interests than others then this indicates that these values are less important in the mind of policymakers.[20]

The Intrinsic Tradeoff Between Values and Interests in Foreign Policy

Policymakers considering foreign policy decisions must contemplate both their national values and their national interests. Policymakers must concern themselves with their national values for social and cognitive reasons. Policymakers, as members of the nation, have a social identity to be maintained. Human beings form and maintain identities because it assists us in interpreting the world and our place in it through categorization. Erikson (1968) goes so far as to

[20] It is also important to note that this analysis is focused on tradeoffs occurring in short-term decision-making rather than long-term foreign policy planning.

say that "there is no sense of being alive without a sense of ego identity" (89). A secure identity is associated with "feelings of contentment" and a crisis of identity is associated with "discomfort and personality breakdown." Individuals "have drive to bolster and to defend their identity" (Bloom 1990, 34-37). Therefore, when individuals have formed identities, these identities must be reinforced and performed, in part by enacting the values associated with them.

Nation-states are often defined as political and social communities that maintain a monopoly of violence over a certain landmass. However, these political communities also share characteristics, history, and experiences that constitute a national identity, defined as a "condition in which the mass of people have made the same identification with national symbols…so that they may act as one psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility of enhancement of, these symbols of national identity" (Bloom 1990, 52).[21]

Policymakers are conferred this national identity and socialized to its values. Policymakers that implement state policies will have a drive to secure and replicate their state's national identity, as it secures their own. Securing identity is accomplished by performing the state's identity. In other words, identity, and the values associated with it, will "have 'regulative' effects that specify standards of proper behavior" for the nation's policymakers (Katzenstein, 23). The state's implementation of prescriptive values associated with national identity is often a conscious decision by policymakers, as can be seen in several instances. Kier (1996) in discussing the impetus for the French military's short-term conscription policy says plainly that

[21] The assumption that a state's identity is its national identity not only assumes a homogenous identity but also that the identity of those conducting affairs of the state map onto the identity of the masses under their authority. One can think of situations in which this is not the case (modern Syria, Iraq under Saddam Hussein). This incongruence can result in "an inherently unstable and precarious situation," the kind of which is now apparent in the Syrian civil war and Iraqi ethno-religious strife (Telhami and Barnett 2002, 9). However, in many cases, especially in Western democracies, there is a fairly homogenous culture that dominates both a plurality of the society and spheres of policymaking.

the dominant left-wing cultural attitudes in post-WWI France determined that "the army must reflect society and society's values in order to be able to defend the entire country" (Kier 1996, 206). In the French case these "values" were national solidarity and radical equality, no doubt stemming from symbols of France's national identity (*Liberte, egalite, fraternite*). The US opposed the Soviet Union, not only because of objective clashes of interests, but also because US policymakers understood the US "as the anticommunist protector of a particular set of values both at home and abroad" and the Soviet Union represented a communist threat (Hopf 1998, 187). Likewise, the Soviet Union adopted the paternal like relations it did with other countries within its sphere of influence due to its identity as the vanguard of communism (Hopf 2002).

Policymakers must consider interests because interests directly relate to the state's well-being, and therefore their existence. Policymakers want their states to survive and thrive. State survival is a "prerequisite to the achievement of other ends" (Waltz 1979, 134). Most states do not face threats to their survival, but are directed by individuals who want not only to live but also to live well. Policymakers want their states to survive *and* prosper. To survive and thrive, policymakers believe that their states must have some amount of national security and economic prosperity. Both are complementary to state survival and well-being (Keohane 1984, 22). Survival and prosperity can be seen as mapping onto the bottom two (or most important) components of Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of needs. The survival of the state is akin to the individual's basic physiological function whereas the well-being of the state is analogous to the individual's sense of safety in the realms of health, property, and resources. Interests are of the utmost importance to policymakers because they ensure the state's very existence, which are similar to and instrumental to the individual's physiological needs and safety needs.

The prospect of failing to satisfy national interests and national values leads to cognitive consequences for the policymaker. Failing to uphold interests puts the existence of the state at risk and therefore also threatens the individual. When an individual's existence is perceived to be at risk they experience "death anxiety" or "apprehension generated by death-awareness" (Lehto and Stein 2009, 23). Experiencing death anxiety can affect the individual's political calculus. Such individuals will support political candidates that emphasize security and are more willing to accept draconian policies that they would not in the absence of reflections on their own mortality (Landau et al. 2004). Even lesser threats that are less than existential can provoke individuals to alter their political choices. Individuals facing threats favor more aggressive government policies to address the threat, such as military action or increased domestic surveillance. Such individuals also heighten in-group solidarity (Huddy et al. 2005).

The potential for interests to go unmet might also produce uncertainty about the state's future. Individuals are biased toward the status quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Like threat, uncertainty is also something to be avoided, and individuals are willing to take more aggressive (what might be called more "conservative") political positions in order to avoid uncertainty and manage threats (Jost et al. 2007).

In sum, the prospect of interests not being fulfilled provokes a host of anxieties and emotions that individuals would rather avoid. Individuals respond to threats to interests with policy preferences meant to aggressively shore up interests. State policymakers will react in the same way when faced with situations that relate to the survival and well-being of the state. Although the survival and well-being of the state is not synonymous with the survival and well-being of the individual, the ability of the state to achieve its national interest clearly relates to individual interest. The ability of a state to remain secure relates to the bodily integrity of its

citizens. The ability of the state to remain thriving economically relates to the safety and welfare of its citizens. The two foundational blocs of Maslow's hierarchy therefore apply at the level of the state through the considerations of policymakers.[22]

The failure to uphold the values associated with national identity places a different form of cognitive pressure on policymakers. Discarding values does not threaten the physical existence of the state but threatens its national identity, which is its social existence. When a policymaker makes a decision that obviously contradicts a national value the disparity between the state's identity and the state's foreign policy becomes apparent. This contradiction between action and identity and its recognition by the policymaker produces cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is a psychological phenomenon an individual experiences when "one cognition does not logically or psychologically follow from the other cognition" (Harmon-Jones 2000, 120). Festinger (1957), the intellectual father of dissonance theory, notes that there is usually consistency "between what a person knows or believes and what he does" (Festinger, 1). Cognitive dissonance is a product of inconsistency, and often a product of inconstancies revolving around or concerning the self. Cognitive dissonance "results when individuals behave in ways that are inconsistent with their expectancies or beliefs about themselves…individuals possess a specific need for self-consistency" (Harmon-Jones, 122). In essence, one of the major ways in which cognitive dissonance can be induced is through recognition of one's own hypocrisy (Aronson 1999). When policymakers advocate for actions that violate the values associated with national identity, this is no doubt a form of hypocrisy.

Festinger (1957) hypothesizes two ways in which individuals respond to dissonance:

[22] The importance of interests does not mean that policymakers will *always* make decisions in favor of tangible interests. I simply argue that the fulfillment of interests, since it strongly relates to the state's survival and well-being, is the strongest and most pressing impulse of policymakers.

1. The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.

2. When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid situations and information, which would likely increase the dissonance (Festinger, 3).

These hypotheses have implications for the behavior of foreign policy practitioners. According to the second hypotheses, foreign policy practitioners should avoid making decisions contrary to the values of the state, since doing so would expose the policymakers to dissonance between the state's identity and the state's policy. Therefore, it is expected that policymakers will generally attempt to uphold state values, not due to the instrumentality of the values, but because policymakers have a cognitive impulse to maintain the state's identity and avoid the dissonance that would result from undermining it. Secondly, in times where the state's values are violated, whatever the reason, policymakers would engage in dissonance reduction strategies. When policymakers violate the nation's values, they may rationalize the violation by appealing to new cognitive elements, such as "long-term" values promotion or "tolerating evils in the pursuit of good" (Gaddis 1985, 116).

The degree to which policymakers avoid making decisions that induce dissonance or feel the need to engage in dissonance reduction strategies should be a function of the magnitude of the dissonance. The magnitude of the dissonance between two cognitions is a function of the importance of the cognitive elements and the "weighted proportion of all relevant relations between the two clusters that are dissonant" (Festinger, 18). In plainer language, the magnitude of dissonance is determined by the importance of the thoughts in question and how many other

thoughts are dissonant with the one in question. This distinction is important because not all national values are equally related to national identity. Some values are more connected to a nation's identity than others. Therefore, not all violations of national values will impose the same magnitude of dissonance upon the policymaker. The magnitude of the dissonance should be a function of the importance of the value that is being violated. When policymakers violate a value that has a more tangential relation to state identity the magnitude of cognitive dissonance experienced should be relatively low compared to when policymakers violate values that are more central to state identity.

The magnitude of the dissonance naturally has consequences for the effort policymakers undertake to avoid situations in which there is the potential for dissonance and for the success of the dissonance reduction strategies that policymakers employ. As individuals wish to avoid dissonance, they will make a greater effort to elude greater-magnitude cognitive dissonance than lower-magnitude cognitive dissonance. Additionally, when the magnitude of the cognitive dissonance is greater, dissonance reduction strategies will be less successful.[23] When applied to policymakers in the realm of foreign policy, what this means is that policymakers will go to greater lengths to avoid cognitive dissonance as the potential magnitude of the dissonance increases, and these policymakers will be less successful in reducing the dissonance as the magnitude of the dissonance increases.

The cognitive dissonance produced from the violation of national values is central to determining the tradeoff between values and interests in foreign policymaking. A tradeoff will be

[23] As Festinger (1957) explains, "This source of resistance to change lies in the fact that an element is in relationship with a number of other elements…to the extent that changing it would replace these consonances by dissonances" (27). Effectively, the more important the cognitive element in question is, and the more consonant it is with other cognitive elements, the greater difficulty there is in altering it through dissonance reduction strategies.

unavoidable when a foreign policy scenario demands a choice where one option will uphold interests but violate values, while the other option will uphold values but violate interests. Festinger (1957) characterizes this situation as one in which there must be a "decision between completely negative alternatives" where "dissonance will exist after the choice has been made" inevitably (34-35). If the policymaker chooses to uphold values, this will produce cognitive dissonance, as it violates interests. If the policymaker chooses to uphold interests, this will produce also cognitive dissonance, as it violates values. However, in addition to the cognitive dissonance that might exist from choosing values over interests, the decision will also induce mortality anxiety, threat awareness, and uncertainty from the fact that the state's interests, and therefore the security and well-being of its citizens, are being put at risk. In the hierarchy of state needs, interests are placed above values. The combination of anxieties and dissonance resulting from the prospect of violating interests will produce greater incentives for policymakers to uphold interests, even when they conflict with values. Therefore, national interests will be favored over national values when a tradeoff between the two is unavoidable.

However, the fact that national interests will be favored over national values will not uniformly affect all values, since not all values are equally connected to national identity. Values that are more central to national identity are more important. Greater-magnitude cognitive dissonance is produced when they are violated, as opposed to more tangential values. Thus, the tradeoff between interests and values will vary with the national value in question. When choosing between values and interests is necessary, the tradeoff will lean more heavily toward interests when the values involved in the tradeoff are more tangential to national identity. When the tradeoff involves values that are more central to national identity, the tradeoff will be more

balanced. Values that are more connected to national identity will better compete with interests in tradeoffs between the two.

To better illustrate this theory imagine a nation that has three interests: one of high importance, one of moderate importance, and one of low importance. Imagine this nation's identity also prescribes three nation values: one of high importance, one of moderate importance, and one of low importance. These interests and these values periodically come into conflict. When they do, policymakers will have to choose whether to uphold the interest or the value. Figure 1.2 below is a decision matrix. Each box represents a potential conflict between the interest specified in the row and the value specified in the column. The words in bold indicate the outcome of the conflict. As is evident, in the majority of the conflicts, interests will carry the day. Anytime an interest faces a value of the same importance, interests win out because they relate to state survival. The same is true of conflicts between interests and values when the interest in question is more important than the corresponding value. However, values can prevail in a conflict with interests of lower importance because of the identity-based motivation for performing values and because the interest is not as vital. The matrix shows the major proposition of the described social-psychological theory: in most cases, interests will outweigh values but this depends on the value's attachment to the state's national identity.

Figure 1.2: Interests vs. Values Decision Matrix

	High Importance Value	Moderate Importance Value	Low Importance Value
High Importance Interest	**INTERESTS**	**INTERESTS**	**INTERESTS**
Moderate Importance Interest	**VALUES**	**INTERESTS**	**INTERESTS**
Low Importance Interest	**VALUES**	**VALUES**	**INTERESTS**

Individual Cognition and Foreign Policy

The theory presented above is an explanation of state behavior that uses cognitive responses that occur at the individual-level as the causal mechanism. Some may argue that the cognitions and actions of individuals do not clearly map onto state behavior. States often make decisions through some process by which multiple individuals influence a decision-maker or they make decisions collectively. However, many decisions in international politics *are* made by individuals, including some of the most consequential decisions. For example, in the contemporary United States the ability to make war is largely the responsibility of the President and the President has, in practice, been relatively unconstrained by Congress. Other actors, such as the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense etc. can provide the President with new information and their own opinions but in the end, the President gets to make the decision as to whether or not troops are sent into a conflict. If the President is

imbued with national identity and is subject to a cognitive process that will bias them to privilege certain interests over certain values, we would expect foreign policy results consistent with the social-psychological theory presented here.

There is no doubt that many decisions in international politics are not made by individuals but are made by some sort of collective. Organizations and bureaucracies within the government fight over policy turf and argue about which policies should be implemented (Allison 1969). How is it possible that individual cognition will play a role in these cases? In cases where groups of policymakers are making decisions collectively, the policy of the state will reflect the outcomes posited by the social-psychological theory presented here because these individuals are all subject to a similar cognitive process that will bias their decisions.

As a simplified illustration, the decision to uphold interests and values can be viewed as a Condorcet jury. The jury must decide whether or not to uphold a national interest or a national value. If a cognitive process makes individuals in the courtroom have a slight preference toward interests over values on average, then as the number of individuals in the group increases the probability that the courtroom will side with interests over values increases as well. In fact, as the number of individual's in the courtroom reaches a sufficient sample, the probability that they will chose interests over values becomes nearly certain. This adaptation of Condorcet's courtroom demonstrates that group decision-making does not really pose any challenge for the idea that cognitive biases, if widely distributed, impact state policy. In fact, the effect of the overall social-psychological mechanisms becomes amplified in group decision-making settings.[24]

[24] This theory assumes that all policymakers are socialized to US national identity in a similar direction. This is a simplifying assumption. However, research shows that US individuals do

The notion that cognitive mechanisms impact foreign policy is widely accepted in the foreign policy analysis literature. Foreign policy analysts, especially those who study decision-making in concrete rather than abstract terms, emphasize that it is the study of "human decision makers" rather than states. An account of state behavior is almost impossible without "an account of the contributions of human beings" (Hudson 2005, 4). Arguing that the international environment determines a state's behavior assumes all states react similarly to international situations. Arguments that a state's domestic politics or identity determines state behavior still assume that policymakers are the executors of that identity. If bureaucracies are fighting over policy turf there still needs to be an explanation for why some bureaucracies prevail over others. Essentially, "it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers beliefs' about the world," (Jervis 1976, 28). Policymakers are the crucial link between the characteristics of the state and the policies the state pursues.[25]

Differentiating Interests

For the purpose of developing this social-psychological theory of foreign policy I have assumed that (1) violating interests produces a myriad of negative cognitive effects, (2) violating values produces cognitive dissonance, and (3) the magnitude of cognitive dissonance produced varies with the value's attachment to national identity. I have conveniently ignored the question

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cultivate a shared national identity despite their diversity, though there is some variation (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001). This assumption is explored in more detail in Chapter 4.

[25] Other social-psychological theories have been formulated to explain state behavior. For example, Brecher (1972) describes both the domestic social and political environment and then the "world views" or psychology of decision-makers in Israel and argues that these have had a mutually reinforcing effect on Israeli foreign policy. Holsti (1970) explains "national role conception" as how the nation views itself and its international role, measured as elite perceptions of this role. Like other social-psychological theories, Holsti (1970) explains elite attitudes as a result of national socialization.

of what interests are likely to be considered more integral to state existence and survival. A general assumption has been that state interests related to national security are the highest priority. This is more or less the assumption of realists as well as neoliberals. However, as the "national interest," in my view, like values, is contingent upon the state in which it is articulated, what interests are prioritized over others will depend on the state being analyzed. In the next section I discuss US interests, their construction, and what kinds of interests are likely to be considered supreme.

US National Identity and the Terms of the Tradeoff Between US Values and US Interests

In this section, I apply the social-psychological theory of state behavior articulated earlier to the United States. I argue that the US has a well-known and well-established national identity that US policymakers frequently cite when justifying or making foreign policy. US national identity is associated with a number of national values, such as democracy, humanitarianism, industriousness, discovery, and human rights. These values are frequently referenced not only in national symbols and traditions, but also in national political speeches, common political discourse, and even internal policy papers. At the same time, perhaps no other country is so obsessed with its own interests and the potential dangers to them that exist. As such, the US will choose to adhere to its interests over its values when tradeoffs between the two are demanded. However, as the social-psychological theory outlined above states, the terms of this tradeoff will not be uniform and will change with the value in question. Values that are at the center of American identity will be more resilient to tradeoffs with interests than values that are more tangential. There is both limited historical and empirical evidence of this relationship between US values and US interests.

US Interests

US interests, or the "material needs" of the US that must be met in order for the US to survive and thrive revolve around fortifying national security and economic might. This has been recognized by scholars that adopt conventional neorealist and neoliberal assumptions about the goals of states and by scholars that adopt more constructivist or sociological views of state behavior. Neorealists and neoliberals assume that states, including the US, "strive to seek their survival" (Waltz, 134). Not having access to complete information, states are weary of competitors and cannot be sure of the intentions of others. Therefore, states seek to acquire power (political, military and economic), which helps them "maintain autonomy," permit many policy options, enjoy greater margins of safety, and manage the international system (Waltz, 194-195). Neoliberals argue that the maintenance of state power is not always as all-encompassing as realists make it out to be. However, neoliberals still assume US actions are motivated by either power and wealth. The US-led global order created economic arrangements "consistent" with American capitalism and "U.S. military strength depended on economic as well as political ties" with anti-communist allies (Keohane 1984, 22).

While neoliberal and neorealists paradigms claim the US pursues economic prosperity and national security by assumption, constructivists offer an alternative means of deciphering US interests but ultimately come to the same conclusion. Even if states have an "objective" need to maintain some amount of national security and economic prosperity in order to ensure state survival and well-being, the state's interests are beliefs about how to meet these needs and are therefore socially constructed. US interests are formed not only by its real need to maintain

security and economic well-being but also by how the environment, domestic context, and state identity shape its understanding of how these needs should be met.

Accepting the constructivist critique does not substantively change the understanding of US interests as being both oriented toward national security and economic prosperity. An analysis of how the US constructs its interests demonstrates that the nation is especially concerned with its national security and economic well-being, much more so than other nations. In the "US representation of international politics" the US is "understood to have a very special global leadership role" (Weldes 1996, 282). Conventional US exceptionalism, once combined with the material reality of owning colonies, moved the US to believe itself to be "compelled, and hence entitled, to play a leading role in the international arena." American elites, and to some extent the general population, began to believe that "to do other than defend nascent security interests with force would not only undermine the basis of American prosperity, it perhaps would put civilization itself at risk" (Walker 2009, 50-56). The success and dominance of the US in the post-War era only furthered its status as a national security state and biased its population and elites toward favoring the maintenance of an unrivaled military for the implementation of coercive policies, the roots of which "were planted during the very early years of the cold war" and continue into the present (Nincic 2011, 35). US identity favors "strength" and "toughness," and "politicians in the United States are unwilling to bear the costs of appearing soft" in the face of enemies (Nincic 1988, 199).

Like its obsessive concern with national security that takes the form of an interest in global dominance, the US need for economic well-being takes the form of an interest in economic dominance. The American concern with power is therefore also a concern with securing economic hegemony, which often meant the expansion and enforcement of global

capitalism. The early American imperial period, in which the US "determined that its empire would be an informal one," saw the US "establishing the political conditions for capital accumulation in what was now defined as the American sphere of influence" (Pantich and Gindin 2012, 38-39). In both Asia and Latin America, "When private American property rights abroad were threatened, Washington would on occasion defend them" (Smith 1981, 142). The US defended its economic might so aggressively, in part, due to its visions of national greatness. Policymakers "wished to harness policy to the burgeoning power generated by a commercializing and later an industrializing economy" because they understood that "economic power created the potential for fashioning the instruments of policy essential to dreams of international greatness" (Hunt 1987, 43). Throughout the early post-War period, policymakers recognized that the US must use its economy to facilitate the "integration of states into the US informal empire." The Truman doctrine of containment and the Marshall Plan were essentially dual policies, one geopolitical and one economic, precipitated by the same motivation: the protection and promotion of American hegemony (Pantich and Gindin, 91-95). The US used its "economic pre-eminence" to alter the economic policies of its allies," as it understood its economic power as a tool to create foreign markets for its own productive purposes and as a tool to "build a framework for international economic relations" (Ikenberry 2006, 29-30). During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was not only perceived as a threat to peace and security but was also perceived as an economic threat. The USSR was alleged to have been conducting "economic warfare" against the US and its Western allies through the spread of communist ideology and its undermining of US economic interests in Europe and the Third World. Policymakers viewed US economic strength as integral to its capability to "cope with threats to its security." Policymakers

therefore resolved to "maximize" its "economic potential" in order to establish reserves "readily available in the event of war" (National Security Council Memorandum 20/4, 1948).

The connection between economic dominance and American power continues to the present day. The US perceives its economic prosperity to be the "strength upon which" its "leadership stands" and "global stability" depends. Acquiring national security depends on "America's ability to leverage" its "unique national attributes," including its "economic competitiveness" (National Security Strategy 2010, 4-7) . US policymakers understand economic success as integral to confronting the previous "ideological, economic, and military threat from communism" and as being the "the wellspring for our power:"

> It pays for our military, underwrites our diplomacy and development efforts, and serves as a leading source of our influence in the world. Moreover, our trade and investment supports millions of American jobs, forges links among countries, spurs global development, and contributes to a stable and peaceful political and economic environment…That is why we are rebuilding our economy so that it will serve as an engine of opportunity for the American people, and a source of American influence abroad…Taken together, these efforts will position our nation for success in the global marketplace, while also supporting our national security capacity-the strength of our military, intelligence, diplomacy and development, and the security and resilience of our homeland (National Security Strategy 2010, 9-10).

The tangible national interests of the US are strongly focused on maintaining global dominance in both military and economic power. This conclusion is arrived at either by

assumption (neorealism and neoliberalism) or through analysis (constructivism). The US, "with its identity as the leader of the free world," believes itself obligated to bear "the burden of leadership" and to therefore maintain "a position of strength" (Weldes, 283). The cognitive desire of US policymakers to secure this national interest is akin to the individual's desire to secure their bodily integrity. These "core interests" of the US are framed by policymakers as directly connected to the "*lives* and *fortunes* of the American people." For this reason, securing the national interest, both economic and military, is understood as the "first responsibility" of policymakers. "Anything less would be a dereliction of duty" (Rice 2013).

US interests are concerned with protecting national security and promoting economic prosperity, but which of these two interests is considered primary? Traditional realist assumptions would place national security as the overarching US concern, since survival is the first priority of all states. Nevertheless, as liberal theorists point out, economic interests are integral to national security as well as prized for their positive effects on the general public. There have been attempts at theorizing and deducing which interests are more salient in US foreign policy. Krasner (1978) argues that US policy in securing raw materials had three primary objectives: "(1) increase competition; (2) insure security of supply; (3) promote broad foreign policy objectives" (Krasner, 14). While Krasner (1978) does not differentiate economic statist goals and national security statist goals, he argues that statist interests outweigh the interests of domestic economic actors.

Literature focusing on US domestic politics has tended to paint a very different picture, showing that even while pursuing national security priorities, national security interests must negotiate with domestic economic concerns. Jacobs and Page (2005) demonstrate that wealthy US populations are more likely to have their foreign policy preferences adopted by

policymakers, indicating an outsized economic effect. Fordham (2008) shows that even when congressional representatives are voting on US national security issues the economic interests of their own districts influence their behavior. Furthermore, the very volume of salient economic issues, such as trade agreements, capital controls, access to markets, stability, etc., seems to surpass the volume of national security concerns. According to Pantich and Gindin (2012), the US Treasury and Federal Reserve have played a larger role in securing US interests than have US military interventions and institutions.

Unlike values, which are universal and timeless, the importance of national security and economic issues will be dependent on time and issue area. While identity may exhibit slow changes, interests exhibit drastic ones. While in 2009, the health of the global economy (economic interests) was of primary concern to US citizens and policymakers, anti-terrorism policies (national security interests) have once again become primary due to the rise of the so-called Islamic State. As such, when economic interests are threatened, economic interests will take on greater importance. When national security interests are threatened, national security interests will take on greater importance. Economic interests will also play a more prominent role in issues of global economy, and national security interests will play a more prominent role in issues of national security. While this distinction seems obvious, there are some issues that do not clearly fit into the economic vs. national security distinction, such as immigration or the cultivation of diplomatic ties. Ascertaining what interests will take precedence in these decisions where both economics and national security are considerations will necessitate theorizing specific to the issue area.

US National Identity and US Values

Like other states, the US has a national identity that infers a set of beliefs about what actions are prescribed by the universal "good." This identity is a product of historical development, reoccurring socialization, and the US role in the international system. US identity and the values it is associated with are recognized and celebrated by both elites and the general populace. As such, the US takes steps to implement values associated with its national identity in its foreign policy. Not all of these values are equally connected to US identity, and those values that are more tangential to US national identity are more mutable than those connected to the core of US national identity.

The role of US values has been recognized by various strains of foreign policy analysis. In the realm of foreign aid, countries that exemplify US values tend to receive more aid than those countries that do not aid (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Abrams and Lewis 1993; Poe et al. 1994; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Neumayer 2003; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; Capellan and Gomez 2007; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009; Fleck and Kilby 2010). The development of the norm of humanitarian intervention (spearheaded by the US) has also been recognized (Weiss 2001; Pape 2012). However, mainstream political science literature that discusses the role of US values has tended to treat values as instrumental to achieving US foreign policy interests rather than as ideals adhered to for their own sake. US adherence to values is assumed to be in the pursuit of "soft power," or the ability to draw countries toward US positions without coercion (Nye 2004). When the US is seen as betraying what it stands for, this has negative consequences for the cultivation of soft power. Anti-Americanism stemming US indiscretions harms US interests (Datta 2014). In some cases, the effects could be intergenerational (McAdam 2007). This concern was most forcefully articulated by President Carter when he vowed to "restore morality" to the White

House to show that "America's real strength…resided more in what it stood for" (Herring 2008, 831-845).

I reject the notion that US values are simply instruments to achieving interest-based US foreign policy goals. Although anti-Americanism results in losses, these losses seem to be relatively minor, and anti-American attitudes typically diminish quickly, especially when political changes are introduced (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007; Datta 2014). Furthermore, "soft power" does not seem to be particularly robust or effective foreign policy tool to the extent that the US would place American lives in harms way in order to cultivate the perception of an overarching humanitarian purpose (Hildebrandt et al. 2013). I suggest that policymakers consider US values because these values are inseparable from the very identity of the US as a state. From the state's inception, Americans considered themselves a "model society…destined to transform the world" (Perkins 1994, 460). US officials proudly promote the uniqueness of US values under the banner of "American exceptionalism." The exalting of US values is found across parties, ideologies, and administrations. Despite being arguably one of most aggressive and defiant foreign policy documents in modern history, the Bush Administration's "National Security Strategy" (2002) mentions values, principles, and morality throughout the text. The Obama Administration's "National Security Strategy" (2010) and "National Security Strategy" (2015) also refer to values numerous times. These administrations are recognized as being different in their tenor, ideology, and strategy. Yet, both express a strong commitment to US values.

Realist (and to some extent, liberal) critics may characterize such discourse as empty rhetoric, yet Campbell (1998) observes that declassified documents reveal policymakers using similar rhetoric behind closed doors. Reports from the National Security Council begin by exalting the "spiritual, moral, and material posture of the United States" that "rests upon

established principles," and state that the basic objective of US security is to preserve "fundamental values and institutions" (National Security Council 1956). Policymakers note the need to combat threats to "free institutions, and fundamental values" of the US and "in doing so," avoid "weakening" or "undermining our fundamental values and institutions" (National Security Council 1953). Cold War-era US national security documents frame the conflict between the US and the USSR as not only one of interests but also one of "ideas and values." Policymakers noted the importance of bringing about "order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy" as a means of combating the Soviet threat. The Cold War would be won with "devotion to our fundamental values" and by cultivating the "moral and material strength" of the "free world" (National Security Council 1950). Private moralizing discourse and invoking of values was reserved not only for the Cold War period, but extends throughout US bureaucratic and diplomatic history and includes both perceived "doves" and "hawks."[26] The private use of such rhetoric indicates that, rather than being calculating utility maximizers, many policymakers are indeed "true believers" in US identity and US values.

State identity is a "property" of the state that "generates motivational and behavioral dispositions" (Wendt 1999, 224). Given that policymakers have a sincere belief in the metaphysical truth of values associated with US identity, policymakers will want to implement a foreign policy that fulfills these values in addition to securing interests. Failure to do so will put identity, the construct that individuals use to cognitively organize the world, at risk. US Policymakers are not isolated from the processes of socialization and social conditioning that occur in all polities. Like all human beings with beliefs, US policymakers will experience

[26] President Carter is generally acknowledged as the "dovish" President that put the greatest emphasis on human rights as a US value. However, values-laden rhetoric was also used by the Reagan administration in both public speeches and private diplomatic correspondence (Wampler 2010).

cognitive dissonance when they attempt to hold two contradictory observations. Enacting policies that violate US values will create cognitive dissonance, as there will be an obvious contradiction between *who* the US *is* and what the US *does.*

The Tradeoff Between US Interests and US Values

Inherent or intrinsic conflicts between US interests and US values will emerge when policymakers are faced with foreign policy decisions that promote values but damage interests or secure interests but violate values. As with other states, acting contrary to the values that US identity imposes will cause policymakers to experience cognitive dissonance that they must resolve. The magnitude of this dissonance, and the desire to avoid it, increases by "the extent of the disagreement itself" (Festinger, 181). Therefore acting contrary to tangential or supporting elements of US identity will produce less dissonance than acting contrary to elements of identity that are more fundamental. As a result, the latter is more difficult to rationalize by appealing to long-term goals or other cognitive elements, and will therefore produce greater motivation to avoid the dissonance. The overarching conceptual hypotheses derived from the social-psychological theory of foreign policy, as applied to the US are: (1) US interests will be prioritized over US values in intrinsic conflicts between the two, and (2) the degree to which US policymakers are willing to overlook values in favor of interests when crafting US foreign policy will depend on how integral the value is to sustaining US national identity.

Evaluating these two conceptual hypotheses and the greater social-psychological theory of US foreign policy requires several pieces of knowledge. First, it must be determined which US values are the more salient components of US identity and which US values are less salient components of US identity. Second, it should be shown that individuals do make choices

consistent with the theory and that cognitive dissonance is the causal mechanism. Finally, actual US foreign policy actions must demonstrate a tendency to prioritize interests over values but to differing degrees depending on the value. These three requirements are the concern of the three subsequent empirical chapters. I now turn my attention to what US values are and their varying attachment to US national identity.

Chapter 3

Charting American Identity: American Values in History, Culture, and Rhetoric

Does the US act with a bias toward interests or values when the two clash? Do US values with a stronger attachment to US national identity better compete with interests in these clashes? Asking these questions presupposes that we have a clear picture of what US national identity is and understand the relative importance of the values associated with it. To establish which values are more likely to compete with interests when the two clash, it is first necessary to determine which values are more prominently featured in US identity. Rather than assume what US identity and its corresponding values entail, the contours of US identity should to be established empirically. This chapter asks the questions "What values does US identity impose" and "What is the relative importance of these values?"

I establish US values and their connection to US identity through three modes of analysis: historical, cultural, and rhetorical. I analyze the value-content of US historical development through an analysis of historical documents classed as national "milestones" by the National Archives and Records Administration. I observe the cultural significance of US values through an analysis of official US cultural artifacts and federal holidays. Lastly, I discern the political significance of US values and their varying attachment to US identity through a content analysis of presidential "State of the Union" addresses. What emerges is a complex, but coherent account of US identity, US values, and the distinction between values that are central to US identity and values that are more tangential. The results of the analyses show the value of democracy to be the single-most important value incorporated into US identity. It is the most referenced value in US historical documents, cultural celebrations, and presidential political rhetoric. Humanitarianism and enterprising progress are also strong elements of US identity, though not nearly to the same degree as democracy. Other values, such as human rights, the rule of law, and religion, play a supporting but tangential role. If national identity influences the cognitions of

individuals, US policymakers should be most reluctant to dismiss democracy in favor of interests compared to lesser values.

US National Identity: Previous Accounts

A number of attempts have been made to examine US identity, culture, ideology, and values in the fields of sociology, history, and political science. These attempts have been descriptive accounts and have overwhelmingly been devoid of any strict methodology of determining which facets of the nation are suitable for analysis. Furthermore, most of these accounts have not attempted to examine differences in the salience of various values. Most are concerned with simply establishing that certain values are present in the American psyche. While insufficient for establishing causal connections or ascertaining the relative importance American values, previous studies do provide a collection of potential values from which others can consider when attempting to analyze US identity. Previous works make use of a number of terms besides identity or values: ideology, culture, beliefs, experience etc. These terms are more specific than identity and broader than "values." Yet, the studies of these broader social constructs contribute to the study of values, since values are discussed as part of these constructs. Below are the values studies of US identity, ideology, values, culture, and beliefs have identified.

Democracy

Studies of American ideology, culture, and identity strongly reinforce the idea that "democracy" or "freedom" is a prevalent US value (Williams 1967, 33). Walker (2009) characterizes "core American values" as stemming from ideas related in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights (Walker 2009, 5). Since the founding

period, American policy has been defined by the "pursuit of republican virtue" (Walker 2009, 294). Thompson (1992) also sees democratic decision-making as a key US value, bolstered by various ethical considerations derived from the Christian tradition. Democracy and "self-determination" were ideas that were present at the founding of the US but continue to be "endorsed" by the entirety of the mainstream political spectrum (Cingranelli 1993; Owen 1997; Mabee 2013). Americans overwhelmingly have an ideological allegiance to democracy, due to the belief that democracy and self-determination is inherently good and both ideological liberals and ideological conservatives agree on promoting democracy abroad (Nincic and Ramos 2010; Pew Research Center 2014b).

Analyses of US culture show democracy to be widely celebrated. McDougall (1997) cites lyrics to "My country, 'tis of thee" to demonstrate that Americans shared an assumption that "liberty is a gift of God" (McDougall 1997, 15). Dueck (2006), who turns the discussion of culture away from the general population and more toward elites, argues that classic liberal assumptions, which include democracy and self-determination, are at the core of a strategic culture that influenced even the most "anti-Wilsonian" of American administrations. Democracy rendered certain international policies unfeasible.

The privileged place of democracy is evident in US foreign policy, even in its harsher moments. Smith (1981) describes how "the democratic-republican cast of Western politics has profoundly influenced the contact of this civilization with that of the preindustrial world…favoring a form of social and political pluralism there, for example, that encouraged the growth of local nationalism" (Smith 1981, 148). Though American imperialism was carried out to the detriment of many, Smith (1981) concludes that, "on the whole, American policy in the

years before World War II was progressive." When other countries strived for self-determination "on balance the force of the United States weighed in their favor" (Smith 1981, 157).

Studies of US history and the ideology and culture emanating from it strongly suggest that democracy is a chief US value. However, the term "democracy" is nebulous and open to interpretation. Contemporary scholars have focused on the "liberal" component of US affinity for democracy. However, early American conceptions of democracy did not contain the same contemporary liberal overtones, but were instead concerned with revolutionary self-determination coupled with the presence of elections and republican government. For Americans, democracy is a broad notion of freedom and self-determination that is not synonymous with liberalism but is a component of liberalism. Other components of liberalism are distinct values and their presence has also been noted in the literature on US identity.

Humanitarianism

Since America's imperial period it has framed its policies and expansions as humanitarian in nature. Hunt's (1987) *Ideology and Foreign Policy* takes a critical view of these humanitarian claims but admits that the American vision of greatness was combined with a racist outlook to justify a perceived humanitarian mission to uplift the world's "lesser peoples." Whatever its effects, a strong sense of moralism is present in the US ideology and policy. McElroy (1992) analyzes the role of moral ideas in US foreign policy and argues that all nations want to be thought of as "moral," and that "domestic public opinion at times pressures state decision makers to follow international moral norms" (McElroy 1992, 28). McElroy (1992) does not analyze a unique US morality but instead argues that it shares a liberal internationalist

morality that includes a strong sense of humanitarianism. This humanitarian impulse is best exemplified by US aid to the USSR during the Hoover Administration.

During the period of US imperialism and "manifest destiny," the US carried out many actions that could not be considered humanitarian by most moral standards. However, this does not mean that policymakers did not consider these actions humanitarian. Values are a component of culture and beliefs that "help shape attitudes toward particular situations and provide both justifications for, and guides to, the policies designed to cope with them" (Payne 1995, 9). Founding myths proclaim the country to be "unique and virtuous among the nations," and allowed policymakers to depict "their own behavior as humanitarian" (Payne 1995, 23). Humanitarianism is still considered in US policymaking, as is evident by US aid allocations and standards of US intervention, which include "efforts to alleviate human suffering" (Kanter and Brooks 1994, 237). Both historical and contemporary American thought show an allegiance to humanitarianism and a general "moral orientation" (Williams 1967, 33).

Rule of Law

The rule of law is included in liberalism's "package" of values. Though a country born of revolution, Hunt (1987) finds that this reality is tempered by a respect for order and rule of law. Revolutions were only endorsed when they were aimed against tyranny *and* were followed with stability. The American Revolution was often (and is still often) favorably contrasted with the French Revolution for this reason. According to Walker (2009), rule of law has historically been integral to the idea of pursuing republican virtue. Both Cingranelli (1993) and Kanter and Brooks (1994) cite preserving the rule of law as a contemporary goal of US policy.

The term "rule of law" is even more ambiguous in its meaning than democracy but is commonly considered to be the exercise of power based upon equality and legitimate authority. "Equality" in the American meaning does not mean equality of life but equality of treatment. Legitimate authority is authority exercised without regard to rank or status (Kohls 1984). However, rule of law is also closely related to the broader notion of "order" as contrasted to chaos. The US has positioned itself against ideologies that upend existing order or norms. For example, throughout the Cold War, US policymakers connected common American cultural proclivities, such as heterosexuality, the nuclear family, female chastity, church services, and traditional gender roles, as evidence of allegiance to the United States. Aberrations from these cultural norms or order were associated with US enemies and declared dangerous to the nation and evidence of communist inclination (Campbell 1998, 154-155).

Human Rights

Human rights is a newer addition to liberalism's compendium. Its meaning was contested, was not readily apparent until the 1970's, and continued to be contested even then (Moyn 2010). Thinkers such as John Locke made the case for the existence of "natural rights," although these rights were considerably different than the physical integrity rights (protections from torture, extrajudicial killing etc.) that Americans uphold today. Initially, human rights were only in the purview of a "group of progressive American internationalists" but became more integrated into broader American thought due to the work of activists in the 1960's and 1970's (Mitoma 2013, 20). Eventually human rights gained such prominence that they are now regularly

advocated for by US government institutions and US policymakers (Apodaca 2005).[27] The attention given to human rights plays a large role in US exceptionalism. Nearly all Americans support physical integrity rights, although the ideological right views their promotion as less integral to US foreign policy than the ideological left (Nincic and Ramos 2010).

Enterprise

The concept of enterprise or progress is another US value. Mabee (2013) calls "liberal" and "commercial" ideologies the "founding ideology" of the United States. Williams (1967) identifies a number of "enterprise" associated values including "activity and work…achievement and success…science and secular rationality" and "progress" (33). Kohls (1984) notes that change, control of time, competition and enterprise, future orientation, action, and efficiency are all hallmarks of American culture. Some, such as Cingranelli (1993) have characterized this value as simply the belief in capitalism, but other scholars note that the idea of enterprise is not limited to the economic system. Americans value "newness" and "innovation" and support ideas they believe are conducive to these goals.

Like humanitarianism, this value is historically associated with the imperial period. During the period of American expansion the purveyors of "manifest destiny" declared that the nation was a unique nation of progress that was bolstered by divine rule (McDougall 1997, 76-77). Americans often viewed themselves at the cutting edge of the frontier in terms of both the expansion of the state and the expansion of knowledge and technology. Even in war, US military prowess and continued history of victories is a testament to the progress of the United States. Through the "destruction of the enemy, new worlds might be created," (Payne 1995, 25). Thus,

[27] Human rights is a central component of the United States Agency for International Development's mission statement (USAID 2014).

the affinity for capitalism should be viewed as an outgrowth of the US affinity for "creative destruction" and progress in all endeavors, including economic.

Individualism

Individualism is related to the value of enterprise or progress. The "frontier" was not just about the expansion of the country but about the perception of maximizing individual agency as well. Likewise, the fascination with capitalism and pulling one's self "up from your bootstraps" is in opposition to collectivism. Individualism, among other things, strongly differentiates the US from Europe. McDougall (1997) argues that the tension in American foreign policy between the real and the ideal also produced a move toward unilateralism in American thought, which can also be seen as an outgrowth of individualism.

Americans likely think that they are more individualistic than they actually are. The "frontier" was not settled by individuals but was settled by cooperative communities and families. Likewise, individualism and non-conformity are espoused, yet the pressures for racial, religious, cultural, and political conformity are immense. Nevertheless, US citizens strongly value their privacy, the idea that each is unique, and they strongly support framing issues in individual terms rather than collective terms. The idea of accomplishing success by one's "self" is highly valued in American culture (Kohls 1984).

Violence

American ideology, which fashioned the US a great "empire" "enabled and justified expansion" that "occurred at the expense of dispossessed Indians, Mexicans, and (to the extent slavery spread) Africans. Military dominance is at the root of American success. Policymakers

depict violence and coercive action as an "unpleasant but essential part of the regeneration process" (Payne 1995, 25). Military victories earlier in US history reinforce the notion that violence is a desirable means by which to navigate international conflicts. This may the reason why post-WWII US policy has been biased toward military engagement or other coercive tools such as punishing sanctions (Nincic 1988, 2011). This inclination toward violence evident in the celebration and remembrance of American victory is strongly tied to American patriotism and nationalism. Displays of patriotism and nationalism are closely tied to the US military establishment. American culture readily embraces violence, toughness, and endurance. From rampant gun violence to the myths of the American West, coercion and violence are an integral part of the American cultural landscape.

Religion

One of the first foreign policy theorists to incorporate culture, Thompson (1992) sees US ideology as a combination of both practical considerations (stemming from the Greaco-Roman tradition) and values rooted in the Christian tradition. Thompson (1992) also sees religion itself, and Christianity in particular, as a US value. McDougall (1997) agrees with Thompson's (1992) suggestion of Christian influence and demonstrates that this strong religious inclination motivated American expansion, often to the detriment of the natives. The religious culture of Americans, the view that the nation was "providential," led statesmen to implore their peers to "cultivate virtue lest liberty parish" (McDougall 1997, 15). Many Americans still adhere to the view that "true Americans" ought to at least espouse a belief in a higher power (Henslin 1975).

Religion is often implicitly tied to foreign policy. During the Cold War, communism was demonized as anti-Christian and anti-religious. A common refrain during the War on Terror was

that it was "being fought to preserve civilization" and "Western civilization" in particular, which is connected to Christianity (Saito 2010, 16). The American view of non-Christian individuals or those who do not partake in traditional American rituals, such as Muslims and atheists, again demonstrates the importance of Christianity in American culture (Pew Research Center 2014a).

White Supremacy

Related to the value of Christian favoritism is white supremacy. Hunt (1987) points out that racism was an epidemic among the founding fathers and continued throughout the modern period. For this reason, Williams (1967) includes "racism and group-related superiority" on his list of American values (33). Historically, slavery and the ethnic cleansing of Native Americans is obviously a testament to American racism. Even in World War II, rather than making arguments strictly in terms of self-defense or international peace, Roosevelt characterized the Japanese as predatory pagan barbarians. Even humanitarian missions were accomplished while dehumanizing and denigrating indigenous peoples, both domestically and abroad (Saito 2010).

Studying US Identity: How to Look?

The catalog of values associated with US identity is a list that sociologists, political scientists, and historians have pointed out as "important" to US citizens and they should therefore be considered in an analysis of US identity. However, how important these values are relative to each other remains unknown. In order to get an accurate picture of the differing components of US identity historical, cultural, and political sources must be chosen for analysis in an unbiased manner. Liberal scholars include quantitative measures of identity in their analyses. These measures are purported to be "objective" metrics of identity. Such measures are

usually based on outward features or characteristics of states and people. For example, scholars measure the "democratic identity" of states largely by the presence of electoral democracy within the state. Maoz and Russett (1993), Newton (2001) Doyle (2005), and others interested in democratic identity and the mutual trust that might exist between democracies, measure democracy by looking at the make-up of domestic institutions. Whether or not a country has a "democratic" identity or values "democracy" is determined by a country's POLITY IV score (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2011) or other similar institution-based measures. Henderson (1997, 1998, 2004) measures cultural identity through demographic state or sub-state level data as does Fearon and Laitin (2003). Likewise, Svensson (2007) and Horowitz (2009) use demographic data to categorize the religious identity of states and groups.

Measuring identity by some "objective" characteristic of states or peoples is useful insofar as it allows large n analyses of how different groups and states respond to each other based on identifying characteristics. This method is a poor one for assigning identity to a nation or people when attempting to understand how these nations and peoples perceive themselves. This method constitutes "quantitative reductionism," wherein the researcher assumes which identities are meaningful and then codes for "their presence or absence" (Hopf 2016, 3). Understanding how people perceive themselves entails more than pointing out their identifying features. It is necessary to understand what identity *means* to them. For example, in Henderson's metric, both Indonesia and Saudi Arabia would qualify as "Muslim" countries, yet there are stark differences in opinion between these populations as to what it means to be Muslim and what role Islam should play in governance and public life. Instead of labeling identity, scholars must attempt to reveal the content or meaning of identity (Abdelal et al. 2009).

Another major issue in determining identity is that many quantitative codings do not "consider the *intensity* of the cultural identities" (Allan and Hopf 2015, 19). Even if the identity codings are correct these identities might not occupy a large space in the state's overall culture relative to others. Democracy is certainly a value of many Western European countries, but adherence and celebration of white identity might actually be more intense relative to the celebration of the value democracy (Fanis 2011; Vucetic 2011). Countries cannot be classed as "belonging" to only one identity but their identity must be considered in light of all the values associated with it (Wedeen 2002, 725). This notion of salience could also be considered the degree to which the subjects of identity agree on its parameters (Abdelal et al. 2009).

In contrast to the rough essentialism of liberal scholars, constructivists have generally opted for interpretive approaches. Constructivists consider and interpret prominent historical events and developments, the statements of political leaders, the arguments of policymakers, and the positions of prominent intellectuals, to explain the emergence of identity and its values. The interpretivist method seeks to describe or characterize "the meaning of human behavior from the standpoint of the individual's whose behavior is being observed" (Brady and Collier 2010, 334). As such, a plethora of methodological issues arise when employing this method while attempting to code and describe state identities. Researchers must take care to ensure that their understanding and interpretation of others is not a product of their own expectations. This is partly an "exercise" in "self-discipline," but the problem can be mitigated by several strategies. First, coders could "try to use the judgments made for entirely different purposes by *other researchers*" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 157). In the case of coding state identity, which is dependent on the interpretation of the individuals living in the state themselves, it would be pertinent to consult these individuals.

Besides consulting others for their judgments, avoiding bias can be done by consulting the proper sources for analysis. Interpretive methods require a reading of texts or events. There are thus two pathways by which bias could result: the interpretation of the researcher and the selection of the text itself. Drawing on the interpretation of others has the potential to ensure that the interpretive bias does not stem from the researcher. However, the researcher could also determine which texts or events to analyze in light of their suppositions and expectations, even unconsciously. This is a potential complicating factor in many past analyses of US identity. For example, Ruggie's (1997) argument that Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt appealed to different sets of US values in justifying US intervention abroad is based upon readings of few speeches of each President.[28]

Consulting the textual choices of others could assist in mitigating bias. Researchers should find either some external metric by which to decide the texts or events of analysis or rely on what text and analysis are deemed "important" by other scholars conducting research on unrelated topics. Texts should be "widely read" and "reflect both the elite and political discourses" (Allan 2016, 33). Hopf (2002) engages in some of these tactics in his analysis of Soviet foreign policy, transparently choosing and explicitly justifying the temporal period of analysis as well as text, relying on uncontroversial Soviet outlets like *Pravda* and the most widely read Soviet literature, such as *Span of the Year*. Bias resulting from Hopf's (2002)

[28] Ruggie (1997) attempts to contrast Roosevelt's appeal to American greatness and Wilson's appeal to American morality and democratic principles, yet he neglects parts of Wilson's declaration of war on Germany that clearly make appeals to America's power and status as a champion among the nations. Likewise, Ruggie's (1997) selection of these two appeals biases his conclusions as to which appeals are more successful. Roosevelt's imperial adventures could hardly be construed as protective measures, while Wilson's entry into WWI was preceded by the Zimmerman telegram, which galvanized American support toward action.

selection of texts is therefore more likely to not be his, but to be that of the Soviet intelligentsia and public. This bias is completely acceptable when the goal is to analyze Soviet identity.[29]

Sources of US Identity: Where to Look?

Analyzing US identity and its values therefore demands an approach with a careful and (as much as possible) impartial selection of artifacts for analysis. Besides deciding which specific samples should be analyzed, researchers must also decide where, ontologically, to look for these samples in the first place. Essentially, where is US identity likely to manifest itself in a way where it can be observed? Past analyses of identity typically investigate three realms in which identity is evident: history, culture, and politics.

Human beings tend to understand their present condition by connecting it to their history. Therefore, in order to understand how a people perceive their own identity it is pertinent to look at their past. The common history of a people, their common experiences, or the experiences they are told are their own, will assist in constructing the identity of their group, their norms, and their values (Liu and Hilton 2005). Values develop "as generalizations from some experiences with certain kinds of action and their consequences" (Williams, 24). When new events happen individuals refer to the past to understand them and construct common narratives (Campbell 2001). Furthermore, nations will tend to look to past events they feel best represent their identity and will downplay or "forget" those events that they feel are unrepresentative (Hirshberg 1993).

[29] For instance, Ruggie (1997)'s conclusions would be much stronger had he either compared and contrasted pre-war speeches by all presidents, using "pre-war" as an unbiased or objective metric, or compared and contrasted speeches which external researchers thought to be of note. Likewise, Campbell (1998)'s analysis could be considered more conclusive had he analyzed all declassified national security documents during a determined time period or had he analyzed national security documents which American foreign policy analysts or historians consider most influential.

As such, when looking to history to understand a nation's identity it is necessary to examine the history not as an unbiased and balanced whole but to look at those events emphasized by the nation itself. Furthermore, past events should be analyzed not only for their identity and value-laden content according to the external observer, but also for their identity and value-laden content according to the members of the nation. For example, while an external observer may see British imperialism as a demonstration of a brutal or despotic segment of British identity, the British may see imperialism as flawed in practice but generally conducted with the goal of benefiting those populations subjected to British rule. Reading the British government's national archives page on British rule in India attests to this fact:

> Research suggests that from about 1870 to 1930 Britain took about 1% of India's wealth per year. This was much less than the French, Dutch and Germans took from their lands. The British invested about £400 million in the same period. They brought in an irrigation programme, which increased the amount of land available for farming by 8 times. They developed a coal industry, which had not existed before. Public health and life expectancy increased under British rule, mainly due to improved water supplies and the introduction of quinine treatment against malaria (Walsh 2016).[30]

Understanding a nation's culture can also offer insight into a nation's identity and the values associated with its identity. Culture is more complicated than the simple designations incorporated into regression models by quantitative oriented scholars. Culture is "common

[30] An interpretation of British imperialism from the point of an external observer would perhaps place greater emphasis on its brutality, while the British account seems to admit shortcomings but emphasizes its desirability over feasible alternatives. When reading British history to understand the UK's identity, the subject's interpretation of history is more pertinent.

knowledge," assumed by groups of people regarding what exists in the world, including the characteristics of others and the state of the world. In the context of a nation, culture is the common knowledge that is collectively shared by the nation. Such common knowledge takes the form of "norms, rules, institutions, conventions, ideologies, customs, and laws" (Wendt 1999, 160). Culture is the means by which agents come to make sense of their world. Wedeen (2002) refers to culture as "semiotic practices," or the process of meaning-making through shared symbols. Culture is not simply beliefs that exist but beliefs that are reinforced and cultivated through practices. Understanding culture therefore "requires an analysis of the ways in which people use words, establish and interpret signs, and acting the world in ways that foster intelligibility" (Wedeen, 720). Values are created from new experiences [history] and they are established through "generalizations" [culture] that could "be taught and learned without the necessity of passing through the full experience of alternative consequences" (Williams, 24). Discovering national values and identity can be done by analyzing these "generalizations."

A nation's values might also be mentioned explicitly in words. In functioning democracies, political rhetoric is how politicians persuade and make their case to the public. Populations are aware of what values they hold and tend to profess them proudly, especially in political contexts. Political argumentation in any society often incorporates appeals to emotion, which includes explicit references to national values. "Political elites attempt to mobilize political opinion to their advantage by framing the issue in terms that prime considerations that will move public opinion in the direction that they desire" (Koch 1998, 209–210). When politicians attempt to convince the public or each other of the correctness of their preferred policies, they portray their policies as consistent with the identity of the nation, which entails being consistent with the nation's values. This type of argumentation can be observed whenever

US policymakers refer to certain policies as "un-American" or "American as apple-pie." They do not mean that certain policies are literally foreign or native, but that some policies reflect the nation's values while other policies do not.

Values appear in political rhetoric constantly but these value-laden appeals are often specific to their audience. For example, American presidents often calibrate their rhetoric to the cultural specificities of the geographic area they are appealing to. The espousing of national values, in the American context, will likely occur under two conditions: National values will appear in political rhetoric directed toward a national audience and in attempts to convince a national audience that proposed policies are desirable.

Data and Methods

Analyzing US values in three domains, history, culture, and politics, will provide for a rich understanding of US identity and will also serve as a robustness check on any single domain. It should be expected that US identity will be "consistent" insofar as the values reflected in one domain should not be wildly different than those reflected in another.

Historical Analysis

I seek to understand the role of history in US identity formation by looking to and interpreting important events in US history, understanding what they mean to the US population, and deciphering what values are celebrated in these events and their subjective readings. The events I have chosen to analyze are those related to the "100 Milestone Documents," compiled by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). These 100 documents relate to US history from 1776 to 1965. The documents are an excellent set of events and lens by which to

examine the formation of US identity and the values associated with it. According to NARA, these documents have "helped shape the national character, and they reflect our diversity, our unity, and our commitment as a nation to continue our work toward forming 'a more perfect union.'" As such, the documents have explicitly been chosen by NARA because of their relation to US character. The documents for analysis were not chosen by myself, which mitigates the opportunities for selection-bias on the part of the researcher.

Coding the documents for their subjective meanings entails consulting subjective interpretations. Subjective sources should "reflect both the elite political discourses" and "discourses that structure mass common sense." Furthermore, these sources should "circulate widely in society and thus can be expected to reflect the available stock of social knowledge" (Allan and Hopf 2015, 21). US history textbooks provide a good source of elite and mass consensus that is readily available. First, history textbooks reflect elite consensus in that historians, who would undoubtedly qualify as "elite," write them. Secondly, textbooks are the organization of history for the purposes of mass consumption on the part of teachers, students, and parents. As such, they structure the knowledge of the masses. Textbooks in the US, apart from being disseminated to the masses, are actually shaped by the masses themselves, and as a consequence they reflect the nuanced and contentious debates about what parts of American history should be emphasized and deemphasized. The debate over textbooks also goes beyond what events should be discussed to what rhetoric should be used to characterize events and ideologies. Textbooks are therefore a pertinent source to consult when exploring how US identity and values are shaped by past historical events.[31]

[31] Allan (2016) explicitly suggests choosing "two widely read high school history textbooks on your country's national history" as a means of ascertaining national identity.

I read each document and NARA's commentary for the values explicitly mentioned. I also consider the political context of the document to interpret what values are implied by the document and its surrounding events. The coding is not exclusionary, in that the documents can be coded as promoting multiple US values. Additionally, I try to interpret the documents as a whole rather than looking for the existence of a keyword.[32] I also observe how US subjects interpret these documents and events themselves by consulting three US history textbooks. The textbooks consulted are *The American Pageant*, *United States History: Colonization Through Reconstruction*, and *United States History: 1877 to the Present*. These textbooks were chosen for two reasons. First, they are among the most popular textbooks in the country, and so are disseminated and read widely. Second, they represent differences in their ideological approach. *The American Pageant* is the mostly widely used advanced placement American history textbook and has often been accused of having a liberal bias.[33] Pearson Publishing's companion books, *United States History: Colonization Through Reconstruction* and *United States History: 1877 to the Present* are approved for use by the Texas State Board of Education, known for its controversial and conservative-leaning education standards. I use the textbooks as a check on my own reading of the documents and the political atmosphere that led to their existence.

One complication regarding the coding is whether these documents should be coded in terms of what they meant to their writers and contemporaries or whether these documents should be coded in terms of how they are remembered by modern Americans. Since I am interested in how values resonate in the current American consciousness given US understandings of the past,

[32] For example, while Declaration of Independence has reference to a creator, the purpose of the document is not essentially religious or attempting to convey strong religious convictions.
[33] The far-left has also accused the book of glossing over the more unsavory aspects of US history.

I place the emphasis on the latter. However, modern understandings cannot be completely disconnected from the document's original intent. Prior understandings will influence later ones.

Cultural Analysis

In order to understand the value illustrated in the common knowledge and practices of the United States a set of cultural artifacts needs to be chosen for analysis. Like historical events, this set of cultural artifacts should be chosen for analysis by some objective standard rather than by perceived import on the part of the researcher. I incorporate cultural displays in the analysis based on two standards: status as federal holidays and status as "officially recognized" traditions. Federal holidays are analyzed because they are state-sanctioned celebrations of common knowledge. The values exhibited in federal holidays are those being celebrated and advanced by the state. By design, national populations participate in the state-sanctioned celebration – either because the impetus for federal holidays originates with the citizens and their own cultural celebrations, or because federal holidays create social pressures to take part in cultural displays.

In addition to federal holidays, I analyze traditions that have been "officially recognized" by the United States. This category seems broad initially, but it applies to a small amount of material, including slogans, mottos, symbols and anthems. While some of these symbols are unknown, a number of them are celebrated with frequency at sporting events, public gatherings, and state-sanctioned memorials. National populations are often exposed to and participate in the celebration of these cultural artifacts. It is therefore reasonable to assume that these traditions were either adopted because of their popular appeal or have popular appeal because of their adoption by the state.

The cultural artifacts I've chosen for analysis span from shortly after independence (Independence Day) to 1983 (Martin Luther King Jr. Day). I analyze the government texts associated with the artifacts. For federal holidays, this means I analyze acts of Congress that led to their adoption, any initial statement by the President at their adoption, and various statements of presidents on their commemoration thereafter. For cultural expressions formally recognized by the state the analysis depends on what exactly these expressions are. Most expressions are songs, anthems, or statements. In this case, textual analysis can also be conducted. In the case of symbols inferences will have to be made regarding the components of the symbol and their common interpretation or explanation. In all cases I will also analyze the events surrounding the adoption of the cultural celebrations by the state.[34]

Rhetorical Analysis

Political rhetoric will reflect national identity when it is addressed to a national audience and when it is intended to persuade the nation to adopt a specific agenda or policy. Presidential rhetoric fits these two criteria perfectly. In functioning democracies, political rhetoric is how politicians persuade and make their case to the public. Presidents want to cultivate broad public support for their policies (Stuckey 2005). As the President is the most visible US policymaker and public official and retains the "bully pulpit," they are granted unparalleled influence and opportunity to speak to the nation and shape the national agenda (Cohen 1995). Because citizens

[34] For example, the adoption of "In God We Trust" did not take place in a vacuum and can therefore not be so easily attributed religiosity without mentioning the perceived irreligiousness of communism during a period of intense McCarthyism. Thus, the motto has political significance beyond its plain religious meaning. Historical interpretation will once again be checked by *The American Pageant*, *United States History: Colonization Through Reconstruction*, and *United States History: 1877 to the Present* when possible.

are infused with national identity, part of persuading the public entails referencing national values. For this reason, presidents can be expected to speak of their policy proposals in terms of American values. Analyzing presidential rhetoric will therefore enable exploration of "which ideals have been associated with national identity in the United States" (Beasley 2001, 170).

Connecting policy proposals with American values is an example of *framing*. A frame can be defined as a central idea or "package" of related ideas that delineate and organize thinking around an issue or conflict (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Koch 1998). Framing is an attempt by politicians to present a frame to the public and therefore define what a policy or realm of public policy concerns. Of course, presidents also frame issues around interests apart from values, however, values remain an integral part of presidential framing.[35] By framing issues around agreed upon principles, presidents can promote "a particular type of ideological consensus" (Beasley 2004, 63).

Framing will be more successful when it is more in accordance with the values or interests that resonate with national "interests, beliefs, experiences, desires, and attitudes" (Van Gorp 2007, 62). As policymakers, presidents want to be as convincing as possible when framing their policies to the national audience. "Not all symbols are equally potent" and certain frames will better "resonate with larger cultural themes" (Gamson and Modigliani, 5). Therefore, not only will presidents frame policies around national values, they will frame policies around the national values that are most prominent in US national identity because receivers (the public) more readily connect frames with cultural constructs that they are already intimately familiar

[35] Attempts at framing around values can be readily seen in presidential political rhetoric. President Clinton attempted (unsuccessfully) to framing healthcare reform around the value of equality (Koch 1998). The notion of "independence" has been a prominent presidential frame in discussion of US energy (Below 2013). President Bush framed the US invasion of Iraq and the extended occupation around the promotion of democracy and freedom to the wider globe (Glazier and Boydstun 2012).

with (Van Gorp 2007, 63). Essentially, it is a reasonable assumption that, on the whole, values will vary in their presence in presidential rhetoric by their prominence in US national identity.

"If any speech ought to have an effect on public knowledge, it should be the State of the Union (SOTU) address." The speeches are "cherished political communication events that help bridge former separations of power among American governmental institutions" (Barabas 2008, 196). Barring any national tragedies or emergencies, SOTU speeches are the most accessible pieces of political rhetoric available to the general public. SOTU speeches are immediately received by a large audience and are an opportunity for the President to outline his or her agenda and attempt to convince both Congress and the general public that the agenda should be implemented. SOTU speeches are also delivered consistently. The address is required, and since 1913, with few exceptions, it has been convention to deliver the speech to a joint session of congress shortly after the New Year.

I conduct a content analysis of SOTU addresses from 1913 to 2016. I create a list of keywords commonly related to potential US values to create a value frame. I then measure the frequency at which these words appear in the SOTU addresses. Each value frame has an equal number of keywords associated with it so as to mitigate possible routes of bias. Additionally the keywords were chosen so that they were value-oriented words rather than policy oriented words. Keywords were chosen for being related to the value in question and for being affective.[36] The value-frames whose key words appear with greater frequency are likely being used because of their perceived persuasive power, meaning that the administration believes these values resonate with the general public. Therefore, the most frequently referenced values are those that are the

[36] For example, for the value "enterprise" the word "economy" was not included as a related keyword since it was employed often to discuss specifics of economic planning rather than the value of enterprise and industriousness.

most prominent in US national identity. Chi-square goodness of fit tests are employed to test whether the differences between frames are nonrandom.

Results

US Identity and Historical Development

Table 1.3: Frequency of Values in US History

Value	Frequency	Date of First Reference	Value Place
Democracy	32	1776	1
Humanitarianism	28	1789	2
Rule of Law	20	1787	3 (tie)
Human Rights	17	1782	4
Enterprise	20	1794	3 (tie)
Individualism	8	1787	8
Religion	4	1789	9
Violence	14	1782	6
White Supremacy	10	1820	7

Interpreting and coding the NARA documents demonstrates there is wide variation in how frequently certain values are referenced in US history. Table 1.3 shows the frequency with which each of the values is found in or related to the texts. Thirty-two percent of the documents

speak to ideas of democracy, freedom, and self-determination either for the people of the US or for other peoples with the support of the US. Documents dedicated to the value of democracy include the obvious foundational documents, such as the Declaration of Independence (1776), the Articles of Confederation (1777), the Treaty of Alliance with France (1778), and the US Constitution (1787). All of these documents are concerned with the independence of the country and overthrowing the "despotism" of British rule (as the Declaration of Independence characterizes it). References to self-determination or democracy are often explicit in these texts. The Lee Resolution of 1776 states that the colonies ought to be "free and independent." The Declaration of Independence (1776) declares a right to "liberty" and condemns "despotism." The libertarian- inclined Articles of Confederation (1777) strong reinforce each state's right to "freedom and independence" in Article II. The words "freedom," "liberty," or "independence" are found in nearly every article. Even the Treaty Alliance with France (1778) makes its purpose the "liberty, sovereignty, and independence absolute and unlimited" of the United States.

The fact that the first seven documents in American history are primarily, if not entirely, concerned with freedom and independence demonstrates the importance of democracy and self-determination as the most salient value at the founding of the country. There is no doubt that independence was in the interests of the founders, yet the founders articulated the right to self-determination as an inherent and natural right that the founders were now exercising. There is also an American consensus that the cause of independence was "righteous," as is evident from referring to the founders in paternalistic terms as well as ruminations that occur in later documents. For example, in the Gettysburg Address (1863), Lincoln asserts the nation was conceived in "liberty," an idea that it would rededicate itself to in a "new birth of freedom." The generalizability of self-determination is made apparent by outward exaltations of the principle in

the international arena, from the Monroe Doctrine (1823) to Wilson's 14 Points (1918). Democracy was valued not simply because it was beneficial for US citizens but because it was a good in and of itself.

The expansion of democracy internally through civil rights legislation is also viewed as the US coming to terms with a paradox: its values of freedom and democracy and the treatment of its black citizens. The civil rights movement is not seen in terms of simple self-interest but in terms of obtaining a value that all are entitled too. The 15th Amendment to the US Constitution (1870) and the Voting Rights Act (1965) are considered the fulfillment of the country's long-espoused dedication to the value of democracy. Americans remembered and continue to remember the revolution and further democratic expansions as a safeguarding of freedom, democracy, and self-determination – universal and timeless American values.

The second most referenced value in US history is humanitarianism. Twenty-eight percent of NARA's "100 Milestone" documents are concerned with the US as a benign giant that acts as a humanitarian for those inside its borders as well as those outside of its borders. Many of the references to humanitarian intentions occur directly in the texts themselves. Washington's Farwell Address (1796) implores the country to uphold neutrality in foreign affairs for reasons of "justice and humanity" imposed on every nation and that, furthermore, all policy should be concerned with both "humanity and interest." Washington calls on the country to observe "good faith," "kindness," and "amity" toward all other nations.

Democracy dominates the founding era of American history but humanitarianism dominates its expansion. American expansion is spoken in terms that signify offering gifts or bequeathing goods upon those brought under its banner. Jefferson's "Message to Congress Regarding the Lewis & Clark Expedition" (1803) was, in large part, concerned with befriending

the native population so that they might be at ease and also benefit from US influence. This was framed in terms of white supremacy, but rather than repression, Jefferson stated that the goal of the expedition was Indian welfare:

> "In leading them to agriculture, to manufacturers, and civilization; in bringing together their and our settlements, and in preparing them ultimately to participate in the benefits of our governments, I trust and believe we are acting for their greatest good."

This attitude is reinforced in US acquisitions, annexations, and expansions, such as the Louisiana Purchase (1803), which pledges humanitarian treatment toward the inhabitants, and President Jackson's "Message to Congress on Indian Removal" (1830). Although the latter is recognized as perhaps one of the most inhumane acts ever put forth by the US government, it was articulated in almost purely humanitarian terms. According to Jackson, the removal of the native population was "important to the United States, to individual States, and to the Indians themselves" since it would result in important "benefits:"

> "It will separate the Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites; free them from the power of the States; enable them to pursue happiness in their own way and under their own rude institutions; will retard the progress of decay, which is lessening their numbers, and perhaps cause them gradually, under the protection of the Government and through the influence of good counsels, to cast off their savage habits and become an interesting, civilized, and Christian community."

The racism of the sentiment and effect of the outcome is revolting, but President Jackson's humanitarian focus is a reminder that often the most horrific acts of ethnic cleansing are carried out by those who believe in the goodness of their own intentions.

The value of humanitarianism is especially highlighted in the documents pertaining to the US imperial period. The Spanish American War, while motivated by imperial competition, received popular support due to the suffering of Cubans and the Filipinos under Spanish rule. US intervention in the Caribbean, Latin America, and the Philippines was justified in similar terms. Documents like the "Monroe Doctrine" (1823), the "Roosevelt Corollary" (1905), and Wilson's "14 Points" (1918) all contribute to this view. The political context and dialogue surrounding the "De Dome Letter" (1898), the "Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States" (1898), and the "Platt Amendment" (1903) also show the salience of humanitarianism as a US value during the imperial period.

US domestic history shows the prevalence of humanitarianism as well. The New Deal's programs were argued for in humanitarian terms. The Social Security Act (1935) was a humanitarian gesture meant to mitigate the poverty of the elderly. While in other industrial democracies social security is viewed as a right, in the US the program is considered a humanitarian measure. The same is true of other US social programs and their amendments, such as the Serviceman's Readjustment Act (1944) and the Social Security Act Amendments (1965).

After democracy and humanitarianism there are a number of US values that exhibit very similar prominence in US history. Rule of law and enterprise are each present in the text and context of 20 percent of the NARA documents. Human rights is present in 17 percent of the NARA documents. The US devotion to the rule of law, or the idea of order and structure,

becomes prominent immediately following the revolution and the founding of the country. Domestic unrest, culminating in Shay's Rebellion in 1787, pressed the founders to create stronger institutions that had more coercive power. The documents drafted and laws instituted immediately following the revolution, such as the Virginia Plan (1787), Northwest Ordinance (1787), the Constitution of the United States (1787), and the Federalist Papers (1788), have long been interpreted as an attempt to constrain or restrict the "excesses" of majoritarian rule and democracy in favor of order and the rule of law.

A civil war not withstanding, Americans tend to believe this institutional arrangement has worked well and believe in the rule of law as a value. This value has been reinforced in further expansions of central power, such as the Interstate Commerce Act (1887) and Executive Order 10730: Desegregation of Central High School (1957). The latter is an especially telling case how the importance of law and order motivated action. Eisenhower was not particularly enthused with the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown vs. Board of Education*, but nevertheless felt that once the decision of the Supreme court had been made, the law should be upheld on principle.

The value of enterprise or progress is equally as salient as rule of law. Prominent American history is filled with early examples of groups or individuals embracing commercial and industrial progress. The Patent for the Cotton Gin (1794) and Jefferson's "Message to Congress Regarding the Lewis & Clark Expedition" (1803) are evidence of this prompt enterprising attitude on the part of Americans. In the latter, Jefferson argues that the expedition will not only improve the lives of the natives but that this improvement will be done through the power of economic progress and commerce. American dedication to progress in both material and immaterial terms is shown in the Pacific Railway Act (1862), the Morill Act (1862) and the Pendleton Act (1883). The US embraced the industrial revolution for economic purposes but also

because it valued progress for progress' sake. Developments like the Boulder Canyon Project Act (1928) were "dramatic evidence of what American brains and manpower could accomplish," according to NARA, and the finished product became "a symbol of hope for the dispossessed." Likewise, John Glenn's space orbit (1962), the "space race," and American scientific achievement more generally were declared worthy of effort by President Kennedy "not because they are easy but because they are hard." Although the embrace of technology, industrialization, progress, and enterprise are boons to the American economy, this embrace is framed in moralizing and universal terms. Progress is valued for the sake of progress.

Human rights follow close behind in terms of importance. The ideological groundwork for what would later be called "human rights" was present in US history from fairly early on. The Bill of Rights (1791) contains a number of rights that have now been included in the liberal pantheon, such as freedom of expression, protection from cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to a fair trial, and non-discrimination. The eventual abolition of slavery with the 13th Amendment (1865), the expansion of civil rights with the 14th Amendment (1868), the right to vote with the 15th Amendment (1870), the Keating-Owen Child-Labor Act of 1916 (1916), and granting women the right to vote with the 19th Amendment (1920) can all be considered developments in the progress of human rights. The establishment of the United Nations Charter (1945) created an institution that is considered by many to be an authority on human rights in addition to international peace and security. Thus, the domestic history of the United States as well as its past interactions abroad led to the development of human rights as a US value.

Other values make appearances in US history as well, but with less frequency. The idea that the US is instinctively oriented toward action and endurance through conflict follows shortly behind enterprise. The value appears in 14 percent of prominent historical documents and could

be the reason why Americans have generally had a bias toward coercive foreign policy tools – they simply value the idea of no retreat. Individualism, white supremacy, and religiosity are also national values, although they do not command as high of a register. Concerning the latter two – this is partly a function of how these events are remembered. For example, *Dred Scott vs. Stanford* (1857) is clearly an example of white supremacy in the American political system. However, the Dred Scott case is remembered almost universally as the worst Supreme Court decision in the history of the nation. The case is remembered an anomaly that contradicts the nation's true self (regardless of how dubious this claim is). Other racist laws, like the Chinese Exclusion Acts (1882) are not recalled with the same universal contempt, and therefore are reasonable to include in the pantheon of history that speaks to the existence of white supremacist values. Nevertheless, individualism, white supremacy, and religiosity each make up a smaller portion of US history.

US Identity and American Culture

The cultural symbols and expressions of the United States that were analyzed were the Pledge of Allegiance (1887), the Star Spangled Banner (1841), and the National Motto (1864). These are symbols and expressions that have been officially adopted by the United States.[37] The cultural symbols of the United States exhibit all of the same values found in prominent US historical events and tell a similar story regarding the greater salience some values command.

Two out of the three cultural symbols and expressions celebrate the values of democracy and self-determination. The Star Spangled Banner is older than both the Pledge of Allegiance and the National Motto, and it is concerned with the preservation of the country – identified in

[37] The Great Seal of the United States could also be counted amongst these symbols; however, the creation of the seal was already analyzed as a one of NARA's 100 documents.

the refrain as the "land of the free." The "Pledge of Allegiance" also explicitly mentions the connection between the symbol of allegiance, the flag of the United States, with the actual item of allegiance, the "Republic for which it stands."

Table 2.3: Values in US Culture

Culture Artifact/Celebration (Date Institutionalized)	Values Referenced
Pledge of Allegiance (1942)	*Democracy, Rule of Law, Religiosity*
Star Spangled Banner (1931)	*Democracy, White Supremacy, Violence, Religiosity*
National Motto (1956)	*Religiosity*
Thanksgiving Day (1870)	*Democracy, White Supremacy, Enterprise, Religiosity, Humanitarianism*
Christmas Day (1870)	*Religiosity, Humanitarianism*
New Year's Day (1870)	*Humanitarianism*
Independence Day (1870)	*Democracy, Violence*
George Washington's Birthday (1880)	*Democracy, Individualism, Religiosity*
Memorial Day (1888)	*Democracy, Violence, Religiosity*
Labor Day (1894)	*Democracy, Individualism, Human Rights, Enterprise*
Veterans Day (1938)	*Democracy, Human Rights, Violence, Humanitarianism*
Inauguration Day (1957)	*Democracy, Rule of Law, Religiosity*
Columbus Day (1968)	*Democracy, Individualism, White Supremacy, Enterprise, Religiosity, Humanitarianism*
Martin Luther King Jr. Day (1983)	*Democracy, Human Rights, Religiosity*

The pledge goes on to extol "liberty" for all inhabitants. Within both of these symbols democracy is not simply mentioned as a value, instead the country is identified as the bearer of democracy. Americans do not just value freedom, America *is* the home of the free. By extension it is what bequeaths freedom. Likewise, Americans do not just value "liberty," but liberty is granted to all of those who fall under its banner. The US is a "Republic" above all else. The pledge does not say the "nation for which it stands" or the "government for which it stands," but says "Republic," denoting the importance of the institutional framework. Symbols of the US do not simply represent the US but represent its desirable governing system.

Democracy is most immediately identified with the country but the fact of democracy is attributed to divine intervention and favor. All three official symbols of the US mention God in some manner. The motto "In God We Trust", which was quoted in the "Star Spangled Banner" but not officially adopted until 1956, is the most obvious appeal to divine grace. The historical background of the motto's adoption cannot be separated from the motto itself. The US was locked in international competition with the Soviet Union, which was officially atheist and often hostile to religious expression. The adoption of the motto signals a reaffirmation of the Christian principles upon which the country was founded and a confidence that such principles are still relevant and still necessary for the continued well-being of the nation in terms of both internal cohesion and confronting external enemies. This is also true of the "Pledge of Allegiance," which was adopted in the same "dangerous" Cold War period where a fear of external and internal enemies (communists), prevailed. The pledging of allegiance to "one nation under God" reinforced obedience to another distinctive aspect of the US and to the US itself. To be irreligious is to be anti-American. Obedience to the divine naturally lends itself to the value of obedience to and preservation of the divine order. Adhering to order is exemplified by the

"Pledge of Allegiance," which is essentially a demand of loyalty recited in classrooms around the nation. Loyalty is to be exhibited by adherence to symbols of the state and the God that protects the state.

Other lesser values are found in these cultural symbols. The "Star Spangled Banner," was written in a war and speaks about the "glory" of war. There is a glorification of violence, battle, and endurance through such violence. The white supremacist history of the US also finds its way into US symbols. The Star Spangled Banner makes a non-condemnatory reference to American slavery. These values are present, yet they do not represent the primary focus of Americans either then or today when they recite or remember such symbols. The US is first and foremost a divinely inspired democracy.

The US has eleven federal holidays: New Years Day, George Washington's Birthday (President's Day), Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, and Inauguration Day (quadrilateral). These federal holidays were official and culturally established at different points in history but all share official recognition by the US government.

These holidays exhibit a wider set of values than the three cultural symbols but still place a great deal of emphasis on democracy. Out of these 11 holidays, nine of them celebrate democracy in some capacity. Independence Day celebrates the breaking of colonial ties and self-determination. The earliest traditions attest to this fact (Heintze 2016). Participants were documented celebrating a "love of liberty," freedom, and independence. The Declaration of Independence (1776), which plainly espouses democratic ideals, was often read in public at the earliest celebrations. The first celebrations, occurring during the middle of the revolutionary war, praised the patriots who "fell gloriously in defence [sic] of freedom and the righteous cause of

their country" (Hall, Hall, and Sellers 1777). In the US, Independence Day is not only a celebration of the founding of a new country but also a celebration of the *character* of the new country; overwhelmingly considered free and democratic.

The other set of holidays that place an emphasis on democracy are those dealing with military victories or remembrances. While US victory in conflict is celebrated on nationalist terms as well, the celebration is framed around the "protection" or the "fight" for democracy, liberties, or rights. On the first Veterans Day, originally "Armistice Day" in celebration of the end of World War I, President Eisenhower called on the nation to "solemnly remember the sacrifices of all those who fought so valiantly, on the seas, in the air, and on foreign shores, to preserve our heritage of freedom" (Eisenhower 1954). Memorial Day (originally called "Decoration Day") is similar in its celebration of what is regarded as the goal of US military campaigns and the legacy of fallen servicepersons: the preservation of freedom and democracy. The holiday was originally meant to allow Union civil war veterans a day to commemorate their fallen. It has since been expanded to celebrate all veterans and their perceived cause. According to the Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War, in "traditional observance" the flag is "solemnly lowered to the half-staff position, where it remains only until noon" until it is "raised by the living, who resolve not to let their sacrifice be in vain, but to rise up in their stead and continue the fight for liberty and justice for all" (Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War 2014). Speaking just years after WWII, President Truman called for peace and paying homage to those

"who have sacrificed their lives in the cause of liberty and peace" (Truman 1949).[38] US Veterans are celebrated because of the alleged purpose of their sacrifice: self-determination.[39]

Celebrations of the value of democracy are also apparent in holidays that surround political events, political groups, or political figures. George Washington's Birthday (1880) and Martin Luther King Jr. Day (1986) are both examples of celebrating political figures identified with American democracy.[40] George Washington is viewed as a founder of American democracy while Martin Luther King Jr. is viewed as fighting for, among other things, the expansion of American democracy to all citizens. Historically, popular practice entailed celebrating Washington's Birthday with the reading of his farewell address in public spaces. The farewell address strongly extols American democracy and the virtues of national self-determination. Likewise, celebration of Martin Luther King Jr. Day often includes the replaying or rereading of his most famous speeches, which rather than criticize American democracy, chastise the US for not adhering to its professed democratic ideals.

Labor Day is the only US federal holiday that explicitly celebrates a political interest group. According to the Department of Labor, Labor Day is the celebration of the contributions of American workers. Like the contributions of political figures, the contributions of labor are intimately connected to the notion of contributing to American democracy. The American

[38] President Truman's presidency marks the beginning of regular proclamations on Memorial Day and the themes of the preservation of freedom and peace remain similar.
[39] Obviously, being a celebration of the military, these holidays have a natural association with US militarism and "action association." These holidays mourn those lost to violence but also celebrate violent action as a means to protect the nation and its values. The celebration of violent action is even deeply embedded in non-military holidays, such as Independence Day. Early celebrations of the holiday included the firing of cannons, guns, and invocations and prayers for military victory (Heintze 2016). Such celebrations reinforce Payne's (1995) assertion of a "culture of violence."
[40] George Washington's Birthday is also commonly called "President's Day," although the official designation of George Washington's Birthday has never formally been changed.

worker is the "creator of so much of the nation's strength, freedom, and leadership" (United States Department of Labor 2016).[41]

Unlike all other federal holidays, Inauguration Day is a quadrillion holiday occurring during the inauguration of a new or reelected president. It is almost impossible to think of Inauguration Day as anything other than an endorsement of American democracy because of the circumstances in which the holiday occurs. Many times, Inauguration Day occurs during transition between administrations and is therefore a celebration of the peaceful transfer of power, a hallmark of a functioning democracy. Themes of reconciliation and commitment to democracy are often present in the speeches of those being inaugurated. In the first transfer of presidential power to a different party, Thomas Jefferson declared "difference of opinion is not a difference of principle…acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, the vital principle of republics" (Jefferson 1801). Even after the most contentious election in modern history, President Obama reassured the country that a "peaceful transfer of power" would occur on January 20th, 2017 (WSJ Video 2016).

Besides democracy, other values such as humanitarianism and enterprise make noteworthy appearances in American culture. Humanitarianism and progress, just like they are related to America's imperial and colonial history, are related to America's colonial and imperial celebrations. Columbus Day celebrates the Italian explorer and his status as "discoverer" and standard-bearer of "progress and enlightenment" (Harrison 1892). On the first official celebration of Columbus Day, President Truman accredited Columbus with finding a new world that "became the haven of millions who sought freedom from oppression and want" and for

[41] Like Martin Luther King Jr. Day, the ideals that organized labor fought for and is remembered for fighting for expand beyond electoral democracy and to "economic democracy," including the right to organize and strike. Such rights can be considered part of the freedom of expression without reprisal and thus part of the pantheon of human rights, in addition to democracy.

producing "spiritual and material heirs" that "give strength to all people who have struggled against tyranny" (Truman 1945). Thus, the arrival of Columbus is celebrated not only as a benefit to Europeans but also as a benefit to all populations.[42] The Thanksgiving holiday also celebrates humanitarian gestures. The holiday emerged in the midst of the American Civil War when President Lincoln called on the nation to observe a day of thanks and pray for all those "who have been brought into affliction by the casualties and calamities of sedition and civil war" (Lincoln 1862). Thanksgiving became an official federal holiday in 1870 and then President Grant expanded on Lincoln's themes, saying that the day should be "an occasion for the sympathy of the sufferers" of "calamities" (Grant 1871).[43] Charitable giving remains highest amongst Americans during Thanksgiving and the "holiday season" more generally (National Center for Charitable Statistics 2015). The Christmas holiday, in addition to more explicit religious and doctrinal overtones, also shares this humanitarian disposition with Thanksgiving. Charities tend to orchestrate larger giving campaigns around Christmas and generally see an increase in donations compared to other times of the year (Mueller 2014).

A clear pattern emerges from the cultural analysis: there is democracy and there are the rest. Other values, such as human rights, humanitarianism, violence, and enterprise are present but they pale in comparison to democracy. Religion is also prominently featured in US cultural celebrations. Even if religious doctrine does not explicitly motivate the celebration, prayer, religious services, and spiritual reflection feature prominently. However, religion is rarely

[42] In recent years this idea has become more challenged in the United States, with many arguing that the holiday should be replaced with a celebration of indigenous peoples. Columbus Day is still supported by the majority of Americans, although support continues to steadily decline (Rasmussen Reports 2015).

[43] The mythical origins of Thanksgiving, the harvest festival celebrated by the Wampanoag tribe and the colonists of the Plymouth colony in 1621, also reinforces the humanitarian nature of the holiday.

spoken of in its own terms. Religion serves to reinforce other values. Democracy is seen as evidence of divine providence. Humanitarianism is seen as a duty demanded by God. Nevertheless, it is apparent that religion and Christianity in particular are values associated with the nation's identity.

US Identity and American Political Rhetoric

The content analysis of presidential rhetoric shows that democracy is far and way the most important US value. It is heavily extolled in US SOTU speeches. From 1913 to 2016, SOTU speeches referenced the value of democracy 1,926 times. The second most referenced value appears only 1,132 times. A concordance analysis (observing the words surrounding references to democracy) shows that these references are uniformly positive. Words that surround references to democracy include "great," "principle," "superior," "triumph," "tribute," "faith," and "defend." Democracy is undoubtedly portrayed as desirable and as a system that should be retained and protected. Furthermore, democracy is not just viewed as a kind of system or one form of government among many. It is understood as a moral "cause" that is associated with principles, values, and ideals that the country must have a "commitment to."

The affinity for democracy is a general one amongst presidential rhetoric. Each president has speeches and terms of different lengths. It would have been possible for democracy's dominance to be a function of a president who generates substantially more text (President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example). However, this is not the case. Out of the 17 presidents whose speeches are analyzed, all but five referenced democracy more than any other value. Furthermore, democracy's dominance is not a function of time. The dominance of democracy as a value is consistent through the temporal period analyzed. The analysis of US history, US

holidays, and US political rhetoric tell a clear story regarding democracy: it is the most important US value and it is at the core of US identity. Other values are drastically less important.

Table 3.3: Values – Frame Coding Scheme

Value-Frame	Keywords
Democracy	Democ*, free*, libert*, self-determination, self-government
Humanitarianism	Aid*, charit*, compassion*, good-will, human*
Rule of Law	Authority, instruct*, mandate, rule, rule of law
Human Rights	Civil-right*, human-right*, natural-right*, rights, universal-right*,
Enterprise	Advance, bold, enterprise, lead, progress
Individualism	Autonom*, individual*, personal, self-interest, self-reliance
Religion	Christ*, church*, faith, god, relig*
Violence	Battle, confront*, defend*, domina*, fight
White Supremacy	Backward, law-and-order, riot*, savage*, uncivilized

* denotes inclusion of all variants of the word so long as prior letters are in order.

The prominence of Democracy is consistent with the analysis of US history and US culture, but the analysis of US political rhetoric departs from these other realms in some respects. The second-most important value is not humanitarianism, as it is in US history. The second most referenced value in US political rhetoric is the value of enterprise or progress. The value is referenced 1,132 times. Three of the five presidents that did not register democracy as the most important US value referenced the value of enterprise above every other. For many of the presidents that referenced democracy as the most important value, enterprise was the second most referenced US value. The words used by presidents speak about enterprise in an affective

manner.[44] Free enterprise is characterized as a "system" with a "framework" associated with a "spirit of initiative," and "competitive nature." The "spirit" of the free enterprise system and the goal of disseminating or "bringing its spark" is spoken of again and again. The word most frequently spoken of in reference to the value of enterprise is "progress." Despite its somewhat political connotation (in both the "progressive" era and the renewed use of the term in the late 1990's), it is used in a bipartisan and emotional fashion. Phrases such as "progress of humanity," "ideas of progress," "progress of the free world," "spiritual progress" and "human progress" are broad in their scope and imply that progress is extolled for the sake of progress.

The last value that is referenced with noticeable frequency is the value of humanitarianism. The value of humanitarianism is referenced 961 times. The vast majority of these references idealize an imagined "human" community or "common humanity" that deserves to have "dignity," "essential human needs," and "welfare." US policy is presented as not just concerning the American people or being to the benefit of the American people. US policy is portrayed as concerning the greater human community and as benefiting the greater global community. American presidents engage in some self-congratulation when they claim the US "deals generously and humanely."

[44] The coding scheme (table 3.3) eliminated words counted through simple discussions of the American economy.

Table 4.3: Frequency of Values in SOTU Address

Value	Frequency	Value Place
Democracy	1,926	1
Humanitarianism	961	3
Rule of Law	329	8
Human Rights	452	5
Enterprise	1,132	2
Individualism	427	6
Religion	421	7
Violence	521	4
White Supremacy	8	9

Figure 2.3: Frequency of Values in SOTU Addresses



Table 5.3: Chi – Square Goodness of Fit Test

Value	Frequency	Value Place
Democracy	1,926	1
Enterprise	1,132	2
		$X^2 = 0.00$
Enterprise	1,132	2
Humanitarianism	961	3
		$X^2 = 0.00$
Humanitarianism	961	3
Violence	521	4
		$X^2 = 0.00$
Violence	521	4
Human Rights	452	5
		$X^2 = 0.02$
Human Rights	452	5
Individualism	427	6
		$X^2 = 0.399$
Individualism	427	6
Religion	421	7
		$X^2 = 0.836$
Religion	421	7
Rule of Law	329	8
		$X^2 = 0.00$
Rule of Law	329	8
White Supremacy	8	9
		$X^2 = 0.00$

Americans are declared a "humane" people. Such engagement with the globe is declared to be an "individual and communal responsibility" and a "basic humanitarian responsibility." This responsibility applies to those within and outside US borders.

Other values are referenced much less often than democracy, enterprise, and humanitarianism. Violence is mentioned 521 times, which places it somewhat above the others. However, human rights are mentioned 452 times, individualism is referenced 427 times, and religiosity makes an appearance 421 times. Compared to values such as democracy and enterprise, these values are far less salient and less distinguishable from each other. Rule of law is cited 329 times and is the second-least cited US value. This is somewhat puzzling, given that rule of law has a prominent place in US history. The US has a history of granting the federal government more power but perhaps this history does not reflect an appreciation of the law for the law's sake, but reflects other values that justify the expansion of federal authority.[45]

The difference in appearances of these values in SOTU texts is statistically significant. A chi square goodness of fit test (table 5.3) reveals that the probability that the observed distribution of US values is random is approximately zero. However, the difference between the salience of observed variables is not always statistically significant. Democracy, enterprise, and humanitarianism are statistically differentiable from each other and differentiable from other variables. However, human rights and individualism, for example, are not statistically differentiable form each other. The same is true when comparing individualism and religiosity. The results demonstrate that there are values that are extremely salient in US rhetoric,

[45] For example, President Eisenhower's desegregation orders, although clearly interpreted by him to be motivated by the rule of law, may be remembered instead as primarily a measure that protected human rights by shielding black citizens from the effects of Southern racism.

democracy, enterprise, and humanitarianism, and then there are much less salient values that exhibit less distinction.

Conclusion and Discussion: Three Tiers of US Values

US national identity is multifaceted but some of its values command much more attention and reverence than others. US values can be grouped into three categories or tiers: central, supporting, and tangential. First and foremost, democracy is undeniably the single-most important organizing principle of US identity and the central value. It is the value most heavily reinforced by US history, including during the earliest and most formative period of US history: the revolution and the founding. Democracy is also the value most celebrated in US culture. Holidays that celebrate the founding of the country celebrate it as a "free" country. Holidays that celebrate US victories celebrate the preservation of the democratic character of the country. Presidents appeal to democracy more than any other value when justifying their policies in the SOTU address. Presidents likely see democracy as the nation's most influential value, and therefore as the most persuasive frame for their policies. Whatever other differences Americans have, their affinity for democracy and their dedication to it as an ideal is not one of them.[46]

Beyond a dedication to democracy the picture of US values grows somewhat murkier. However, two supporting values standout from the rest. In all realms of analysis, humanitarianism was one of the foremost referenced values. In American history it is a clear artifact of the imperial period, in US holidays it is espoused through domestic and international

[46] Although there is evidence that the popularity of democracy is waning in the US and other industrialized Western democracies, this is mostly due to frustrations with the democratic system. Respondents who are critical of "democracy" are critical because of the perception that their democratic institutions favor the elite or are functioning in a way that seems to clash with our common perceptions of representative democracy (Inglehart 2016).

charity, in presidential rhetoric it serves to reify the goodness of the US state and its people. It is the second-most referenced value in US history and is the third-most referenced value in US political rhetoric. Humanitarianism is rivaled by the US value of enterprise, which outstrips it in salience in US presidential rhetoric. This affinity for enterprise is *not* a function of US interests in economic well-being, it is a function of seeing progress as a good for progress' sake. American inventiveness is also integral in how Americans view their own history. From the cotton gin to the space-race, the US has had the appearance of being on the cutting edge or on the verge of a "new frontier." Culturally, the value of enterprise is celebrated in holidays that commemorate this adventurous past. The value is not simply about market predominance, although the sanctity of the free-market system may be a result of the value, it is about ingenuity and the willingness to explore and confront the unknown.

The rest of the values could be considered "tangential." They are not as central to US identity, although they are clearly a part. In terms of US history, human rights is referenced almost as much as free enterprise, and is also especially prominent in the speeches of recent presidents, indicating that it may be transitioning to become a much larger part of US identity than it has been in the past. Rule of law and violence retain a strong prominence in US history and are also referenced frequently in presidential rhetoric. Religiosity and individualism make appearances but are seen less frequently. Religiosity functions primarily to justify other values.

If policymakers are imbued with US national identity we should expect a stronger attachment to the "core value" of democracy, lesser attachment to secondary values like humanitarianism and enterprise, and even lesser attachment to tangential values like human

rights and rule of law. Democracy should best compete with countervailing interests while human rights and rule of law should be more easily swept aside.[47]

How well a value competes with an interest is, of course, also a function of how important that interest is to the country as well. Interests are different from values in that they are based on material realities that can change rapidly. The economy is not discussed as such a vital interest until a recession hits. National defense is not discussed as the predominant interest until a large-scale conventional military or terrorist attack occurs. It is therefore difficult to say that one interest being more discussed automatically makes it more important. It could be simply that this interest is in need of addressing at the moment while the much more important interest is safely secured. In fact, we might expect that more important interests *are* discussed less because they are less prone to crisis than those interests that rise and fall in their importance. Regardless, a textual analysis of presidential may provide hints as to which interests have been discussed more historically. Conventional wisdom is that defense interests are more important than economic interests (Krasner 1978). The goal of "protecting" the American people is consistently referred to as the US government's most important priority. However, previous analyses have shown economic interests to have more influence in some realms of US foreign policy, such as economic aid allocation (Sandlin 2016).

To conduct a textual analysis I use the word most identified with the economy – "jobs" and the word most identified with military defense – "security." The word "jobs" appears 568 times in SOTU addresses. The word "security" appears 570 times: virtually the exact same

[47] Critics may state that US national identity is aspirational rather than demonstrably held in terms of actions, but this is just another way of saying that there exists US foreign policy actions that do not comport with US national identity. However, that is the very purpose of this investigation: to demonstrate how the values associated with US national identity influence or do not influence foreign policy actions. To determine identity by US foreign policy actions eliminates the possibility of identity being predictive.

amount of references as economic strength.[48] Whether national security or economic strength is prioritized will likely depend on the issue area and the time period. There does not seem to be any systematic difference between the two.

[48] The count of the word "security" has an obvious confounding factor that increases the count – the existence of the US social security program. This is certainly not what Americans are referring to when they discuss national security as an interest. Therefore, I go through 789 initial references and remove those referring to the social security program. Altogether, social security was mentioned 219 times, which means that a more accurate count of references to national security is 570.

Chapter 4

The Cognitive Consequences of Violating National Values

US identity promotes a central value (democracy), secondary values (humanitarianism and enterprise) and tangential values (human rights, individualism, rule of law, religion, violence, and white supremacy). If identity is predictive, and states craft foreign policy in light of their identity, US values should determine US foreign policy relative to the strength of their connection to US national identity. How does this happen? Despite the common international relations assumption of the state as a singular actor, states are made up of bureaucracies, and those bureaucracies are made up of policymakers. Policymakers, like all human beings, are subject to cognitive pressures, and national identity is among them. When policymakers devise foreign policy, they do so while instilled with a national identity that prescribes certain actions that reinforce national values.

Why would policymakers not be able to simply ignore national values when crafting foreign policy meant to establish national interests? Cognitive dissonance is the causal mechanism that demands policymakers make decisions in accordance with national identity. The prospect of *greater* cognitive dissonance in response to violations of central and secondary values creates *greater* pressures for conformity. The prospect of *lesser* cognitive dissonance in response to violations of tangential values creates *lesser* pressures for conformity.

In order to demonstrate that cognitive dissonance is the causal mechanism that encourages US policymakers to promote national values, two effects should be established. First, US individuals should be less willing to violate central values than secondary values and less willing to violate secondary values than tangential values when making foreign policy decisions. This effect would demonstrate that US national identity, as described in the previous chapter, is accurate and operates at the level of the individual. Second, US individuals should experience more cognitive dissonance when forced to violate central values than secondary values and more

cognitive dissonance when violating secondary values than tangential values when making foreign policy decisions. Establishing these two results would demonstrate the effect of national identity at the individual level and cognitive dissonance as a causal mechanism.

I conduct two experiments to investigate these hypotheses. I use a series of foreign policy vignettes to gauge how willing participants are to violate US values when they conflict with US interests in a foreign policy conundrum. In a separate experiment, I induce participants to violate a US value and then gauge the extent of the cognitive dissonance they experience post-decision. If these patterns of behavior are prevalent amongst US individuals, it is reasonable to expect that such patterns will be found in US foreign policy as a result of similar behavioral dispositions. The results of these two experiments show that respondents are more hesitant to undertake actions that violate US values. What is more, violations of the central value of democracy induce more cognitive dissonance than violations of the secondary value of humanitarianism.

From National Identity to Personal Identity

Collective identities allow individuals to recognize and differentiate between "individuals, categories, [and] groups" and promote habits that "express the qualities of selves and collection of selves" (Wiley 1994, 130). National identity is a characteristic of the nation as a whole, or the collective of individuals who reside within the nation. National identity is therefore a kind of collective identity that allows its perceivers to draw distinctions between other groups. The construction of this collective identity is rooted in experience and memory.[49] "Entitativity," or the perception that an aggregate of individuals constitutes a group, is cultivated by shared

[49] Analyzing US history and US culture was therefore a reasonable way of gauging US identity. The former assists in forming US identity, and the latter assists in reinforcing it through social memory.

history and interaction (Hamilton, Sherman, and Castelli 2002). "Knowledge about the past is widely viewed as a crucial ingredient in the construction of identity" (Wertsch 1997, 5). Whether political in motivation or not, references to apparent historical contiguity and "stability" abound when constructing a national identity (Condor 1996). Elites and intellectuals create and venerate mythical national heroes and argue for national revitalization or the pursuit of new goals in accordance with national history (Kaplowitz 1990). History acts as a myth or narrative that creates the perception of a common national ancestry as well as a shared national fate. The perception of being inevitably bound together as a group fosters national social and political cohesion, which leads to a "cultural and political bond, uniting a single political community" (Smith, Anthony D. 1991, 14–15). This bond establishes collective "rules, norms, moral codes, laws, 'do's and don'ts'" (Liu and Hilton 2005, 539). This shared history, bonds, and norms constitute national identity.[50]

Once national identity is constituted, entitativity is reinforced through memory, which often takes the form of cultural and social interactions that bolster collective identity. National identity is fortified through the mechanism of collective memory, defined as "widely shared perceptions of the past" (Duncan 2006, 2). Collective memory is an "inherently historical phenomen[on]" that persists through a continuing process of "ritual enactment" (Wendt 1999, 163). This ritual reenactment can include everything from cultural traditions to elite and popular discourse (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999). A group's collective representation of itself is central to defining and redefining "the social identity of peoples, especially in how they relate to other peoples," and therefore themselves (Lie and Hilton 2005, 537–545). Collective memory is

[50] Identity is never "done" being constituted but can be renegotiated. However, a constituted identity usually remains long enough to produce behavioral regularities and expectations; otherwise, the social and political bond identity provides would be meaningless.

"expressed in the habitual memory of a culture," meaning that the collective memory becomes regular behavior or performance (Fierke 2006, 134). Reenacting and remembering means the national community "may have recourse to rules and beliefs that rely on assumed knowledge and embed actions in a taken for granted background narrative" (Fierke, 122). Collective memory is "passed on" to new generations through social communication channels and ensures collective identity is relevant to the present (David and Bar-Tal 2009).

The working of both history and memory can be seen in the construction of US identity. Formative historical events leading to the creation and continuation of the US form the basis of US national identity and national values. This national identity is then reinforced by cultural celebration and rhetorical endorsements. Thus, the founding of the US is celebrated as a triumph for democracy since it is taken for granted that the US is synonymous with democracy. US military victories are also celebrated as democratic achievements, since it is taken for granted that democracy is what the US fights to preserve. Democracy is repeatedly espoused in current US political rhetoric and celebration since it makes up part of the "assumed knowledge" common to the nation. In doing so, these interactions preserve the identity founded and constructed in the past.

Collective identity is a group characteristic, but maintaining this characteristic is only possible through individual cognition. If collective identities exist, they exist because humans "evolved an emotional capacity for intense group loyalty" that can be "extremely powerful in shaping views" (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 416). The causes and consequences of national identity are therefore not simply a question of macro-construction and macro-constraints but also a question of micro-construction and micro-constraints. The construction of national identity is seen at the individual level, and its consequences should also be seen at the individual level.

The propensity for adopting identity is inherent in human beings. Erikson (1968) notes that human beings need identity to make sense of the world and organize their place in it. Collective identity gives individuals a sense of security, belonging, and importance (Druckman 1994). However, this function does not make the adoption of specific collective identities inevitable. The adoption of a certain identity, including national identity, is a consequence of social pressures. Individuals adopt national identity through a process of primary and secondary socialization (Berger 1996). Socialization is the instrument by which rulers "instil [*sic*] in the population a strong sense of national belonging" (Medrano and Gutierrez 2001, 753). Socialization is the "precise point at which the individual meets society, at which psychology meets sociology" (Bloom 1990, 15). Human beings are placed in a world where others are trying to construct their identity for them from the time they are young children. Even as infants, human beings begin to understand affective attachments to objects based on the behavior and language of their parents (Ochs 1993). Although these affective attachments are themselves constructed and not "natural," children will perceive them as naturally occurring and adopt them as their own, even to the point of being able to discern the deeper meaning behind predominant symbols (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004).

Affective meanings are not only imposed through parenting but also by the institutions of the state and community. The institutions and "national agencies" of "mass socialization" include "the public system of education and the mass media" (Smith 1991, 11). Children become accustomed to the symbols and ceremonies of the collectives they belong to, including their national collective. For example, Mertan (2011) explains the childhood construction of Turkish and Greek identities in Cyprus:

> "In this sociopolitical environment, family and school practices both in Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot communities supported ethnic identities and reinforced antagonism against each other. Children were systematically exposed to over-exaggerated ethnocentric historical narratives and cultural heritage. For example, every day Turkish-Cypriot school children had to stand in front of Ataturk's bust and recite the pledge of allegiance to both the Turkish flag and the Turkish motherland. In school, history books include narratives to enforce ethno-national and religious identities and derogate the 'other.' After the 1960s many generations have grown up in school and home environments that stigmatized the 'other' and described the other as the 'enemy'" (Mertan 2011, 76).

As a result of this social and political climate, Turkish-Cypriot children's perceptions of national identity were very strong and close to "the highest possible scale value" (Mertan 2011, 82). Although the Turkish case is an extreme one, it is obvious that the cultivation of identity would occur similarly in the United States. American children read about the founding of their country in their history classes, recite the Pledge of the Allegiance every day, hear the national anthem before every sporting event, and see their nation extolled in media. This process becomes especially acute as children mature and begin to think about national issues (Mavric 2014).

Socialization occurs throughout all of adult life. Proximity to others that share a similar identity strengthens one's own (Demo and Hughes 1990). Continuing familial relations, friendships, the media, and participation in civic organizations socialize adults to adopt or reinforce their national identity. Individual interactions with civic society and its institutions, "communities, movements, and organizations (from churches to political parties and mutual aid

societies)" are all an opportunity for the individual to be socialized to the predominant national identity (Calhoun 1994, 311). Interacting more frequently with the state apparatus that promotes national identity also acts as a "cognitive mobilizer" that "increases the individual's capacity to receive and interpret messages" (Inglehart 1970, 47).

The end result of this socialization is the internalization of national identity. According to Katz (1980), the attachment to the national symbols, the relationship with national structure, and the need for personal identity all result in individuals adopting national identity as part of their own personal identities. Once individuals internalize national identity and adopt it as their own, they identify with "the behavior, mores and attitudes of significant figures" in their "social environment." Values are included in these behavioral mores. Furthermore, these individuals wish to "enhance and protect identity" by performing it. The "urge to belong" is one of the "most powerful forces in the human world" and as such, personal identities are enthusiastically protected (Scheff 1994, 277). Collective national identity produces an individual identity, which then reinforces the collective national identity. The result is summed up by Bloom (1990):

> "Given the same environmental circumstances there will be a tendency for a group of individuals to make the same identification, to internalize the same identity. Similarly, again given the same environmental circumstances, there will also be a tendency for a group of individuals to act together to protect and enhance their shared identity" (Bloom 1990, 23).

Through this process, national identity becomes part of the "self-concept," or an "individual's beliefs about the self" that includes "personality traits…values, goals, and roles"

(Campbell, Assanand, and Di Paula 2000, 67). Parts of the self are "activated" when the are in situations that provide "information that has implications for the symbolic self," such as drawing inferences about others, choosing with whom to affiliate, or making decisions that provide information about the self (Sedikides and Skowronski 2000, 100). Individuals want information that confirms their belief about themselves rather than contradicts it. This motivates individuals to avoid situations in which their symbolic self is put into question. Thus, individuals avoid difficult tasks and select tasks in which success is more likely and tasks that confirm their pre-existing beliefs.

In the context of US national identity and its values, history and memory construct a national identity that is reinforced collectively through cultural celebration, rhetoric, and tradition. For example, the founding of the US as a democracy and the celebration of "freedom" in US holidays and presidential speeches construct and reinforce the notion of the US as having a democratic national identity. At the individual level, US citizens are socialized to value democracy (amongst other US national values) and think of themselves as citizens of a democratic state through the education system, predominant national symbols, their relationship with state institutions, and their interpersonal relationships. These individuals adopt US national identity and its democratic affiliation as their own. To enhance and reinforce their personal identity, they attempt to act in ways consistent with their democratic values. Thus, members of the US populous, including US policymakers, are simultaneously acting together to preserve and strengthen their own personal identities, which each share this same national component.

The key to this theory is the assumption of similar environmental circumstances, which Bloom (1990) mentions. This is a simplifying assumption. The relative strength of national identity should vary with variations in environment or socialization (Citril, Wong, and Duff

2001, 78). Although US citizens are subjected to the same national history, the same national cultural celebrations, and the same national political rhetoric, they are not blank slates. Even if they may share the same national identity, this identity may interact with other social identities that they inhabit (Collins 2010). Black Americans will view the country's history differently from white Americans. Recent immigrants to the US or new citizens may not have the same connection to the country's past as born-and-raised US citizens.[51] However, different doesn't necessarily mean dissimilar. Although different classes of Americans may have different views on US history, they are subject to the same national socialization and will still be familiar with its main themes. Furthermore, American national institutions are well established and may be able to mitigate most differences by promoting a strong overarching American identity (Horowitz 1985). American minorities can be expected to still share broadly in American identity but to a lesser extent than Americans who share in the dominant white Christian culture.[52] Previous research shows that a majority of all American subgroups identify as American; however, minorities identify less strongly and maintain less national pride than whites (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Transue 2007; Rodriguez, Schwartz, and Whitebourne 2010).

Objective events, history, and memory act as constant inputs on collective national identity. Collective national identity is imported to national institutions, which carry out the process of socialization. The process of socialization influences the individual's personal identity to the point where he or she adopts national identity and becomes a member of the collective.

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[51] However, in order to gain citizenship, these immigrants go through an intense socialization process that might actually make them more in tune with US national identity than US citizens who have long been out of the education system.

[52] This may be true of Americans broadly but may not be true of American policymaking circles. Generally, policymaking elites go through a selection process in order to enter their positions, which includes elite socialization and credentials. As a result, those minorities who find themselves in the policymaking apparatus are more likely to share in the dominant culture than their non-elite US counterparts.

Their own personal behavior, in conjunction with the personal behavior of others, then reinforces the collective national identity.

Cognitive Dissonance: What is it and how does it work?

National identity is not the only motivator of behavior and will therefore not be the sole determinant of behavior. As stated in Chapter 2, individuals and collectives also have national interests, which are the means by which collectives secure their person. When the actions or policies required to secure national interests come into conflict with the actions required to secure their national identity, individuals will be, depending on the strength of the identity component (value), more likely to choose to preserve their life. However, doing so means they have betrayed who they are, and thus they incur cognitive dissonance.

What exactly is cognitive dissonance? According to Festinger (1957), human beings dislike contradiction between cognitions and actions or between mutually held cognitions. Cognitive dissonance is therefore defined as a lack of internal consistency between cognitions or actions and beliefs. A lack of internal consistency and its recognition produces psychological discomfort for the human being. This psychological discomfort motivates both dissonance avoidance and dissonance resolution. Dissonance avoidance will motivate humans to avoid dissonance in the first place while dissonance resolution will motivate humans to resolve dissonance after its recognition. Humans avoid dissonance by maintaining consistency. Humans resolve cognitive dissonance by changing their beliefs, changing their actions, or changing their perception of an action post-action.

Cognitive dissonance varies by cause but also by magnitude. The magnitude of the dissonance is determined by the importance of the elements involved in the cognitions and by the

proportion of dissonant elements to consonant elements.[53] Festinger (1957) hypothesized that the *magnitude* of the dissonance would play a role in determining both dissonance avoidance and dissonance resolution because the magnitude of the cognitive dissonance is positively related to psychological discomfort. Therefore, a greater magnitude of dissonance motivates a greater effort at avoidance of the dissonance and increases the effort needed to resolve the dissonance.

Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance has implications for social identity theory, and by extension, theories of national identity. If any social identity, including national identity, is a personal identity as well, it is constituted by personal beliefs or cognitions. Any cognitions or behavior that contradicts this identity would produce cognitive dissonance. Furthermore, this cognitive dissonance would be of a relatively high magnitude. If scholars such as Erikson (1968) and Scheff (1994) are correct that identity and social identity are vital elements of human existence, the weakening of which can produce crises, we would expect that humans would engage in vigorous dissonance avoidance or reduction in order to protect their national identity. Past studies show that occupational identity, sexual identity, and religious identity, all forms of social identities, can create the conditions for cognitive dissonance and motivate dissonance avoidance and reduction (Ashforth and Humphrey 1993; Mahaffy 1996).

Competing cognitions are especially effective in inducing dissonance when the cognitions involve the self-concept (Aronson 1968, 1969). According to Aronson, individuals have an inherent drive toward self-consistency. Individuals wish to produce a stable and consistent picture of the self, a competent sense of the self, and a moral sense of the self.

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[53] There is some confusion over what, precisely, Festinger (1957) meant by the second piece of this argument. In his 1962 article, he argues that dissonance magnitude increases with the gulf of the "deviation." Essentially, the spatial distance between the cognitions increases the magnitude. The "proportion" of cognitions seems not to be conceptualized as the number of dissonant cognitions versus the number of consonant cognitions, but as the amount of cognitive space the dissonant cognition contradicts (Festinger 1962).

Violation of any of these components introduces substantial amounts dissonance (Aronson 1992; Thibodeau and Aronson 1992). The betrayal of American identity can be seen as a moral one, since values are considered to be universally correct (Graham 2007). In simplified terms, the introduction of hypocrisy – a contradictory statement or belief about what the self morally *is* and what the self morally *does* will produce dissonance. Rather than cognitive inconsistency, dissonance results from cognitive damage to self-regard (Steele and Liu 1983; Steele 1988). Potential acts of hypocrisy motivate individuals to keep their behavior in line with their morals. Failure to do so will induce dissonance and motivate individuals to reduce this dissonance (Aronson 1999; Stone and Fernandez 2008).

It has long been recognized that cognitive processes, cognitive dissonance among them, have the potential to play a driving role in human affairs, including in the realm of international relations (Jervis 1976; Landau et al. 2004; Huddy et al. 2005). There is no reason to expect that policymakers would be exempt from these psychological experiences. In the context of US foreign policy, policymakers are attempting to balance values and interests, and at times they will need to necessarily choose one over the other. Both interests and values are important cognitions, and disregarding them will necessarily produce dissonance. Values are a product of US identity and are therefore a betrayal of the positive self-concept deemed vitally important by scholars of cognitive dissonance. However, as Chapter 2 found, not all of these values are equally part of US national identity and therefore not equally part of the self-concept. The value of democracy is more important than the others. The betrayal of democracy should therefore produce more dissonance than a betrayal of other values.

Interests are beliefs relate directly to material self-survival. Like values, disregarding interests will also produce cognitive dissonance and in fact, disregarding interests will produce a

greater-magnitude of cognitive dissonance than the betrayal of values. The drive for ontological survival is the most important priority of the individual (Becker 1971, 1973, 1975). Thus, a failure to protect interests will result in a much greater crisis than the crisis produced by a failure to uphold personal identity. "The more important the cognitive elements involved in the inconsistency are to the individual, the greater the dissonance. Thus, inconsistencies involving cognitions central to the self-concept or to valued goals, such as economic prosperity or basic needs, such as survival will arouse particularly high levels of cognitive dissonance" (Simon, Greenberg, and Jack 1995, 247).[54] Interests can be seen as a much more important cognition than values, and the amount of cognitive dissonance produced by their violation will result in greater efforts to avoid such dissonance and reduce the resulting dissonance.

A few conceptual hypotheses are derived from this social-psychological theory about interests, values, and dissonance. First, individuals instilled with US national identity should be less willing to approve of foreign policy actions that violate US values. This is because actions that violate values will produce cognitive dissonance. Secondly, violations of the "core" value of democracy should incite greater cognitive dissonance than the violation of lesser national values. This is because violations of democracy, which is the most important US value, are a greater attack on US national identity than violations of lesser values.

[54] Death anxiety may be a contributing factor to interests being chosen over values in US foreign policy. Although the experiments in this chapter do not intend to trigger mortal anxiety, individuals thinking about material well-being and security may nevertheless think about their mortality when making the decision. This likely replicates many of the decisions made in US foreign policy.

Observing/Measuring Dissonance

The first challenge when measuring and observing dissonance is ensuring that dissonance is created. This can be done in two ways. First, participants can be induced to act contrary to their prior attitudes (induced-compliance paradigm). Participants can also experience dissonance through being asked to choose between two alternatives (free-choice paradigm). More dissonance is created the greater the number and importance of the rejected alternative and the negative aspects of the chosen alternative relative to the number and importance of negative aspects of the rejected alternative and positive aspects of the chosen alternative (Harmon-Jones 2000, 121). Under either of these paradigms, dissonance may be provoked by the introduction of hypocrisy that damages self-consistency or self-integrity. This is because this dissonance is a threat to self-integrity rather than simply self-consistency. Low, concrete cognitions might not involve self-conception, while higher-level, more abstract cognitions (for which national identity would qualify) might involve the self (Carver and Scheier 1981).

Aronson (1969) finds that the perception of persuasion is an integral part to creating cognitive dissonance. Individuals do not experience cognitive dissonance if they are under the impressions that their dissonant actions will have no real effect on material conditions. However, when individuals think their dissonant actions will change outcomes, they experience cognitive dissonance and engage in dissonance reduction strategies. Applying this to the American case, individuals should experience cognitive dissonance when they violate US values and believe this violation will potentially alter policy.[55]

[55] Another condition suggested as necessary to produce dissonance is the perception of freedom on the part of the subject. If the subject views his or her own choice as a result of pressure from the researcher, they do not recognize the dissonance between their beliefs and their actions, since they attribute their actions to the researcher. For a review of this literature, see Cooper and Fazio (1984).

A question that the theory of cognitive dissonance has not entirely resolved is how cognitive dissonance is actually observed. A direct measure of dissonance is the actual dissonance between two cognitions. Keutzer (1968) ingeniously measures the dissonance between the cognitions of smokers by having them estimate the age they will live to if they continue smoking and the age they will live to if they quite immediately. The difference in years is the dissonance between their cognition and their actions (continued smoking). Yet measuring dissonance in this way is nearly impossible when the dissonance between the cognitions (values and their betrayal) cannot be quantified in any straightforward way.

The literature has generally reported only three means of observation and measurement: dissonance reduction, individual acknowledgment, and psychological discomfort. In the first experiment to measure cognitive dissonance, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) use the presence of dissonance reduction as evidence of cognitive dissonance. Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) examine how individuals react when they are "forced to do or say something contrary" to a personal belief. The authors hypothesized that individuals should "change their private opinion" to bring it "into correspondence" with their forced behavior and that "the pressure to reduce dissonance will be a function of the magnitude of the dissonance … [and] observed opinion change should be greatest when the pressure used to elicit the overt behavior is just sufficient" (114). The authors found that when subjects were induced by monetary awards to change their private opinion, their tendency to do so increase with the reward offered. This change of opinion, according to Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), is dissonance reduction. The less the reward offered, the greater the magnitude of the dissonance, since there was more pressure applied to change personal belief because the person did not want to "sell out" for more paltry amounts.

Measuring cognitive dissonance by measuring dissonance reduction (operationalized as a change in belief) has come under fierce criticism, as psychological processes other than cognitive dissonance could have contributed to motivate the opinion change (Chapanis and Chapanis 1964; Rosenberg 1965; Oshikawa 1968). Others have acceded to the basic finding, but argue that it was not the dissonance between the two cognitions that motivated dissonance reduction but rather behavior that endangered the self-esteem of the individual (Aronson 1968; Steele and Liu 1983; Aronson 1999). Cognitive dissonance here is essentially framed as a consequence of self-contradiction that hurts the self-esteem of the individual. Either of these explanations for dissonance reduction are compatible with the story of American identity and interests. Individuals who experience cognitive dissonance for violating national values could be experiencing dissonance resulting from contradictions between behavior and cognition or the violation of their own identity, the latter of which reduces their self-esteem.

A major criticism of measuring dissonance by the existence of dissonance reduction strategies is that it is not a direct measure of cognitive dissonance but of opinion change. Even if there was opinion change as a result of the dissonance, the actual dissonance and its magnitude is theorized rather than measured. Psychologists have instead measured dissonance as negative physiological arousal and have tested for its presence using physiological assessments. These tests have generally been mixed, but many find evidence of arousal-like qualities when subjects are induced to experience cognitive dissonance (Elkin and Leippe 1986). However, using physiological measures of cognitive dissonance still does not measure the underlying psychological distress that Festinger (1957) claimed motivated dissonance avoidance and reduction. A simple means of measuring dissonance is to ask decision makers how they feel about their decisions or actions post-decision or post-action and measure reported psychological

distress. Bell (1967) measures cognitive dissonance by asking respondents if they feel "uneasy" or if they feel they made the "right decision" (Bell 1967, 14). The more unsure the respondent is, the greater the dissonance between their decision and their perception of it. Questioning should also take place immediately post-decision so as to preempt dissonance reduction strategies.

Measuring dissonance through surveys has become steadily more comprehensive with the use of more complex response scales. Elliot and Devine (1994) created an "affective measure" comprising 24 items, some of which are dissonance-relevant terms and some that are not. Subjects indicated how well the term applied to them "right now" (immediately after dissonance induction). Identification with dissonance-relevant terms increased after dissonance induction. Hausknecht et al. (1998) and Sweeney, Hausknecht, and Soutar (2000) developed post-dissonance scales meant to measure two dimensions of "post-purchase" cognitive dissonance. First these scales measure the degree of the "cognition" portion of cognitive dissonance. This is essentially the degree to which "consumers" or decision makers recognize the inherent inconsistency in their actions, behaviors, or cognitions. These scales also measure the degree of "emotional dissonance," which are subjective feelings resulting from the psychological discomfort induced by the cognitive dissonance. Scales such as these or other multi-dimensional measures are attractive because they measure both forms of dissonance inherent in Festinger's (1957) original concept and because individuals may not all be affected by dissonance in the same way (Soutar and Sweeney 2003).

In order to test the propensity of individuals to violate different US values and their propensity to experience cognitive dissonance via the violations of US values, I conduct two experiments that incorporate the suggestions of the cognitive dissonance literature. I induce

cognitive dissonance through both the choice paradigm and the forced compliance paradigm. I measure cognitive dissonance through both a dissonance scale and by measuring attitude change.

Experiment #1

Subjects and Experimental Procedures

I first conduct an experiment meant to gauge how willing individuals are to violate the central value of democracy as opposed to the secondary value of humanitarianism. This experiment ran from May 24th to May 26th 2017. Eighty subjects were recruited from undergraduate classes at a research institution in Northern California. Students were given extra credit for their participation in the experiment, which took the form of a computer survey that lasted approximately 10 minutes. Self-reported data indicate that 32.5% of the population were white, 30% were Asian, 27.5% were Hispanic or Latino, 3.75% were Middle Eastern, 1.25% were Black, and 1.25% were American Indian. The average score for participants on an ideological scale (1 = Very liberal, 7 = Very conservative) was 2.21. Subjects were recruited through announcements in their classes and flyers emailed to them. Students took the survey in a computer lab where the online survey randomly assigned them a control or treated vignette.

Experimental Design

In the first experiment, individuals are asked a number of questions gauging demographic information. Among the demographic information, individuals are asked whether or not they identify as "American." Respondents who answer in the affirmative are associating themselves with the US and should therefore be instilled with US national identity. Respondents are then asked about their views on a range of US values and interests by indicating how much they agree

with following statements on a scale from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree": "The US should support humanitarian efforts in the world," "The US should support democracy in the world," "It is the responsibility of US policymakers to ensure the economic well-being of the American people," and "It is the responsibility of US policymakers to ensure the safety of the American people."

After this series of questions, respondents are presented with a foreign policy vignette. In the "control" vignettes, respondents are asked whether or not they will approve of a trade pact or security pact with another country that benefits US manufacturing or US national security. Notwithstanding those respondents critical of trade, most individuals should ostensibly support a trade deal or a national security pact that they are told will benefit US manufacturing. In the "treatment" vignettes, respondents are asked whether or not they will approve of a trade pact or a security pact with another country that benefits US manufacturing or US national security but also violates a US national value. In one treatment, respondents are told that the agreement violates the core US national value (democracy). In another treatment respondents are told that the agreement violates a secondary US national value (humanitarianism).[56]

An example of the treatment vignette is below:

> The United States is considering signing a trade pact with another country. This country has an authoritarian government. The trade pact will further empower the authoritarian

[56] I choose to include the value of humanitarianism in the vignette because it is easier to frame a vignette as having humanitarian implications rather than enterprise implications. Additionally, critics likely think that humanitarian concerns would carry more emotional salience than enterprise concerns.

regime, preventing democratization. However, the trade pact will also create American jobs. Should the US go forward with the trade pact?

According to the conceptual hypotheses, respondents should be less willing to engage in US foreign policy actions when such actions violate US national values, meaning that there should be less approval in the treatment vignettes than control vignettes.

Hypothesis 1: Respondents will be less likely to approve engaging in a foreign policy action when that action violates a US national value.

However, not all US national values are equal in importance, and we would expect that more central US national values provoke more cognitive dissonance, thereby inducing individuals to be more wary about disregarding them. The analysis of US national identity showed democracy to be the more central value and humanitarianism to be a secondary value. Therefore, we should expect that respondents are less likely to favor agreements violating democracy in comparison to agreements violating humanitarianism.

Hypothesis 2: Respondents will be less likely to approve engaging in a foreign policy action when that action violates democracy as opposed to humanitarianism.

It is not profitable to test differences in dissonance between the different responses to the treatment vignettes, since individuals select into violating US national values or interests. However, it is possible to observe whether more cognitive dissonance is created when

individuals are forced to choose between US values or US interests. This is accomplished by measuring the dissonance of subjects in the control condition and subjects in the treatment condition. Subjects in the treatment condition should have higher levels of cognitive dissonance, as they were forced to choose between protecting US national values or protecting US national interests. In this experiment I measure cognitive dissonance in two different ways established by the cognitive dissonance literature. First, I measure cognitive dissonance by utilizing a dissonance scale of the kind suggested by the cognitive dissonance literature (Elliot and Devine 1994; Hausknecht et al. 1998; Devine et al. 1999; Sweeney, Hausknecht, and Soutar 2000). To this end, respondents are asked to determine the degree to which a number of dissonance-related terms describe them on a scale from "Does not describe me," to "Describes me very much." Those respondents experiencing greater levels of cognitive dissonance should more readily identify with these dissonance-related terms.[57]

Hypothesis 3: Respondents will be more likely to identify with dissonance-related terms when they are in the treatment condition.

I also measure the attitude change of the respondents, as this is a dissonance-reduction strategy and its observation indicates the subject is experiencing cognitive dissonance. In order to measure attitude change relating to US values and US national identity, I ask respondents the same questions concerning US values and interests asked prior to the experimental treatment.

[57] Terms relate to both emotional cognitive dissonance (psychological discomfort) and cognitive dissonance (perception of inconsistency). The dissonance terms included are "uneasy," "uncomfortable," and "bothered."

Those in the treatment condition should be more likely to change their attitude because they will be suffering from cognitive dissonance.

Hypothesis 4: Respondents will be more likely to change their attitude when they are in the treatment condition.

Results

The results demonstrate that respondents are indeed less likely to support the US making a trade or security pact with a country that violates US values. Table 1.4 shows the differences in means of agreement approval between those presented the control vignette, where the hypothetical agreement *did not* violate US national values, and the treatment vignette, where the hypothetical agreement *did* violate US national interests. Approval of the agreement amongst the control group was 93%, while approval of the agreement amongst the treatment group was 22.5%. Clearly, respondents were warier of agreements that seemed to violate US national values, which supports the first hypothesis.

While individuals in the treatment group were less likely to support any potential agreement, there is no significant difference between treatment groups (see table 2.4). Respondents were just as likely to approve of an agreement that violated humanitarianism as they were to approve of an agreement that violated democracy. Therefore, although values affect the propensity to approve of US foreign policy, these results suggest that at the individual-level, respondents view agreements that violate democracy more negatively than agreements that violate humanitarianism. Thus, we cannot reject the null for the second hypothesis.

Table 1.4: Agreement Approval by Group

Group	Observations	Mean	SD	SE	*t*	*p*	Difference
Control	43	0.930	0.257	0.039	8.853	0.00	0.704
Treatment	31	0.225	0.425	0.076			

Table 2.4: Agreement Approval by Democracy vs. Humanitarianism

Group	Observations	Mean	SD	SE	*t*	*p*	Difference
Humanitarianism	15	0.200	0.414	0.106	– 0.322	0.749	– 0.05
Democracy	16	0.250	0.447	0.111			

When it comes to cognitive dissonance, there are differences between control and treatment groups. However, these results are not significant (table 3.4). When it comes to dissonance-related terms, those in the treatment condition had a slightly higher average identification with such terms than those in the control condition. However, this difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, when it comes to changing attitudes (table 4.4), those in the treatment condition were more likely to change their attitude regarding democracy or humanitarianism than those in the control group. These changes were all in the "positive" direction, meaning that those in the treatment group were more likely to say that democracy and/or humanitarianism were *more* important than they did initially, which makes sense given that the vast majority of them advocated not pursuing an agreement that violated US values. They were exhibiting classic cognitive dissonance reduction behavior: changing their attitudes to

conform with their decision-making. Once again, these results are statistically insignificant and we do not have evidence to reject the null hypothesis.

Table 3.4: Emotional Cognitive Dissonance by Group

Group	Observations	Mean	SD	SE	*t*	*p*	Difference
Control	43	7.837	3.323	0.506	– 0.867	0.388	– 0.711
Treatment	31	8.548	3.686	0.662			

Table 4.4: Attitude-Change by Group

Group	Observations	Mean	SD	SE	*t*	*p*	Difference
Control	43	0.674	0.944	0.143	– 0.792	0.430	– 0.228
Treatment	31	0.903	1.535	0.275			

Experiment #2

Subjects and Experimental Procedures

The purpose of the second experiment was to see if more cognitive dissonance was produced from violations of democracy (a central value) than violations of humanitarianism (a secondary value). This experiment ran in two sessions, from November 28th to December 1st 2017 and then again from December 5th to December 7th 2017. I recruited 282 subjects from undergraduate courses at a research institution in Northern California. The respondents were compensated with extra credit for their participation in the experiment. The experiment entailed

taking a 20-minute computer survey in an on-campus computer lab. The data indicate that about 54% of the sample identified as Democrat, 10.4% identified as Republican, and 35.4% identified as either independent or something else. Of this sample, 39.4% identified best with "Male" and 60.6% of the sample identified best with "Female." In terms of ethnicity, 32.8% identified as white, 25% identified as Asian, 26.1% identified as Hispanic or Latino, 2.6% identified as Black or African American, 5.5% identified as Middle Eastern or North African, and 8% identified as American Indian, Pacific Islander, or something else. These subjects were recruited through announcements in their undergraduate classes and flyers sent to them by email. Respondents signed up for a date and time to take the survey in an on-campus computer lab.

Experimental Design

In the second experiment, respondents are initially asked whether they believe the US should support democracy and humanitarianism in its foreign policy, and to rate the strength of their belief on a scale of "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree." These questions are asked to establish the respondent's initial attitude toward traditional US values. Directly after answering these questions, respondents are asked to write an essay. In the treatment conditions, the assigned prompts were written to induce cognitive dissonance. In the control condition, respondents were told that their university was planning to increase student fees to pay for more organic and local foods. Respondents were then asked to write a short paragraph explaining why they agreed or disagreed with the university's proposal.

In the treatment groups, half of respondents were asked to write a paragraph arguing in favor of promoting US values (democracy or humanitarianism) in US foreign policy and half were asked to write against promoting US values in US foreign policy. Respondents had no

choice as to which view they were asked to write in favor of. Additionally, students were told that their responses would be anonymously given to California's two senators. This was done to induce cognitive dissonance via the "forced compliance" mechanism found in the cognitive dissonance literature, where cognitive dissonance is induced by asking individuals to argue in favor of something they may actually oppose. Respondents were told that their responses were being sent to policymakers in order to induce them to think that there was a possibility (however remote) that their short essays might actually affect US policy. An example of a treatment vignette is below:

> Recently, there has been a lot of talk about whether or not the US should support other people's democratic aspirations as part of its foreign policy (for example, giving more aid to democratic countries). We think it is desirable if policymakers receive input from their constituents regarding this issue. We also think it is desirable that students practice writing persuasively by writing in support of ideas that they might not actually agree with. Therefore, we have assigned the following prompt to you: Please write a short paragraph detailing why you think the US **should not** support people's democratic aspirations in the conduct of its foreign policy. After all the responses are collected, we will forward your anonymous response to the offices of both of California's Senators.

After participants completed the writing task, their cognitive dissonance was measured in two ways. Just as in the first experiment, respondents were asked the degree to which they currently identify with dissonance-related terms on a scale from "Does not describe me" to "Describes me very much." Those experiencing stronger identification with dissonance-related

terms should be experiencing more cognitive dissonance. Treatment conditions where respondents are asked to argue against incorporating US values into US foreign policy should promote the most cognitive dissonance because these respondents are more likely to be arguing against part of their national identity. These treatment groups will therefore be more likely to identify with dissonance-related terms.

Hypothesis 5: Respondents who write in opposition to incorporating US values into US foreign policy will be more likely to identify with dissonance-related terms.

Not only will respondents who write in opposition to incorporating US values into US foreign policy be more likely to identify with dissonance-related terms, those respondents asked to write against the incorporation of democracy should experience more cognitive dissonance than those who write against the incorporation of humanitarianism. This should occur because democracy is a more central value. Therefore, those in the anti-democracy treatment should more readily identify with dissonance-related terms than those in the anti-humanitarianism treatment.

Hypothesis 6: Respondents who write in opposition to incorporating democracy into US foreign policy will be more likely to identify with dissonance-related terms than respondents who write against the incorporation of humanitarianism into US foreign policy.

Cognitive dissonance is also measured by attitude change. After completing the writing task, respondents were asked the same questions about US values that they were prior to the writing task. The difference between their pre-treatment and post-treatment answers was then

measured. It is expected that respondents who write a counter-attitudinal essay will be more likely to change their attitudes in an attempt to resolve the greater magnitude dissonance they accrue in contrast to their control or pro-attitudinal counterparts.

Hypothesis 7: Respondents who write in opposition to incorporating US values into US foreign policy will be more likely to exhibit attitude change.

Since respondents who write in opposition to democracy are writing against a more central part of their national identity, it is expected that they will experience more cognitive dissonance and therefore exhibit greater attitude change.

Hypothesis 8: Respondents who write in opposition to incorporating democracy into US foreign policy will be more likely to exhibit attitude change than respondents who write against the incorporation of humanitarianism into US foreign policy.

Results

Like the first experiment, the results of the second experiment show that US respondents do indeed consider US values to be important when making US foreign policy. In this experiment, we see this evidence through different levels of cognitive dissonance that are incurred via violations of US values. Table 5.4 shows the dissonance-terms ANOVA results for three experimental groups: those in the control group, those who wrote in favor of US values, and those who wrote in favor of disregarding US values. The mean level of identification with dissonance-related terms is highest for those in the last experimental group: those who wrote in

favor of violating US values. The difference between these groups is statistically significant. Thus, there is strong evidence in favor of Hypothesis 5. Individuals who write in favor of disregarding US values in US foreign policy incur greater cognitive dissonance compared to those who write unrelated essays and those who write in favor of incorporating US values into US foreign policy.

Table 5.4: ANOVA for Dissonance-Related Terms

Dissonance	SS	df	MS	F	*p*	Obs.
Between Groups	74.708	2	37.354	4.320	0.014	248
Within Groups	2118.259	245	8.645			
Total	2192.967	247	8.878			
Experimental Group	Mean Dissonance					
Control	5.396					
Pro-Values	6.618					
Anti-Values	6.816					

Table 6.4: ANOVA for Dissonance-Related Terms

Dissonance	SS	df	MS	F	*p*	Obs.
Between Groups	85.458	4	21.364	2.460	0.045	248
Within Groups	2107.259	243	8.672			
Total	2192.967	247	8.878			
Experimental Group	Mean Dissonance					
Control	5.396					
Pro-Humanitarianism	6.596					
Pro-Democracy	6.644					
Anti-Humanitarianism	6.479					
Anti-Democracy	7.140					

In addition to the differences seen among broader groups of writing tasks, these differences are seen with respect to which value respondents are asked to violate in the treatment writing task. Table 6.4 shows the dissonance-terms ANOVA results for the control and experimental groups divided by which value they were addressing. The results between groups are statistically significant and show that those who wrote in favor of violating democracy experienced the greatest average identification with dissonance-related terms, including compared to those who wrote in favor of violating humanitarianism. Therefore, there exists evidence for Hypothesis 6. The idea of violating the US value of democracy produces more cognitive dissonance than violating humanitarianism, which points to the notion that democracy

is a more central value in US national identity than humanitarianism. Additionally, the results of table 6.4 show that the anti-democracy treatment group is driving the results of Hypothesis 5. There is little difference in terms of identifying with dissonance-related terms between the pro-humanitarianism group and the anti-humanitarianism group. It is the violation of democracy that produces the greatest identification with dissonance-related terms.

The results pertaining to association with dissonance-related terms are similar to the findings with respect to dissonance-induced attitude change. Attitude change was measured by quantifying the respondents' answers to the questions regarding US values and then subtracting their first answer from their second answer. Table 7.4 and table 8.4 are the ANOVA results reporting differences in the degree of democracy- and humanitarianism-related attitude change, respectively, across experimental groups. In both cases, more attitude change is seen in groups where recipients were arguing against incorporating US values into US foreign policy. The results in table 7.4 demonstrate that those arguing against US values had a much higher mean democracy-related attitude change than either those in the control group or those who argued in favor of US values. The differences between groups are statistically significant. The results are similar with respect to attitude change regarding humanitarianism. The results in table 8.4 show that respondents who wrote against US values had a higher mean humanitarianism-related attitude change than either the control group or the group writing in favor of US values. However, the results are only statistically significant at the $p < 0.1$ level. Along with the results in table 7.4, this provides moderate evidence in favor of hypothesis 7. There exists a higher propensity for attitude change and therefore evidence of a greater magnitude of dissonance among violators of US national identity.

Table 7.4: ANOVA for Democracy-Related Attitude Change

Democracy Change	SS	df	MS	F	*p*	Obs.
Between Groups	5.068	2	2.534	3.680	0.026	250
Within Groups	170.115	245	0.688			
Total	175.184	249	0.703			
Experimental Group	Mean Democracy Change					
Control	– 0.094					
Pro-Values	– 0.091					
Anti-Values	– 0.383					

Table 8.4: ANOVA for Humanitarianism-Related Attitude Change

Humanitarianism Change	SS	df	MS	F	*p*	Obs.
Between Groups	3.328	2	1.664	2.740	0.066	249
Within Groups	149.226	246	0.606			
Total	152.554	248	0.615			
Experimental Group	Mean Humanitarianism Change					
Control	– 0.018					
Pro-Values	– 0.183					
Anti-Values	– 0.326					

Table 9.4: Answer-Change by Group

Group	Observations	Mean	SD	SE	*p*	Difference
Anti-Humanitarianism	47	– 0.425	0.972	0.141	0.750	0.064
Anti-Democracy	51	– 0.490	1.027	0.143		

Table 9.4 shows the results of a difference in means test between the anti-democracy and anti-humanitarian writing groups regarding their propensity for attitude change with respect to the value that their group violated. Overall, the mean propensity for attitude change is higher in the anti-democracy group. However, this result is statistically insignificant, rendering Hypothesis 8 inconclusive.

External Validity

The protocols of both of these experiments raise questions as to their external validity. In this project, my primary interest is in the actions and cognitions of policymakers. Yet, I did not conduct this experiment using a sample of policymakers, but instead used a sample of undergraduates at a university. While not ideal, I believe this approach is useful for several reasons. First, in some ways the undergraduate population better represents the policymaking population than a representative sample of US citizens would be. Only about 40% of Americans have some college education but a college degree is essentially required to become an influential policymaker in a foreign policymaking bureaucracy (Mason 2014). Thus, an undergraduate population in college more closely aligns with the educational requirements of a policymaker than the general population. There are other ways in which the undergraduate population more closely resembles the policymaking population. The median family income of the students at the

university where the experiments were conducted is higher than the US average, with the percentage coming from families in the top 1% income bracket being 2.4% (New York Times 2017). Thus, the university population here is more "elite" than the American public at large and likely closer to the kind of population making up elite policymaking bureaucracies.

In addition to the likelihood that the convenience sample here might be closer to policymakers than the general population, the lack of a realistic policymaking atmosphere may also not be as problematic as commonly thought. Although individuals here may not have been in a "realistic" policymaking setting, we would expect this to lessen some of the experimental effects rather than enhance them. In other words, the lack of a policymaking setting is a problem for internal validity rather than external validity (McDermott 2002). The fact that these results were attained without such a setting might actually speak to the strength of the results rather than their weakness. Student participants *did not actually* choose to violate another people's democratic aspirations and results were nevertheless attained.

Use of a student sample may still have limitations, as the results could theoretically be affected by a characteristic of the sample a researcher intends to generalize to on which there is little variation within the experimental sample (Druckman and Kam 2011). In this case, the characteristic on which there is little variation is the role of "policymaker." Furthermore, while in many cases this can be dealt with by observing heterogeneous experimental effects, this is not possible in the present case, as there are no US policymakers in the sample. The question is how policymakers might differ from students in their cognition and consideration of US interests and values. It is highly unlikely that policymakers differ fundamentally from undergraduates in either their cognitive capacity or mechanisms. Studies show that policymakers are subject to the same cognitions found among all peoples (Geva, Mayhar, and Skorick 2000). However, it is likely that

policymakers, having taken an oath to uphold US interests, would be more reluctant to disregard an agreement that fostered these interests even if that agreement violated US values. Thus, while the majority of students *would not* enter into an agreement that violated US values, this result may not hold if the experiment were conducted amongst policymakers. It is still likely that policymakers would be less likely to approve of agreements that violated US national identity. Policymakers are subjected to symbols and environmental stimuli that strongly reinforces a sense of national identity (Berger 1996; Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001). Bureaucracies also socialize those they encounter, including policymakers, to the bureaucracy's values (Denhardt 1968; Avruch 1981). Thus, it is probable that policymakers are more attuned to both US interests *and* US values than the sample used here. Thus, it is likely that policymakers will not jettison interest-based goals as quickly as the student sample (as the next chapter will demonstrate) but will still attempt to prevent the violation of salient US values and will suffer cognitive consequences if they do so.

Conclusion and Discussion

This chapter attempts to bridge the gap between a conception of US national identity and how this identity gets incorporated into US foreign policy by focusing on the individual policymakers and the likelihood that they will experience cognitive dissonance. The results validated some aspects of the theory that the hierarchy of US values found in US national identity maps onto individual cognition. First, the results show that participants were much more reluctant to support US foreign policy actions that they believed would violate some aspect of US national identity. However, in the first experiment, policies that violate democracy and

humanitarianism fare equally as poorly. This result suggests that policies that violate democracy don't offend respondents any more than policies that violate humanitarianism.

However, when it comes to inducing cognitive dissonance, the value in question matters. Respondents clearly experience more cognitive dissonance, measured in terms of both association with dissonance-related terms and attitude change, when they argue in favor of violating US values. Specifically, arguing in favor of violating democracy produces greater dissonance than arguing for violating humanitarianism. This effect was especially pronounced when it came to identifying with dissonance-related terms. The current results suggest that at the individual level, democracy is a quantifiably more important value than humanitarianism.

One question that arises is why there are no differences in terms of the propensity to violate democracy and humanitarianism, even as there are differences in the magnitude of cognitive dissonance that these actions produce. Experiment #1 had far fewer subjects than Experiment #2, and it is possible that increasing the sample size would lead to significant results. It is also possible that the security or trade agreement used in the vignette was not drastic enough to illustrate the differences between democracy and humanitarianism. Perhaps differences would be evident if more drastic events were used in the vignette, such as the overthrow of a democratic government or the forced-impoverishment of a nation. Future work should look at individual-level responses to more drastic scenarios and more US values.

Chapter 5

The Limits of US National Identity: Interests and Values in US Military Aid

The United States has long justified its foreign policy on the basis of its national identity, or as former President Obama would say, "Who we are."[58] This tendency is visible, even in a "hard power" tool such as US military assistance. The US has recently cut off or reduced military aid to states such as Thailand, Mexico, and the Philippines for their undermining of democracy or abuses of their citizenry – practices in conflict with US national identity (Reuters 2014; Malkin and Ahmed 2015; Villamor 2016). Despite these examples, other instances of US military assistance seem to contradict the values embedded in US national identity. For example, the US has allocated large amounts of military aid to Uzbekistan, a country that, according to the US State Department's own reports, is a "nightmarish world of rampant corruption, organized crime, forced labor in the cotton fields and torture."[59] While Uzbekistan is an affront to US values, it is an asset to US interests. The country provides a transit point for US troops and supplies and was a central location in the Bush Administration's rendition program. There are also economic reasons for supporting Uzbekistan, as the US seeks to create a "New Silk Road" through helping establish regional trade ties and acting as an economic counterweight to Russia (Sanger 2015; McBride 2015).

While much of US military assistance is granted in accordance with values rooted in US national identity, showering the repressive and non-democratic government of Uzbekistan powerfully illustrates national identity's limits. The US-Uzbek relationship also hints at the reasons for these limits: material interests. According to former Secretary of State John Kerry,

[58] Former President Obama is known to have used this phrase in many speeches when expounding on US national values and what it means to be American (Gopnik 2015).
[59] Quoted from a leaked diplomatic cable in the *New York Times* (Sanger 2015).

"the challenge for the United States is to strike a balance between its short-term, war-fighting needs and long-term interests in promoting a stable, prosperous, and democratic Central Asia."[60]

The determinants of US foreign aid have been written about extensively. Both US national values and US interests have generally been included into models of US economic and military aid allocation. This literature has found evidence for the influence of both. However, with few exceptions, these models treat values and interests as independent determinants. This additive model ignores the fact that interests and values often clash (as is evident in the case of Uzbekistan), requiring policymakers to choose between the two.

In contrast to the previous literature, I analyze the tradeoff between US interests and US values in US military assistance and demonstrate that the influence of US values on US military aid allocation is eroded when recipient states are of national security or economic importance to the US. Essentially, US military aid allocation aligns with the social-psychological theory outlined in Chapter 2. Values matter, but interests will determine when they matter. Furthermore, this theory, combined with the analysis of US national identity in Chapter 3, predicts that the value of democracy should be more resilient to clashes with interests in US military aid allocation than other values because it has the strongest attachment to US national identity.

In order to demonstrate the salience and limits of US national identity in US military aid policy, I develop a theory of why US policymakers would focus on US values when allocating US military aid. I then explain how the social-psychological theory would work within the structure and process that undergirds US military aid allocation. Lastly, I test the degree to which US national values are overshadowed by US interest using a dataset of US military aid allocation. The results demonstrate that while US values are overlooked when they compete with

[60] Secretary Kerry is quoted during his visit to Uzbekistan in the *New York Times* (Sanger 2015).

US interests in military aid allocation, the most central US value, democracy, is more resilient to countervailing interests.

US Foreign Aid: A Story of Interests and Values

US foreign aid is a tool of US foreign policy meant to achieve strategic goals (Morgenthau 1962; Mason 1964). This is especially true of military aid, which is deployed to bolster friendly states against their internal and external adversaries. The State Department, charged with deciding which countries get US military aid and how much, calls US military assistance "an instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy – a program with a substantial return on investment" (US Department of State 2004, 151). However, the US justifies its policies on the basis of its national identity in addition to strategic concerns. The literature on US foreign aid has repeatedly shown the influence of various US values on both US economic and military aid. For example, democracy is consistently claimed as a US national value and a consistent finding is that democracies tend to receive more US economic and military aid than non-democracies (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009). Poor countries are also much more likely to receive US economic aid, demonstrating a humanitarian impulse in US foreign aid policy (Fleck and Kilby 2006, 2010). The results for the US value of human rights have been mixed. Early studies show little support for the influence of human rights (Schoultz 1981b; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984; Carleton and Stohl 1985). Later studies demonstrate that on the whole, countries guilty of human rights abuses get less US military and economic aid (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Abrams and Lewis 1993; Poe et al. 1994). However, this effect is generally weak and inconsistent, especially for US military aid (Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Neumayer 2003; Capellan and Gomez 2007;

Gibler 2008). Recent studies of US economic aid allocation have shown that human rights considerations are conditioned by military and economic interests in the recipient states (Nielsen 2013; Sandlin 2016).

The US foreign aid literature presents two important findings. First, both US interests and US national values are incorporated into decisions concerning US aid allocation, even US military aid allocation. Secondly, US values differ in their incorporation into US policy. Some, like democracy, are consistently shown to play a significant role. Others, like human rights, seem less influential. However, the literature leaves two important problems unaddressed or underspecified. First, with few exceptions, the literature ignores the interaction between values and interests. These interactions obviously takes place, as the US-Uzbek example at the outset of this paper demonstrates (Nielsen 2013; Sandlin 2016). How do policymakers negotiate a tradeoff between interests and values when allocating military aid? The second problem with the aid literature is theoretical. The literature demonstrates that some values, such as democracy, have greater influence on the allocation of US military aid than others, such as human rights. However, no compelling reason is given for why some values matter more than others. Why are some values greater determinants of US military aid? I argue that US identity holds the answer.

A Social-Psychological Theory of US Military Aid Allocation

Both liberals and realist characterize US adherence to values as instrumental to other policy goals. Liberals especially point out that the ability of the US to achieve its policy goals suffers when it violates its values. Anti-Americanism stemming from a betrayal of US values harms American interests abroad (Datta 2014). In contrast, acting on US values can foster a

positive international image and cultivate US "soft power," drawing other countries toward US positions (Nye 2004).

There are two problems with the notion that US values are purely instrumental. First, the consequences of violating values are minor. Anti-Americanism can result in material losses, but these losses are small and anti-Americanism is typically short-lived (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007). There is also little evidence to suggest that differences in the determinants of military aid disbursements would be publicized enough to cultivate soft power in the first place.

The instrumentalist account is also unable to explain why some values would matter more than others in military aid allocation. A consistent finding is that the recipient state's democracy has a greater influence on US military aid than the recipient state's human rights record. Would instrumentalist theorists suggest that aiding democracies is a greater means by which to create a positive US image as opposed to aiding countries that protect human rights? While supporting both democracy and human rights might contribute to US soft power, it is unlikely the US gains more soft power from the former than the latter or vice versa.

I depart from the instrumentalist account and suggest that policymakers will consider US values when allocating military aid because the US has a national identity that socializes policymakers to genuinely care about such values. US policymakers wish to incorporate the values associated with US identity into foreign policy, including the allocation of US military aid, because it is consistent with their self-image and assists in maintaining their personal national identity. The foreign aid allocation process allows plenty of opportunities for the national identity of policymakers to intervene, as is seen by the history and political process that forms the basis of US military aid allocation policy.

In its contemporary form, US foreign aid is a rather recent development in US foreign policy and domestic politics. The first major modern aid program was the Marshall Plan, which was coupled with contemporaneous military aid measures that were limited and targeted. For example, Congress authorized specific programs to send US military forces to train friendly Latin American militaries in the 1920's and 1930's (Schoultz 1981a, 212). After WWII, these programs were preeminently concerned with eradicating communism in post-war Europe. Both State Department and military officials believed that military aid, coupled with economic aid, could prop up centrist, liberal, and social democratic governments and parties in European states like Greece and Italy. Although, certainly strategic, these military aid allocations were not devoid of US values (Pach 1991). At the time, British Foreign Secretary Ernest K. Bevin noted that such assistance represented a "spiritual union" resulting from "basic freedoms and ethical principles" for which both the US and Europe stood for.[61] In the course of these early programs, American officials also stressed the goal of "freedom" for European countries (Pach 1991, 141). Statements from the National Security Council (NSC) during this time corroborate a widespread belief in the early days of the Cold War that containing communism was synonymous with protecting and promoting US values. The Mutual Security Act, the first major global military assistance program to be renewed year after year until 1961, claims that its purpose is to assist "friendly nations in the interest of international peace and security"… and to "support the freedom of Europe…" (Mutual Security Act 1951). O'Leary (1967) notes that instrumental and national security justifications for aid were never "widely used by the executive branch" and there "has been instead more frequent use of the broad philosophical themes enunciated in President Truman's Point Four speech…to define foreign aid as 'exporting the American idea, the

[61] Quoted in Pach (1991), page 145.

American Revolution, or the American dream…' The high international ideals and moral force of the United States, held to be powerful even when American politics were isolationist, were seen as being furthered in foreign aid programs" (92-93).

Just as the forerunners to modern US aid programs were rooted in and orientated toward US values, so are the major existing aid programs. The creation of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) with the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act was the first time an agency was created to be the single agency tasked with foreign economic development. Written into the original 1961 Foreign Assistance Act were requirements stemming from US values. Section 102 of the Foreign Assistance Act states that the purpose of the act is to "help strengthen the forces of freedom" and realize the "aspirations for justice, education, dignity, and respect as individual human beings." Rather than making a purely interests-based argument, the 1961 Act makes an argument for its existence based on US national identity. The Act claims that "Congress declares it to be a primary necessity, opportunity, and responsibility of the United States, and consistent with its traditions and ideals, to renew the spirit which lay behind these past efforts…to the end that an enlarged community of free, stable, and self-reliant countries can reduce world tensions and insecurity" (Foreign Assistance Act 1961). A sizeable chunk of US security aid is allocated through USAID today.

In addition to the origins of modern-day US aid programs, subsequent regulations on US security aid imposed on the executive by Congress are based on US national identity and US values. Amendments to the foreign aid process "find the Congress and Executive exchanging their traditional roles. Congress drafts and initiates" (Pastor 1980, 313). By the late 1970's there were already "about twenty-five" legislative restrictions that "constrain the executive branch's freedom in military aid decision making" (Schoultz 1981a, 229). Many of these restrictions were

pragmatic but many of them were based on US values. For example, in the 1970's a number of human rights provisions were added to the Foreign Assistance Act, precluding aid from going to any country, "which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." Another example is Section 660, which precludes funds to train foreign police and security forces unless these funds are used for "the promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy." Section 508 also famously prohibits US foreign aid from going to any country "whose duly elected head of government is deposed by decree or military coup." These provisions have been criticized as being vague but their existence shows that US Congressional representatives cared enough about US values to ensure some consideration of them became part of the policymaking process.

To a large extent, US values are already reflected in the formal military aid allocation process. However, the policy process itself has many points at which individual human cognition can play a significant role. The first place such cognition can play a role is in the executive branch, particularly in the US State Department. Staff members from the Office of Security Assistance and Sales (SAS) scrutinize each aid request and "any government agency or bureau can become involved in the decision-making process simply by informing SAS that military aid is related to its area of responsibility" (Schoultz 1981a, 223). This may include the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor – a bureau filled with individuals dedicated to traditional US values. If any agency within the State Department opposes military sales or aid to any state the process halts and these agencies attempt to rectify their differences. In the event of continued disagreement, the deputy director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs sends an action memo to the Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security who can then approve or alter the action memo. The Secretary of State or deputy secretary signs off the final decision

(Schoultz 1981, 224). In all these steps in the policymaking process, individuals in the executive have the potential to be faced with making decisions that will either uphold US interests at the expense of values or vice versa. For those in the position of final decision maker, such as the undersecretaries and the Secretary of State, the cognitive pressure to fulfill both US national identity and US interests will be especially conspicuous.

On the whole Congress' treatment of foreign aid, even in its early days, "assumed an annually recurring pattern" (O'Leary 1967, 71). Members are often more concerned with what domestic constituencies are benefiting from US foreign aid than what countries foreign aid goes to (Lancaster 2007; Milner and Tingley 2010). However, in Congress too there are times when individuals are forced to confront the values versus interests tradeoff. Although the executive branch essentially determines which countries get what aid, Congress has the ability to act as oversight. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations are responsible for reviewing executive requests and authorizing the expenditures. Members of Congress on these committees are likely acutely aware of when the US is giving aid to countries that violate US ideals.

Congress controls military aid through the allocation of funds in the form of appropriations, although the President is generally able to disburse these funds as they wish. However, members of Congress can prohibit funds from going to specific countries. This has been done a considerable amount of times. For example, after negative State Department reports, the "Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act of 1978 prohibited foreign military sales to Guatemala and El Salvador" (Pearce 1982, 117). In 2013, the US Senate heavily conditioned aid to Egypt in response to the military coup that brought Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to power (Zengerle 2013). While it is not reasonable to expect the Congress to be aware of the

conditions in all recipient countries, they may become aware of conditions in specific countries due to lobbying efforts on behalf of foreign governments, diaspora from these countries, or from human rights organizations (Baldwin 2008; Newhouse 2009).

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program in particular is also more susceptible to Congressional oversight and therefore, Congressional control. Congress is able to veto any FMS sale of major defense equipment valued over amounts specified by the Arms Export Control Act. In the case that a sale exceeds these amounts, this triggers a Congressional review period during which House and Senate Committees can question or comment on the sale prior to the State Department notification of the sale. This period is typically 30 days. During the review period, Congress can object to the sale by passing a Joint Resolution of Disapproval (Tarnoff and Lawson 2016; Kaidanow 2017). Thus, whenever there is a large FMS, members of Congress will have an opportunity to look at the sale more closely and any conflict between values and interests will become more apparent than it would be otherwise.

Essentially, while the aid allocation process is commonly viewed as bureaucratic and lacking a human face, this picture does not hold up to scrutiny. At nearly every step in the process there is the opportunity for and likelihood of human intervention and therefore the process is subject to human cognition. The values associated with national identity and the national interests of the humans involved in the decision-making process are bound to have an impact. However, the social-psychological theory presented here assumes that some values will have greater influence than others because of their greater attachment to US national identity. For the purposes of this analysis, I analyze the incorporation of three different values that will play a role in US military aid allocation.

Democracy

Democracy or self-determination is the most important US value. It is the value that has the deepest historical roots, being referenced in the founding documents of the United States including the Declaration of Independence (1776), the Alliance with France (1778), the Articles of Confederation (1781), and the Constitution of the United States (1789). References to "democracy" "liberty" and "freedom" abound in these documents and are explicitly connected with the notion of self-determination and self-government. Rather than simple anti-colonial or revolutionary fervor, the founding documents make republican government their goal and the revolution is perceived to be the means by which to attain that goal. Later documents, such as the Voting Rights Act (1965), are viewed as expansions of pre-existing democracy. Democracy is also the most frequent value appearing in US traditions and political rhetoric.

Democracy is an influential value in foreign policymaking in the contemporary period. Many administrations have explicitly justified their foreign policy in terms of promoting democracy (Dueck 2006; Walker 2009). Critics of different administrations have also framed their criticism in terms of what actions might be more conducive to democracy promotion.[62] USAID explicitly includes democracy promotion as one of their goals in conducting their aid programs (USAID 2014). In section 508 of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, the US must cut military assistance to any "duly elected head" of government deposed in a military coup or decree (Foreign Assistance Act 1961).

Because of its strong and lasting attachment to US identity, violating democracy through the allocation of military aid to a non-democracy produces an enormous contradiction between US actions and US national identity. Policymakers would have trouble rationalizing these

[62] A recent example of this phenomenon was the criticism President Obama incurred for visiting Cuba and meeting with dictator Raul Castro.

contradictions and will consequently opt to avoid them. Democracy should therefore be the value that is most resilient to clashes with interests when US policymakers allocate military aid. There are cases in which the US does allocate aid to non-democracies.[63] However, these cases are outliers in which the regime supported with military aid was determined to be absolutely vital to US interests. The democratic nature of a state should therefore have a positive effect on that state's military aid allocation and the effect of democracy should only weakly decline with increases in US security or economic interests. The positive effect of democracy on US military aid should remain for all states with the exception of those who are exceptionally important for US security or economic purposes.

H1: The positive effect of democracy on US military aid weakly declines with an increase in US national security interests.

H2: The positive effect of democracy on US military aid weakly declines with an increase in US economic interests.

Enterprise

The United States is well known for its enterprising and progressive outlook. By "enterprising" I do not simply mean free markets, although this is no doubt an important component of the value of enterprise. By "progressive" I do not mean any partisan political attitude, but a general disposition toward advancing the nation and humanity through history. Early US history is characterized by an embrace of commercial and industrial progress such as

[63] The US maintained aid to non-democratic Latin American states during the Cold War and gives large amounts of aid to non-democratic states in the Persian Gulf today.

the Patent for the Cotton Gin (1974) and Jefferson's "Message to Congress Regarding the Lewis and Clark Expedition" (1803). Central to the American attitude at the time is an emphasis on America's "newness" as opposed to "old" Europe and a willingness to explore the unknown. Later industrial advances demonstrate that Americans do not simply value technology or capitalism because of what it can accomplish, but value these things as an ethic in and of themselves. In the US, enterprise and progress are valued not just for the standard of living they are presumed to create but for the sake of progress itself.

The fact that military aid would be more readily supplied to states that exhibit principles of enterprise and progress would be relatively unsurprising given that the US has explicitly done so before with the goal of strengthening and supporting these states against potential internal and external socialist and communist adversaries. This pattern continued after the Cold War with the "Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union Act" of 1992, which granted security aid to post-Soviet states transitioning to free markets (Federation of American Scientists 2017). At times the US has allocated large amounts of military aid to socialist states, such as Yugoslavia, or (more commonly) to economically clientelistic states, such as Zaire. As such, it seems that the US concern with this value diminishes when interests demand it. This is to be expected, given that the value is less attached to US national identity than democracy and will therefore be more easily outweighed by countervailing economic and security interests.

H3: The positive effect of enterprise on US military aid declines with an increase in US national security interests.

H4: The positive effect of enterprise on US military aid declines with an increase in US economic interests.

Human Rights

In contrast to democracy and enterprise, the value of human rights is less well established in US national identity. In the contemporary period, human rights is perhaps the most widely discussed US value. However, the value is often discussed in the context of failures on the part of US policymakers to uphold human rights when implementing US foreign policy. Human rights only came into the purview of Americans in the 1940's when they were enshrined in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (1948). Even as the term gained prominence in activist circles, its meaning ranged from social welfare to decolonization (Moyn 2010). Eventually human rights took on a primarily liberal definition, embraced by the Carter Administration (Shestack 1989). Past documents, such as the Bill of Rights (1791), accord nicely with the recently adopted liberal definition but references to the general concept are fewer than either democracy or enterprise. The value also makes fewer appearances in US political rhetoric.

The number of congressional staff interested in human rights grew during the 1970's (Schoultz 1981a). The concept was formally incorporated into US federal law with the Foreign Assistance Act and its amendments (Apodaca 2005). As a result, it is expected that human rights violations should have a negative effect on US military aid when the recipient is of no strategic value to the US. However, this relationship should change when the recipient state is of strategic or economic value. Policymakers should more easily discard human rights concerns because human rights have a more minor attachment to US national identity. Furthermore, whenever countries violate human rights, it usually signals that they are facing potential internal dissent or

turmoil and are attempting to pacify it. Thus, human rights violations committed by an economically or strategically important state should signal to US policymakers that a friendly regime is in need of assistance. Threats to the friendly regime also represent a threat to US economic or strategic interests. As such, policymakers will wish to assist the regime. One way to accomplish this task is by giving the regime more military assistance. One of the primary historical examples of this phenomenon is US policy with respect to Latin America during the 1980's. The US showered countries like El Salvador and Guatemala with military assistance. These regimes were US-friendly, faced domestic backlash, and had horrendous human rights records. Even under the more human rights oriented Carter Administration, countries such as El Salvador continued to receive military assistance on the basis of US security concerns just as their human rights records reached their most abysmal (Pearce 1982). President Carter's policy of hesitant military assistance to these client states would later be taken up by the Reagan Administration "with alacrity" (Schwarz 1998).

Human rights violations should have a negative effect on US military aid when recipients contribute little to US economic prowess or security, but should have a positive effect on US military aid when the recipient state contributes to US economic or strategic interests. Nielsen (2013) and Sandlin (2016) find this relationship with respect to economic aid. It is reasonable to expect this relationship to also apply to US military aid.

H5: Human rights violations will have a negative effect on US military aid when US national security interests are low.

H6: Human rights violations will have a negative effect on US military aid when US economic interests are low.

H7: The negative effect of human rights violations should decline with an increase in US national security interests.

H8: The negative effect of human rights violations should decline with an increase in US economic interests.

H9: Human rights violations should have a significant and positive effect on US military aid when US national security interests are high.

H10: Human rights violations should have a significant and positive effect on US military aid when US economic interests are high.

If realists and liberals are correct that US national values may matter but they are purely instrumental, we would expect to see a minimal incorporation of US values into US military assistance policy and no difference in *how* values are incorporated into US military assistance policy. However, if national identity matters, we should see an incorporation of US values into US foreign policy *and* we should see differences in this incorporation based on how integral the value is to US national identity. Democracy should be more resilient to countervailing interests, enterprise less so, and human rights even less. The hypotheses presented here speak not only to

the importance of these values relative to interests, but also of the importance of these values relative to each other.

Data and Methods

To test this theory I use a cross-sectional time-series data set of US bilateral military aid allocations spanning from 1976-2006. The dependent variable, *US Military Aid*, is the natural log of the total amount of military aid in constant dollars allocated to the recipient in the given year. The data is taken from USAID's *Overseas Loans and Grants* "Greenbook (USAID 2013)."[64]

The first two hypotheses concern how policymakers consider recipient democracy when allocating US military aid. To measure how democratic the recipient state is, I include the variable *Democracy*, operationalized as revised combined Polity IV scores (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2011). Americans generally think of democracy in a liberal-democratic framework. Polity IV utilizes a similar standard when making quantitative judgments.

Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 address the value of enterprise. While enterprise is a broader concept than free markets, the presence or absence of free markets and secure property rights is perhaps the easiest means by which policymakers could classify a country as being enterprising or not. Policymakers will likely perceive countries that have clientelistic or socialist economies as being "backward" and deficient for not embracing the process of creative destruction. I measure *Enterprise* using an index of investment risk, used by financial institutions to rate the favorability of a country's investment climate. While used primarily for international investors, it is essentially a measure of domestic property rights within the state. The index

[64] Aid amounts are logged due to the skewness of the aid distribution. The dependent variable is therefore ln(total military aid +1). Figure A.5 in the appendix graphs the distribution of the raw value of US military aid.

measures the degree to which a country's investment climate is at risk of expropriation, profit repatriation, and payment delays. The index, obtained from the International Country Risk Guide ranges from "0" to "12," where 12 indicates the most favorable investment climate (PRS Group 2010; Powell and Chacha 2016). The measure exhibits a lower correlation with GDP per capita compared with other potential measures for *Enterprise*.[65] Thus, investment risk is a good measure of property rights with less overlap with general economic well-being.

I measure the level of human rights violations in the recipient state by including the variable *Human Rights Violations*, measured by the "Political Terror Scale" (PTS) (Gibney et al. 2013). The PTS is an ordinal variable measuring the level of citizen's physical integrity within the state based on the amount of torture, imprisonment, and extrajudicial killing perpetrated by the state. It has been re-coded from a "1-5" scale to a "0-4" scale to more easily interpret the constituent terms of the interactions. A score of "0" indicates that human rights violations are rare. A score of "4" indicates that violations are common and severe.[66] There are two sets of PTS scales. One scale is coded from US State Department reports while the other is coded from Amnesty International country reports.[67] I unify these scales into a single measure by averaging the scores between them.

Half of the hypotheses concern the degree to which US values are overwhelmed by the US national security importance of the recipient state. I measure the national security worth of

[65] The correlation between the index and GDP per capita is .52, which is favorable compared with contract intensive economy (.83), total investment (.78), and contract intensive money (.60) (Clague et al. 1999; Mousseau 2016). Additionally, the measure covers a much greater temporal period than indices of economic freedom such as the Fraser Institute's "Economic Freedom Ranking" and the Heritage Foundation's "Index of Economic Freedom" (The Fraser Institute 2014; The Heritage Foundation 2017).
[66] For further details on coding see Wood and Gibney (2010).
[67] The PTS coded from US State Department reports is more favorable to US security partners. For more information, see Poe, Carey, and Vazquez (2001).

the recipient state by the amount of US *Troops* present in the recipient state (Kane 2006). Troops are a measure of the geopolitical importance of the recipient state. The US deploys troops to areas of strategic importance. Furthermore, once a significant amount of troops are present in a country, the US has an interest in ensuring that the government allowing them to reside there remains appeased and defended. The allocation of US military aid has the potential of accomplishing both of these goals. Therefore, the presence of *Troops* should indicate that a country is of national security importance to the US.

In order to test the hypothesis that economic interests will moderate the effect of US values on US military aid allocation, I include the variable *Trade*, which measures the extent of the economic relationship between the US and the recipient state. *Trade* is operationalized as the sum of the nature log of US exports to and imports from the recipient state in a given year (coded from COW dyadic trade data) (Barbieri and Keshk 2012). Trade relations create economic interdependence by ensuring that both countries are reliant on each other's economies. The US has an interest in ensuring the protection of its trade partners. The more the US trades with the recipient state, the greater the economic interest the US has in ensuring the security of the state from internal and external threats.

I include a number of control variables that may influence the relationship between values, interests, and US military aid allocation. The recipient's real *GDP Per Capita* is included in the model to measure the recipient state's need for US military assistance. I also control for the need for US military aid by including the variable *Military Expenditure*, which measures the state's military spending as a percentage of GDP for the given year (Powell and Chacha 2016). Sometimes, *Troops* and *US Military Aid* will substitute for one another when the purpose of those troops is military assistance under an existing agreement. The North American Treaty

Organization (NATO) is the prime example of such a situation and is the most prominent US-multilateral military alliance. Therefore, I control for *NATO* membership using a dichotomous variable that takes the value of "1" if the recipient state is a full member of the alliance.[68] I control for the presence of *Interstate Conflict* and *Intrastate Conflict* with measures from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's "Armed Conflict Dataset" (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2013). The variable *Population*, measured as the natural log of the state's population as specified by the World Bank and the UN, is included in the model.[69] I control for *Past Aid* by lagging the dependent variable by one year and including it in the model as an independent variable. All of the independent variables are measured at t_{-1}.

Results

In order to test the hypotheses, I estimate six tobit regressions. The tobit model is used due to the fact that aid allocations are left censored.[70] Standard errors are clustered by country mitigate heteroskedasticity. Each of the regressions interacts a US value (*Democracy, Enterprise, Human Rights Violations*) with a US interest (*Troops* or *Trade*). Each of these interactions allows for an examination of how the effect of the US value on *US Military Aid* varies or doesn't vary with the quantity of each US interest. Table 1.5 shows the tobit coefficients of the interactions and their constituent terms for each of the six models.[71] Generally, the interaction terms are significant, meaning that the effect of values is altered by the presence of interests.

[68] The results of the models are the same when this variable is excluded.
[69] Data missing from the UN dataset is supplemented with data from the World Bank (United Nations 2013; The World Bank 2013). Data missing from both is taken from Gleditsch (2002).
[70] The tobit model estimates the effect of the independent variable on a latent dependent variable, or the sum of the probability of receiving aid weighted by the expected value of aid and the converse (Tobin 1958; McDonald and Moffitt 1980).
[71] Results of the controls are reported in the Appendix.

Table 1.5: Tobit Model Interactions and Constituent Terms

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Democracy	0.035 (0.009)	0.042 (0.015)	0.015 (0.006)	0.015 (0.006)	0.015 (0.006)	0.014 (0.006)
Enterprise	0.003 (0.011)	0.006 (0.010)	0.057 (0.021)	0.132 (0.038)	0.006 (0.011)	0.004 (0.010)
HR Violations	0.025 (0.042)	0.019 (0.042)	0.024 (0.041)	0.023 (0.041)	– 0.138 (0.063)	– 0.443 (0.111)
Troops	0.006 (0.025)	– 0.013 (0.022)	0.083 (0.042)	– 0.011 (0.022)	– 0.093 (0.034)	– 0.001 (0.022)
Trade	0.029 (0.012)	0.037 (0.013)	0.033 (0.021)	0.102 (0.024)	0.028 (0.012)	– 0.033 (0.017)
Dem x *Troops*	– 0.005 (0.002)					
Dem x *Trade*		– 0.002 (0.001)				
Ent x *Troops*			– 0.014 (0.005)			
Ent x Trade				– 0.010 (0.002)		
HR x *Troops*					0.055 (0.014)	
HR x *Trade*						0.037 (0.007)
Censored Obs.	774	774	744	744	744	744
Total Obs.	2224	2224	2224	2224	2224	2224
Log Likelihood	–2316.204	–2318.219	–2317.145	–2311.436	–2308.20	–2290.271

Clustered standard errors are in the parentheses below the coefficients.

Figure 1.5: Effect of *Democracy* on *US Military Aid* Over *Troops*



Figure 2.5: Effect of *Democracy* on *US Military Aid* Over *Trade*



Figure 3.5: Effect of *Enterprise* on *US Military Aid* Over *Troops*



Figure 4.5: Effect of *Enterprise* on *US Military Aid* Over *Trade*



Figure 5.5: Effect of *Human Rights Violations* on *US Military Aid* Over *Troops*



Figure 6.5: Effect of *Human Rights Violations* on *US Military Aid* Over *Trade*



This result alone demonstrates the inconsistency of the effect of values over the range of US security and economic interests. The effect of US values on US military aid depends on the economic and security significance of the recipient state. However, the coefficients of the interaction terms also reveals that *Democracy, Enterprise*, and *Human Rights* are not equally altered by *Troops* and *Trade*, but that *Democracy* is much more resilient to clashes with interests.

In model 1, the constituent term for *Democracy* is positive and significant, meaning that when *Troops* are not present, *Democracy* has a positive effect on *US Military Aid*. The interaction of *Democracy* and *Troops* is statistically significant and in the negative direction. Therefore, the positive effect of *Democracy* on *US Military Aid* declines with an increase in *Troops.* This result is in line with the expectation of H1, which predicted that *Democracy* would have a positive effect that weakly declines with an increase in the national security importance of the recipient state. The coefficient of the interaction between *Democracy* and *Trade* in model 2 is also in the negative direction although the p value is just larger than .10.

Figure 1.5 and figure 2.5 graph the respective interactions and provide a more complete picture of how the effect of *Democracy* on *US Military Aid* varies with *Troops* and *Trade*. The decline in figure 1.5 demonstrates that when numbers of *Troops* are low, *Democracy* has a strong positive effect on *US Military Aid*. As *Troops* increases the positive effect of *Democracy* declines, eventually becoming insignificant. However, the level of *Troops* must reach roughly the 80th percentile in order for the effect to diminish to insignificance. Therefore, for the vast majority of states, being a democracy will result in more US military aid. For states with a very high number of *Troops,* democracy does not play any role in US military aid allocation. Figure 2.5 shows that the positive effect of *Democracy* also declines slightly with an increase in *Trade*.

The effect of *Democracy* remains positive and significant over the range of values for *Trade* until *Trade* reaches past the 75th percentile.

The results show that strategically and economically non-vital countries receive more US military aid when they are democracies. This result reveals the importance of democracy as a value: it motivates the allocation of US military aid even in the absence of economic and national security considerations. The presence of democracy in countries that don't matter very much still grants them access to US military assistance. For the majority of states, the effect of democracy changes relatively little with increases in the closeness of the security and economic relationship with the US. These results provide support for both H1 and H2. In the case of H1, the effect of democracy on US military aid is conditioned by national security interests (perhaps more so than anticipated) but the effect of democracy on US military aid remains positive for the overwhelming majority of states. In the case of H2, the positive effect of democracy decreases with the presence of economic interests, but only slightly. Thus, non-democratic countries can expect to receive less US military aid unless they are enormously important to US national security or are extremely strong US economic partners.

As expected, the results for *Enterprise* show the value to be much more affected by US interests. The interactions in model 3 and model 4 are both negative and significant. The constituent term for *Enterprise* is positive and significant in both models, indicating that recipient countries that are more enterprising are rewarded with more US military aid so long as they are hosting few *Troops* and have a low volume of *Trade* with the US. Figure 3.5 and figure 4.5 show that the positive effect of *Enterprise* declines quickly with increases in *Troops* and *Trade.* Unlike *Democracy,* the effect of *Enterprise* becomes insignificant almost immediately after passing the median of number of *Troops* and shortly after passing the median of volume

Trade. The results support H3 and H4 which predict that the value of enterprise would be affected by both security and economic interests in US aid allocation. Furthermore, the effect of *Enterprise* actually becomes negative and significant when *Troops* and *Trade* are very high (upwards of the 80th percentile). States that display the value of enterprise will receive more US military aid when they are not US economic or security assets and will receive less US aid when they are very strong US economic and security associates.[72]

As predicted, human rights are the most conditioned of US values. The constituent term for *Human Rights Violations* is negative in model 5 and model 6, meaning that human rights violators are given less *US Military Aid* when *Troops* and *Trade* are low. The result supports H5 and H6. The positive and significant interaction terms in both models signal that the negative effect of *Human Rights Violations* declines in significance with an increase in *Troops* and *Trade*, which supports the predictions of H7 and H8. As shown by figure 5.5 and figure 6.5, this change is fairly drastic. The effect of *Human Rights Violations* is insignificant when *Troops* and *Trade* are at their median values. As predicted by H9 and H10, *Human Rights Violations* have a positive and significant effect on *US Military Aid* when values of *Troops* and *Trade* are moderately high. Recipient states of even moderate importance to US national security and the US economy are granted more US military aid when they violate human rights. The results demonstrate that the findings of Nielsen (2013) and Sandlin (2016), which pertain to economic aid, also apply to the domain of US military aid.

The effects of all three values on US military aid are modified by US security and economic interests. However, there are differences in how each value is modified. The vast majority of states receive more US military aid if they are democracies. This only changes in

[72] This result was not predicted by H3 and H4, although it does not contradict them. The discussion section discusses some possible reasons for this result.

cases where US security or economic interests are overwhelming, in which case democracy ceases to play any role in the allocation of aid. Most states that exhibit the value of enterprise also receive more US military aid. However, a state's loyalty to enterprise ceases to matter once states are of average US security and economic importance. In cases of overwhelming US security and economic importance, states that are enterprising can be expected to receive less US military aid. Human rights are the least important of US values. States that violate human rights can only be expected to receive less US military aid if they are of little US security and economic importance. States of even moderate importance will be rewarded with more US military aid when they violate human rights.

Table 2.5: Per-Unit Percentage Effects

	Per-Unit % Change in Aid	Per-Unit % Change in Aid	Per-Unit % Change in Aid
Troops Profile[1]	*Democracy*	*Enterprise*	*Human Rights Violations*
Low	3.5	5.7	– 13.8
High	–1.0	–5.6	29.7
Trade Profile			
Low	4.2	13.2	– 44.3
High	– 0.4	– 8.1	34.9

"High" levels *Troops* and *Trade* add two standard deviations to their average values. "Low" levels subtract two standard deviations from their average values.

The varying resilience of US national values to conflicts with interests is also evident by comparing changes in their effects per-unit increase. Table 2.5 lists each US value and its per-unit percentage effect on *US Military Aid* at both high and low values of *Troops* and *Trade*. Both *Enterprise* and *Human Rights Violations* exhibit large differences in per-unit effects when moving from low to high quantities of *Troops* and *Trade.* The change is most drastic for *Human Rights Violations*. A one-unit increase in *Human Rights Violations* decreases *US Military Aid* by 13 percent at low levels of *Troops* but increases *US Military Aid* by nearly 30 percent at high levels of *Troops*. A one-unit increase in *Human Rights Violations* at low levels of *Trade* decreases *US Military Aid* by 44 percent, while a one-unit increase at high levels of *Trade* increases *US Military Aid* by almost 35 percent.

I conduct several robustness checks, the results of which are reported in the Appendix. First, it is possible that not all US military aid is allocated in the same fashion. Since the 1990's the US has increasingly allocated military assistance through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Through the FMF program, countries are given grants to purchase US-made military equipment, surplus US military supplies, and US defense training. The purpose of FMF may be to satisfy US domestic military industries rather than to contribute to US strategic goals.

In order to test whether or not FMF is treated differently, I estimate the models using the natural log of *US Foreign Military Financing* as the dependent variable.[73] The results are substantively the same as those using *US Military Aid* with a few differences. The effect of *Democracy* becomes negative and statistically significant at extremely high levels of *Troops*. Additionally, the effect of *Human Rights Violations* does not have a negative effect on *US Foreign Military Financing*, regardless of the effect of *Troops.* US values may be more affected

[73] *US Foreign Military Financing* is measured as ln(FMF + 1).

by the presence of countervailing US interests in the realm of FMF, but values are still conditioned in a manner consistent with US national identity.

The possibility that US troops and US military aid serve the same purpose, to ensure the recipient state's military prowess, may also be disconcerting. It is possible that troops and military aid are substitutes for each other. States with characteristics that motivate US troop deployments may get less military aid because they are already receiving a different form of US military assistance. I attempt to mitigate this possibility by using the *Tau-B* alliance index as the measure of the potential recipient state's US national security importance. The *Tau-B* alliance index ranges from "–1" to "1," where a "1" indicates perfect congruity of alliances between the US and the recipient state. The results of the models using the *Tau-B* index present the same story as the original estimation. The interaction between *Tau-B* and *Democracy* is insignificant, which contradicts H1. However, the interactions between both *Tau-B* and *Enterprise* and *Tau-B* and *Human Rights Violations* are both significant with *Human Rights Violations* being the most affected of the variables. The US values of enterprise and human rights are more easily discarded when the US shares many alliances with the recipient state.

Another potential issue with the results concerns the value of enterprise. Although the investment risk index used has a much lower correlation with economic development than alternative measures, it may still be capturing an aspect of development that is not captured by *GDP Per Capita*. I therefore check the robustness of the result by measuring *Enterprise* with the Heritage Foundation's Property Rights Index (The Heritage Foundation 2017).[74] Results of the tobit regression using the Property Rights Index to measure *Enterprise* are substantively the same as those using investment risk.

[74] The downsides of this measure are that it constrains the temporal range of the analysis (1996 – 2006) and it uses solely US sources for measurement.

Property rights may not be the proper means by which to measure the broad notion of enterprise, which denotes human progress just as much as economic progress. Measuring women's participation in society could be a means of measuring a broader notion of progress. Therefore, I conduct tobit regressions using women's political empowerment as the measure of *Enterprise* (Sundstrom et al. 2015). Once again, the variable *Enterprise* is conditioned by *Troops* and *Trade* in the same way as it is in the initial tests.

In the original model, I clustered standard errors by state in order to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. However, problems of unobserved heterogeneity might be better addressed by using hierarchical modeling (King and Roberts 2015). I therefore re-estimate the models using a random effects tobit. Overall, the results of the models are substantively similar. US interests condition US values and affect both *Enterprise* and *Human Rights Violations* much more than they affect *Democracy*. The major difference between the results of the random effects model and the results of the original estimation is that the interactions between *Trade* and both *Democracy* and *Enterprise* are insignificant. The interaction between *Trade* and *Human Rights Violations* remains significant. It may be that economic interests are not vital enough to motivate policymakers to disregard democracy or enterprise but do mollify their human rights concerns.

Conclusion and Discussion

Does identity matter in US foreign policy? The results of this study show that it does. Allocating US military aid is widely perceived to be an act of self-interest, yet US values such as democracy, enterprise, and human rights play a role in the aid allocation process.

Material interests still play a predominant role in the allocation of US military aid and determine when and how US values will be integrated into aid policy. The influence of US

national values on US military aid wanes when potential recipient states are important economic and security partners. The influence of material interests is so strong that countries that protect human rights and enterprise receive *less* aid when they are strong economic and security partners. The first result was predicted by the hypotheses and has a straightforward explanation: when countries are of high strategic importance to the US, the US will grant them greater amounts of military aid to ensure they continue to repress political activity that could upset the US-recipient relationship. The latter result is more puzzling. Why would the US punish enterprising countries with less aid when they are strategic partners? One potential explanation is that progress, whether economic or social, results in more actors being able to influence the state. For example, economic liberalization creates newly empowered constituencies that could place political pressure on a recipient government. Thus, when the US has already captured influence through beneficial trade or security ties, the potential influence of other actors represents uncertainty and a potential threat to the existing economic and security order. The US will give non-enterprising countries more US military aid when these countries are important assets because the US is surer the relationship is free from other influences.

Realists and liberals will likely consider these results as being consistent with the view that US values are instrumental to achieving foreign policy goals. Democracy, enterprise, and human rights foster stability and peace and therefore serve long-term US interests. These interests are disregarded when they come into conflict with more tangible and pressing ones: national security and economic prosperity. However, this view is not entirely consistent with the other major finding of this paper. Despite the fact that material interests direct how US national values are incorporated into US military aid policy, US national identity still determines how resilient these values are to countervailing interests. Democracy, the value most integral to US

national identity, is much less affected by conflicts with material interests. Enterprise, a value less attached to US national identity is more affected by countervailing material interests. Human rights, a more recent US value, is easily overridden by interests when the two clash. The difference in how these values are treated corresponds to US national identity. The results therefore vindicate aspects of constructivist theory. The national identity of the US predicts US behavior. Those who believe US values are instrumental would have to explain how democracy serves US interests more than enterprise. They would also have to explain how enterprise serves US interests more than protecting human rights. This seems like a difficult case to make. Although US policymakers likely see democracy, enterprise, and human rights as promoting US interests, it is doubtful that any one of these values is more instrumental to serving US interests than the other. In other words, the fact that these values could be instrumental does not explain their hierarchy. In contrast, US national identity is a compelling explanation for the differing prioritization of these values.

Appendix

Table A.5: Tobit Model Controls

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
GDP Per Capita	– 0.186 (0.044)	– 0.185 (0.043)	– 0.192 (0.043)	– 0.200 (0.043)	– 0.174 (0.043)	– 0.178 (0.042)
Population	– 0.054 (0.035)	– 0.062 (0.039)	– 0.063 (0.038)	– 0.072 (0.037)	– 0.054 (0.037)	– 0.066 (0.037)
Interstate Conflict	– 0.072 (0.042)	– 0.068 (0.045)	– 0.072 (0.045)	– 0.078 (0.045)	– 0.056 (0.043)	– 0.075 (0.041)
Intrastate Conflict	– 0.012 (0.036)	– 0.009 (0.035)	– 0.018 (0.035)	– 0.013 (0.034)	– 0.026 (0.036)	– 0.010 (0.033)
NATO	– 0.020 (0.181)	– 0.113 (0.168)	– 0.101 (0.167)	– 0.081 (0.166)	– 0.017 (0.169)	0.006 (0.162)
Military Expenditure	– 0.004 (0.002)	– 0.004 (0.001)	– 0.004 (0.001)	– 0.004 (0.001)	– 0.003 (0.001)	– 0.003 (0.025)
Military Aid Lagged	0.994 (0.658)	1.001 (0.024)	0.994 (0.024)	0.994 (0.023)	0.979 (0.669)	0.970 (0.696)
Censored Obs.	774	774	744	744	744	744
Total Obs.	2224	2224	2224	2224	2224	2224
Log Likelihood	–2316.204	–2318.219	–2317.145	–2311.436	–2308.20	–2290.271

Clustered standard errors are in the parentheses below the coefficients.

Table B.5: Results Using Foreign Military Financing

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Democracy	0.174 (0.043)	0.227 (0.065)	0.051 (0.028)	0.057 (0.029)	0.055 (0.027)	0.057 (0.028)
Enterprise	0.296 (0.057)	0.315 (0.055)	0.675 (0.111)	0.910 (0.163)	0.313 (0.057)	0.308 (0.053)
HR Violations	– 0.031 (0.201)	– 0.052 (0.199)	– 0.045 (0.196)	– 0.034 (0.197)	– 0.898 (0.279)	– 1.514 (0.478)
Troops	0.263 (0.093)	0.147 (0.097)	0.844 (0.189)	0.153 (0.097)	– 0.266 (0.151)	0.178 (0.100)
Trade	– 0.036 (0.064)	0.017 (0.063)	– 0.010 (0.063)	0.327 (0.098)	– 0.031 (0.063)	– 0.221 (0.091)
Dem x *Troops*	– 0.032 (0.009)					
Dem x *Trade*		– 0.014 (0.005)				
Ent x *Troops*			– 0.104 (0.027)			
Ent x Trade				– 0.048 (0.011)		
HR x *Troops*					0.280 (0.060)	
HR x *Trade*						0.120 (0.034)
Censored Obs.	1692	1692	1692	1692	1692	1692
Total Obs.	2226	2226	2226	2226	2226	2226
Log Likelihood	–1867.926	–1872.502	–1862.226	–1866.658	–1852.082	–1859.217

Clustered standard errors are in the parentheses below the coefficients.

Table C.5: Results of *Enterprise* Interactions Using Alternative Measures

Variable	(*Enterprise* = Property Rights)	*Enterprise* = Gender Equality)
Ent x *Troops*	– 0.003 (0.000)	– 0.265 (0.077)
Ent x *Trade*	– 0.001 (0.000)	– 0.077 (0.037)
Total Obs.	1314	3215

Clustered standard errors are in the parentheses below the coefficients.

Table D.5: Interactions Using *Tau-B*

Variable	Model 1	Model 3	Model 5
Democracy	0.018 (0.007)	0.017 (0.007)	0.018 (0.007)
Enterprise	0.010 (0.011)	0.025 (0.013)	0.011 (0.011)
HR Violations	0.000 (0.043)	– 0.005 (0.043)	– 0.038 (0.047)
Tau-B	0.010 (0.142)	0.573 (0.276)	– 0.343 (0.145)
Dem x *Tau-B*	0.063 (0.016)		
Ent x *Tau-B*		– 0.082 (0.034)	
HR x *Tau-B*			0.222 (0.074)
Total Obs.	2170	2170	2170

Clustered standard errors are in the parentheses below the coefficients.

Table F.5: Random Effects Tobit Model Interactions and Constituent Terms

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Democracy	0.061 (0.011)	0.039 (0.017)	0.025 (0.007)	0.028 (0.007)	0.028 (0.007)	0.029 (0.007)
Enterprise	0.082 (0.016)	0.087 (0.016)	0.185 (0.026)	0.144 (0.042)	0.086 (0.016)	0.089 (0.016)
HR Violations	– 0.199 (0.042)	– 0.203 (0.051)	– 0.202 (0.051)	– 0.201 (0.051)	– 0.426 (0.076)	– 0.630 (0.124)
Troops	0.249 (0.034)	0.207 (0.032)	0.374 (0.048)	– 0.206 (0.032)	0.082 (0.045)	– 0.207 (0.032)
Trade	0.112 (0.029)	0.121 (0.029)	0.123 (0.029)	0.151 (0.037)	0.113 (0.029)	0.036 (0.036)
Dem x *Troops*	– 0.011 (0.003)					
Dem x *Trade*		– 0.001 (0.001)				
Ent x *Troops*			– 0.029 (0.006)			
Ent x Trade				– 0.004 (0.003)		
HR x *Troops*					0.076 (0.019)	
HR x *Trade*						0.037 (0.007)
Censored Obs.	775	775	745	745	744	744
Total Obs.	2227	2227	2227	2227	2227	2227
Log Likelihood	–2622.640	–2629.024	–2618.822	–2628.254	–2621.41	–2622.089

Standard errors are in the parentheses below the coefficients.

Figure A.5: Distribution of US Military Aid



Chapter 6

Conclusion and Addendum: Thoughts on US National Identity and the Prospect of Change

On November 8th 2016 President Trump was elected in a surprise upset over Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton. As a Republican candidate, President Trump had opened his campaign by claiming that the Mexican government was sending drug dealers and rapists across the Southern border (Lee 2015). In his campaign speeches, candidate Trump called for violence against protesters and for cracking down on freedom of speech (Schreckinger 2016; Gold 2016). When asked if he would accept the results of the 2016 election, he said he would so long as he was declared the winner (Diamond 2016). When it came to foreign policy, candidate Trump said that the US should have outright stolen Iraq's natural resources, that the US should kill the family members of Islamic State fighters, that the US should engage in indiscriminate bombing campaigns, that the US should reduce its integration with the global economy, and that the US should cut its assistance to foreign countries in the global South that "hate us" (LoBianco 2015; Grimley 2016; McDonald 2017).

As President, Donald Trump has not pursued all of these policies but has generally acted in accordance with their tenor. Civilian casualties resulting from US bombing have increased in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen under the Trump Administration (Feldstein 2017). The US has refrained from issuing criticism of its brutal security partners, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Honduras, Israel, and others. From Russia to Egypt, the US has also abstained from criticizing elections that were patently not free and not fair (Gittleson 2018). Former Secretary of State Tillerson made it his explicit goal to de-emphasize human rights at the State Department (Snyder 2018). As of this writing, the Trump Administration seems intent on starting a trade war that engulfs not only US adversaries like China, but also US allies such as the European Union, South Korea, Japan, and Canada (Donnan, Brunsden, and Mance 2018).

The election of President Trump and the policies he pursues may lead many to wonder if the picture of US national identity painted here is irrelevant, outdated, or simply wrong. How could the US population that adheres to a democratic, humanitarian, and progressive national identity elect an administration that pursues policies anathema to these concepts? I argue here that while the Trump Administration may indeed be defying the prevailing vision of US national identity, the picture of US national identity presented here is relevant for exactly that reason: recognition of the Trump Administration as being largely an aberration from expectations about who the American people are and what they expect from their politics. Furthermore, deeper structures besides the Presidential Administration are at work in the service of protecting and promoting US national identity in US foreign policy.

Do US Values Matter?

This dissertation project started with a question at the heart of popular and academic discourse surrounding US foreign policy: What role do US values play in US foreign policy, especially when promoting these values conflicts with the material interests of the US? As the results of this dissertation show, US values do matter. From the founding of the country, US policymakers have viewed the fate of the US as being tied up in its ability to be the "Empire of Liberty" in the Western hemisphere. These sentiments are found in the most important US historical documents. US policymakers frame historical US achievements such as the founding of the country, Westward expansion, the building of infrastructure, and civil rights legislation as not only being in the pursuit of national advancement but also as being consistent with the universal truths that the country has always been dedicated to. Not only are such sentiments found in prominent historical documents, they are also readily apparent in US culture, as

evidenced by the kinds of practices that surround the celebration of US federal holidays and symbols of the US. Thus, rather than being part of some "elite" consensus, the values that make-up US national identity are part of a popular construction. Finally, the exaltation of US national values occurs throughout modern US political rhetoric. In State of the Union speeches, President's couch their arguments in the language of US national values in an attempt to appeal to the broader population.

The US has a national identity that is clearly concerned with values, however, not all values are equally revered. Democracy is unique in the amount of ideological space it takes up in US history, US culture, and US political rhetoric. It is a value that is unequaled in its influence. Other values are present but do not have nearly the same weight.

Virtually everyone would agree that the US has a national identity and that the public and policymakers often talk about US values. However, many in both the academic literature and public discourse would argue that talk of values is just that: talk. For critics of US foreign policy, the claim that values like democracy are a true part of US national identity stands in stark contrast to the empirically identifiable record of US foreign policy throughout history, from the ethnic cleansing of indigenous peoples to the invasion and destruction of Iraq.

Are US values purely rhetoric? The results of this dissertation show the answer to be a clear no. First, US values have clear individual effects. When asked if they would favor US foreign policy actions that violate US national identity, respondents overwhelmingly argue against such actions. US respondents clearly do not want their country to engage in actions that violate the values and identity that they have internalized. Why does this happen? The results of the second experiment in Chapter 4 show that cognitive dissonance is induced in subjects that violate US national identity. When subjects write in favor of foreign policy stances that violate

US national identity they are more likely to experience cognitive dissonance than when they write in favor of stances that are consistent with US national identity. The experiment also provides some evidence that it is the violation of democracy, the most central part of US national identity, which induces the greatest magnitude of cognitive dissonance in experimental subjects. While it is clear that the actual decisions of respondents may differ when they occupy the role of policymakers, the feelings of national identity and therefore the cognitive dissonance associated with violating it, may intensify given the increased stakes of decision-making. Thus, national identity is *not* purely rhetorical. It has individual effects that manifest in decision-making and psychological mechanisms.

Even if values impact individual decision-making, critics of US national identity and US foreign policy would argue that US values simply do not manifest in US policymaking when they conflict with interests. Critics of US foreign policy and materialists schools of international relations would probably be the first to point out large US military aid allocations to recipient states that are the antithesis of common perceptions of US national identity. The results of this dissertation show that these assessments are only half correct at best. First, for many cases, recipient states that do not emulate the US values of democracy, enterprise, and human rights receive less US military than states that do emulate these US values. Thus, policymakers often make decisions that are consistent with US national identity and US values. Despite the claim of critics, US values manifest themselves in US foreign policy, even in a policy realm (military aid) that is largely viewed as purely instrumental to US national security and other material interests.

Materialists and critics of US foreign policy are also partially correct. The degree to which US values play a role in US foreign policy is determined by whether or not they conflict with material interests. When vital US interests are at stake, values are disregarded or actively

undermined by US policymakers. When recipient states contribute a great deal to US national security or economic well-being, policymakers do not give autocracies or non-enterprising states less military aid. The US also essentially *rewards* these countries for violating human rights.

Despite the fact that countervailing US interests undermine US values, this result is not the end of the story. The effects of US values are determined by their relation to US national identity in addition to the presence or absence of countervailing US interests. The US value with the strongest attachment to US national identity, democracy, retains a positive effect on US military aid for the vast majority of cases even when recipients are of great importance to securing US interests. This means that even when an autocracy contributes to US interests, policymakers will give that state less US military aid because it does not emulate the US value of democracy. Values of lesser importance than democracy, such as enterprise or human rights, are more undermined by policymakers when they come into conflict with interests. Thus, recipient states that violate human rights are only given less US military aid when they are not contributors to US national security or the US economy.

Unanswered Questions

What roles do US values play in US foreign policy, especially when promoting these values conflicts with the material interests of the US? The results show that US values are undermined when they conflict with material interests in US foreign policy and the degree to which they are undermined corresponds to their position in US national identity and how important the conflicting interests are. This results from the construction of US national identity and psychological mechanisms that bias human beings to privilege their physical well-being and their personal national identity.

These findings are important but they also provoke more questions. One of the simplifying assumptions of this story is that institutions aggregate psychological biases in a similar way as Condorcet's jury. This is just that, a simplifying assumption. Institutions have their own policies, priorities, and identities. The individuals within these organizations are likely subject to socialization on the basis of their "role," or what place they occupy in the US government's bureaucracy (Denhardt 1968; Avruch 1981; March and Olsen 1984). Beyond the socialization that occurs within these institutions, it is also likely that individuals select into these institutions based on what ideas and interests they feel dedicated to. Therefore, those in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor are likely to be vigilant about the implementation and promotion of these ideas in US foreign policy. The Bureau of Counterterrorism is likely to have different priorities.

The test of how US identity is incorporated into US foreign policy here may have therefore captured not only US national identity but also the role that individuals within the State Department and USAID (who have significantly more influence than other actors) see for themselves. The State Department is traditionally the institution that favors diplomacy and a measured response to international affairs that takes into account the cultural and political nuances of various regions and countries. USAID is dedicated to lifting up the impoverished. A test of the incorporation of US values into other US policies, such as bilateral military agreements or international intervention, may demonstrate that values are disregarded much more readily than they are in the realm of US foreign aid allocation due to a different institutional context. However, it should be noted that the State Department consults US military leaders and institutions when it allocates US military aid. Thus, even with the strong influence of US institutions that have allegedly not been concerned with US values, US values still have

significant effects on policy. Nevertheless, analyses of how interests and values collide should be extended to other issue areas that are generally outside the purview of the State Department and USAID to ensure that the hierarchy in the prioritization of values remains largely consistent.

Another question that this dissertation does not address is the issue of identity change. The analysis of US national identity here was an analysis of contemporary US national identity. The NARA documents that were analyzed were compiled in the early 2000's. The textbooks that served as robustness checks for coding were the latest available editions. The SOTU Addresses that were studied were from the early 1900's onward. The individual-level analysis focused on individuals alive and in the present-day. The analysis of US foreign aid looked at US military aid allocations from 1976 to 2006. At most, the picture of US national identity presented here represents contemporary US national identity that has been relatively consistent for the past half century. It was for this reason that the investigation into US identity's correspondence with US policy was concerned with policymaking during this same period.

US national identity has certainly changed. The NARA documents demonstrate this change. Humanitarianism as a value does not become ubiquitous until much later in US history. The value of human rights does not have a strong presence until the post-War period. We would only expect a certain writing of US national identity to correspond to US policy when the two are contemporaneous with each other. Thus, if US identity changes we would expect the incorporation of values into US foreign policy to change as well.

President Trump: Remaking US National Identity?

The discussion of US identity change brings us to the question of the Trump Presidency. As stated at the outset of this chapter, Trump's rhetoric and policies seem diametrically opposed

to what many consider (and this project considers) the prevailing portrait of US national identity and its associated values. Is US national identity undergoing some sort of change? Was this picture of US national identity inaccurate in the first place? To the latter I argue no, given the vast amount of evidence resulting from the Trump Presidency that the current picture of US national identity is the prevailing one. To the former, I argue possibly but it is still too early to tell and there is historical evidence indicating that it is unlikely.

It is important to mention that President Trump still exhibits many values imbedded in US national identity. His discussions of race and the rule of law clearly demonstrate some affinity for a tacit sort of white supremacy. His campaign's policy prescriptions with respect to ISIS and Iran show his attraction to US militarism. These are consistent with the white supremacist and action orientation values that are a part of US national identity, although these make up a relatively small part of US national identity.

The greater concern is that much of what President Trump says and advocates for does seem to inherently contradict major US national values. Here, the contrast between President Obama and President Trump is illustrative. In President Obama's first inaugural address, he spoke about liberty, US freedoms, and the historical struggle to gain these freedoms (Obama 2009). Trump only mentions "freedom" once, in the context of praising the US military (Trump 2017). President Obama discusses the collective responsibility of the nation to each other *and* global humanity. President Trump does not and argues that the nation will advance its own interests. He also extolls national loyalty. Clearly, there is a difference here. Perhaps Obama was the aberration? Not so. President Bush speaks even more highly of democracy in his inaugural address than President Obama (Bush 2001). Additionally, the analysis of SOTU addresses in

Chapter 3 demonstrates that democratic, humanitarian, and progressive values are common and relatively consistent across presidential administrations. President Trump is an abnormality.

However, the very recognition that President Trump is an aberration is a validation of the prevailing picture of US national identity. President Trump has provoked an enormous amount of writing dedicated to criticizing him and his Administration in light of US national identity.[75] The refrain repeated by members of the public and government officials: "This is not normal," perfectly encapsulates the chief complaint with President Trump: He is a deviation from what we've come to expect from the President of the US.[76]

If President Trump and his administration do differ from or contradict US national identity in fundamental ways, is this evidence of a change in US national identity? This is possible, but should be approached with caution. It is pertinent to remember that President Trump *did not* win a plurality of the national vote and that President Trump's approval rating has been at a historic low at this early juncture in his presidency (Wilson 2018). This evidence demonstrates at least some ambivalence to President Trump's ideas and policies even while measures of US economic well-being improve. It is still early in the Trump Presidency, but his controversial status and general unpopularity might make us question whether or not the general population or the political elite are embracing President Trump's ideas.

We might also be critical of the notion that Trump represents identity change when there exists another historical analogue: Nixon and Kissinger. Like President Trump, the Nixon Administration strongly endorsed order and loyalty to the nation. Kissinger eschewed discussion

[75] It is very difficult to capture the most influential of this commentary because as of this writing new events happen nearly every week that provoke this kind of critique of the Trump Administration. Weiland (2017) writing in *The New York Times* and Hunt (2018) writing in *Bloomberg View* accurately capture the tenor of many of these pieces.
[76] This mantra was recently repeated by former FBI director James Comey when he said that Trump threatened "core American values" (Inskeep 2018).

of morals or ethics in the conduct of US foreign policy. Yet, rather than being embraced by the nation, Kissinger and Nixon often complained about being hampered by other US institutions, including the foreign policymaking bureaucracy (Grandin 2015). At every instance, Nixon and Kissinger would actively undermine and ridicule those in the foreign policymaking apparatus who disagreed with their brutal and even genocidal foreign policy.[77] Once again, the fact that these actors felt so obstructed and were exceedingly controversial demonstrates their dissimilarities to prevailing notions of US values rather than a shifting of US national identity.

The fact that a majority of Americans reject President Trump's ideas, that he is exceedingly controversial, and that there are clear historical analogues that did not manifest in a changed US national identity should make us weary of claims that President Trump represents a new era in US national identity and US values. This does not mean that US national identity is immune to change. On the contrary, there is a great amount of constructivist literature dedicated to examining instances of how national identity is re-written and re-constructed. The most common explanation for identity change is that exogenous shocks create new openings and possibilities for interpreting the nation's history and legacy. Thus, the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed Russia to revive a sense of national pride connected to the historical Russian Empire (Tsygankov 2016). The same is true for many post-Soviet Republics (Roper 2008). In the US case, its interactions with indigenous populations that prompted its expansion West clearly led to the development of a national identity that embodied humanitarian and white supremacist aspects of the "White man's burden." It is unclear what could currently be described as a similar

[77] Notable instances of Kissinger and Nixon either complaining about others in the State Department or undermining them including US support for Pinochet, where Kissinger referred to those in the State Department as "people who have a vocation for the ministry," and US support for Pakistan as it committed genocide in what is now Bangladesh, where Kissinger mocked those who "bleed" for the "dying Bengalis" and actively tried to crush dissent within the Administration (Kornbluh 2013; Bass 2013).

internal or external development that allows for a similarly drastic re-writing of US national identity, although sometimes these shocks and developments are more apparent in retrospect.

What is clear from what we presently know is this: policymakers make choices based on their national identity but quickly jettison parts of their national identity when convenient. If we, as Americans actually care about these values: democracy, humanitarianism, progress, human rights etc. then we might find the quick disregard for these values unacceptable. This is especially true for the lesser parts of our identity, like human rights and humanitarianism. Are we too comfortable with these US values being completely undermined by even relatively parochial national interests? The best way to combat such tendencies may be to recognize the problem: our own cognitive biases. Only by questioning ourselves and our instinctive interpretation of international events can we better understand when our disregard for our values is based on confronting serious threats or international problems and when it is based on cognitive biases that have taught us to privilege our cognitive comfort over the rights of others. It is after this recognition that we can begin to pressure policymakers in order ensure that the values we hold dear as Americans are given their appropriate space in the conduct of US foreign policy.

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